QUESTIONS A...: LA CRISE ET LE G-20
In: Utopie critique: revue internationale pour l'autogestion, Heft 50, S. 9-18
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In: Utopie critique: revue internationale pour l'autogestion, Heft 50, S. 9-18
In: Economia e sociedade: revista do Instituto de Economia da UNICAMP, Band 17, Heft spe, S. 575-610
ISSN: 1982-3533, 0104-0618
Fragmented payment systems are a major obstacle to financial integration at the regional and international levels. The European Union has launched ambitious policies for the ceation of common payment systems among its country members. Significant results have been achieved in some aspects, but one can say that the European Union is still largely caracterised by fragmented payment systems. This means that one of the basic conditions for financial integration is not fullfilled in the European Union. The purpose of this paper is, in the first place, to present the situation of the different payment systems in the European Union (I), and then, to draw lessons from the European experience for financial integration and payment systems in Asia (II).
BASE
Fragmented payment systems are a major obstacle to financial integration at the regional and international levels. The European Union has launched ambitious policies for the ceation of common payment systems among its country members. Significant results have been achieved in some aspects, but one can say that the European Union is still largely caracterised by fragmented payment systems. This means that one of the basic conditions for financial integration is not fullfilled in the European Union. The purpose of this paper is, in the first place, to present the situation of the different payment systems in the European Union (I), and then, to draw lessons from the European experience for financial integration and payment systems in Asia (II).
BASE
Fragmented payment systems are a major obstacle to financial integration at the regional and international levels. The European Union has launched ambitious policies for the ceation of common payment systems among its country members. Significant results have been achieved in some aspects, but one can say that the European Union is still largely caracterised by fragmented payment systems. This means that one of the basic conditions for financial integration is not fullfilled in the European Union. The purpose of this paper is, in the first place, to present the situation of the different payment systems in the European Union (I), and then, to draw lessons from the European experience for financial integration and payment systems in Asia (II).
BASE
This article provides insight into the future of financial markets and regulation in order to define what would be the best strategy for Europe. To preserve financial stability, Europe has to choose between financial opening and independently determining how to regulate finance. Among the five scenarios we defined, three achieve financial stability both inside and outside Europe. In terms of market efficiency, the multi-polar scenario is the best and the fragmentation scenario is the worst, since gains of integration depend on the size of the new capital market. Regarding sovereignty of regulation, fragmentation is the best scenario and the multi-polar scenario is the worst because it necessitates coordination at the global level which implies moving further away from respective national preferences. However, the more realistic option seems to be the regionalisation scenario: (i) this level of coordination seems much more realistic than the global one; (ii) the market should be of sufficient size to enjoy substantial benefits of integration. Nevertheless, the "European government" might gradually increase the degree of financial integration outside Europe in line with the degree of cooperation with the rest of the world.
BASE
This article provides insight into the future of financial markets and regulation in order to define what would be the best strategy for Europe. To preserve financial stability, Europe has to choose between financial opening and independently determining how to regulate finance. Among the five scenarios we defined, three achieve financial stability both inside and outside Europe. In terms of market efficiency, the multi-polar scenario is the best and the fragmentation scenario is the worst, since gains of integration depend on the size of the new capital market. Regarding sovereignty of regulation, fragmentation is the best scenario and the multi-polar scenario is the worst because it necessitates coordination at the global level which implies moving further away from respective national preferences. However, the more realistic option seems to be the regionalisation scenario: (i) this level of coordination seems much more realistic than the global one; (ii) the market should be of sufficient size to enjoy substantial benefits of integration. Nevertheless, the "European government" might gradually increase the degree of financial integration outside Europe in line with the degree of cooperation with the rest of the world.
BASE
This article provides insight into the future of financial markets and regulation in order to define what would be the best strategy for Europe. To preserve financial stability, Europe has to choose between financial opening and independently determining how to regulate finance. Among the five scenarios we defined, three achieve financial stability both inside and outside Europe. In terms of market efficiency, the multi-polar scenario is the best and the fragmentation scenario is the worst, since gains of integration depend on the size of the new capital market. Regarding sovereignty of regulation, fragmentation is the best scenario and the multi-polar scenario is the worst because it necessitates coordination at the global level which implies moving further away from respective national preferences. However, the more realistic option seems to be the regionalisation scenario: (i) this level of coordination seems much more realistic than the global one; (ii) the market should be of sufficient size to enjoy substantial benefits of integration. Nevertheless, the "European government" might gradually increase the degree of financial integration outside Europe in line with the degree of cooperation with the rest of the world.
BASE
La récurrence récente des épisodes de crises bancaires dans les pays émergents a suscité une abondante littérature. Les analyses les plus répandues tendent à négliger le rôle des institutions dans l'explication des épisodes d'instabilité financière dans des régions comme l'Amérique Latine et l'Asie. Dans la dynamique des crises, des facteurs d'ordre institutionnel semblent interagir entre eux, ainsi qu'avec les politiques de libéralisation financière. Cet article, en utilisant la base de données du MINEFI, « Profils institutionnels », examine le rôle de la qualité des institutions dans les crises bancaires récentes. L'hypothèse de base est qu'une structure institutionnelle peu développée renforce les mécanismes incitatifs à la prise de risque excessif. Plus précisément, on analyse au moyen d'une modélisation Logit sur un échantillon de 51 pays en coupe transversale en 2001, l'impact de l'environnement réglementaire, public, juridique et politique. L'examen empirique permet de valider une relation économique non triviale entre qualité des institutions et dynamique de crises bancaires systémiques.
BASE
La récurrence récente des épisodes de crises bancaires dans les pays émergents a suscité une abondante littérature. Les analyses les plus répandues tendent à négliger le rôle des institutions dans l'explication des épisodes d'instabilité financière dans des régions comme l'Amérique Latine et l'Asie. Dans la dynamique des crises, des facteurs d'ordre institutionnel semblent interagir entre eux, ainsi qu'avec les politiques de libéralisation financière. Cet article, en utilisant la base de données du MINEFI, « Profils institutionnels », examine le rôle de la qualité des institutions dans les crises bancaires récentes. L'hypothèse de base est qu'une structure institutionnelle peu développée renforce les mécanismes incitatifs à la prise de risque excessif. Plus précisément, on analyse au moyen d'une modélisation Logit sur un échantillon de 51 pays en coupe transversale en 2001, l'impact de l'environnement réglementaire, public, juridique et politique. L'examen empirique permet de valider une relation économique non triviale entre qualité des institutions et dynamique de crises bancaires systémiques.
BASE
La récurrence récente des épisodes de crises bancaires dans les pays émergents a suscité une abondante littérature. Les analyses les plus répandues tendent à négliger le rôle des institutions dans l'explication des épisodes d'instabilité financière dans des régions comme l'Amérique Latine et l'Asie. Dans la dynamique des crises, des facteurs d'ordre institutionnel semblent interagir entre eux, ainsi qu'avec les politiques de libéralisation financière. Cet article, en utilisant la base de données du MINEFI, « Profils institutionnels », examine le rôle de la qualité des institutions dans les crises bancaires récentes. L'hypothèse de base est qu'une structure institutionnelle peu développée renforce les mécanismes incitatifs à la prise de risque excessif. Plus précisément, on analyse au moyen d'une modélisation Logit sur un échantillon de 51 pays en coupe transversale en 2001, l'impact de l'environnement réglementaire, public, juridique et politique. L'examen empirique permet de valider une relation économique non triviale entre qualité des institutions et dynamique de crises bancaires systémiques.
BASE
In: Alternatives Économiques, Band 302, Heft 5, S. 10-10
In: Alternatives Économiques, Band 234, Heft 3, S. 66-66
In: Le monde diplomatique, Band 49, Heft 574, S. 8-11
ISSN: 0026-9395, 1147-2766