Suchergebnisse

We revisit the Tragedy of the Commons in an dynamic overlapping generations economy peopled of shepherds who decide how many sheepthey let graze on a common parcel of land, while relying on di fferent forms of rationality (Nash players, Pure or Impure Kantian players). Weexamine the dynamics of heterogeneity and land congestion when the prevalance of those di fferent forms of rationality evolves over time follow-ing a vertical/oblique socialization process a la Bisin and Verdier (2001).We study the impacts of a quota and of a tax on the congestion of land, and we show that introducing a quota may, in some cases, reduce theproportion of Kantians (Pure and Impure), and worsen the Tragedy of Commons with respect to the laissez-faire. Finally, we examine whethera government should promote either a Pure or an Impure Kantian morality, by comparing the relative fi tness of Pure/Impure Kantians, and theirinteractions with the congestion of land.

We revisit the Tragedy of the Commons in an dynamic overlapping generations economy peopled of shepherds who decide how many sheepthey let graze on a common parcel of land, while relying on di fferent forms of rationality (Nash players, Pure or Impure Kantian players). Weexamine the dynamics of heterogeneity and land congestion when the prevalance of those di fferent forms of rationality evolves over time follow-ing a vertical/oblique socialization process a la Bisin and Verdier (2001).We study the impacts of a quota and of a tax on the congestion of land, and we show that introducing a quota may, in some cases, reduce theproportion of Kantians (Pure and Impure), and worsen the Tragedy of Commons with respect to the laissez-faire. Finally, we examine whethera government should promote either a Pure or an Impure Kantian morality, by comparing the relative fi tness of Pure/Impure Kantians, and theirinteractions with the congestion of land.

We revisit the Tragedy of the Commons in an dynamic overlapping generations economy peopled of shepherds who decide how many sheepthey let graze on a common parcel of land, while relying on di fferent forms of rationality (Nash players, Pure or Impure Kantian players). Weexamine the dynamics of heterogeneity and land congestion when the prevalance of those di fferent forms of rationality evolves over time follow-ing a vertical/oblique socialization process a la Bisin and Verdier (2001).We study the impacts of a quota and of a tax on the congestion of land, and we show that introducing a quota may, in some cases, reduce theproportion of Kantians (Pure and Impure), and worsen the Tragedy of Commons with respect to the laissez-faire. Finally, we examine whethera government should promote either a Pure or an Impure Kantian morality, by comparing the relative fi tness of Pure/Impure Kantians, and theirinteractions with the congestion of land.

We revisit the Tragedy of the Commons in an dynamic overlapping generations economy peopled of shepherds who decide how many sheepthey let graze on a common parcel of land, while relying on di fferent forms of rationality (Nash players, Pure or Impure Kantian players). Weexamine the dynamics of heterogeneity and land congestion when the prevalance of those di fferent forms of rationality evolves over time follow-ing a vertical/oblique socialization process a la Bisin and Verdier (2001).We study the impacts of a quota and of a tax on the congestion of land, and we show that introducing a quota may, in some cases, reduce theproportion of Kantians (Pure and Impure), and worsen the Tragedy of Commons with respect to the laissez-faire. Finally, we examine whethera government should promote either a Pure or an Impure Kantian morality, by comparing the relative fi tness of Pure/Impure Kantians, and theirinteractions with the congestion of land.

We revisit the Tragedy of the Commons in an dynamic overlapping generations economy peopled of shepherds who decide how many sheepthey let graze on a common parcel of land, while relying on di fferent forms of rationality (Nash players, Pure or Impure Kantian players). Weexamine the dynamics of heterogeneity and land congestion when the prevalance of those di fferent forms of rationality evolves over time follow-ing a vertical/oblique socialization process a la Bisin and Verdier (2001).We study the impacts of a quota and of a tax on the congestion of land, and we show that introducing a quota may, in some cases, reduce theproportion of Kantians (Pure and Impure), and worsen the Tragedy of Commons with respect to the laissez-faire. Finally, we examine whethera government should promote either a Pure or an Impure Kantian morality, by comparing the relative fi tness of Pure/Impure Kantians, and theirinteractions with the congestion of land.

We revisit the Tragedy of the Commons in an dynamic overlapping generations economy peopled of shepherds who decide how many sheepthey let graze on a common parcel of land, while relying on di fferent forms of rationality (Nash players, Pure or Impure Kantian players). Weexamine the dynamics of heterogeneity and land congestion when the prevalance of those di fferent forms of rationality evolves over time follow-ing a vertical/oblique socialization process a la Bisin and Verdier (2001).We study the impacts of a quota and of a tax on the congestion of land, and we show that introducing a quota may, in some cases, reduce theproportion of Kantians (Pure and Impure), and worsen the Tragedy of Commons with respect to the laissez-faire. Finally, we examine whethera government should promote either a Pure or an Impure Kantian morality, by comparing the relative fi tness of Pure/Impure Kantians, and theirinteractions with the congestion of land.

Under the existing marriage contracts, the default length of a marriage is the total remaining lifespan of the spouses. This paper aims at questioning the standard long-term marriage contracts by exploring the conditions under which short-term contracts would be more desirable. Using a two-period collective household model, we show that, under general conditions on individual preferences and household production technology, short-term marriage contracts, if available, would dominate long-term contracts. Moreover, the recent equalization of bargaining power within the household is shown to make short-term contracts even more desirable than in the past.

One of the greatest success stories in our societies is that people are living longer, life expectancy at birth being now above 80 years. Whereas the lengthening of life opens huge opportunities for individuals if extra years are spent in prosperity and good health, it is however often regarded as a source of problems for policy-makers. The goal of this paper is to examine the key policy challenges raised by increasing longevity. For that purpose, we first pay attention to the representation of individual preferences, and to the normative foundations of the economy, and, then, we consider the challenges raised for the design of the social security system, pension policies, preventive health policies, the provision of long term care, as well as for long-run economic growth.

One of the greatest success stories in our societies is that people are living longer, life expectancy at birth being now above 80 years. Whereas the lengthening of life opens huge opportunities for individuals if extra years are spent in prosperity and good health, it is however often regarded as a source of problems for policy-makers. The goal of this paper is to examine the key policy challenges raised by increasing longevity. For that purpose, we first pay attention to the representation of individual preferences, and to the normative foundations of the economy, and, then, we consider the challenges raised for the design of the social security system, pension policies, preventive health policies, the provision of long term care, as well as for long-run economic growth.

One of the greatest success stories in our societies is that people are living longer, life expectancy at birth being now above 80 years. Whereas the lengthening of life opens huge opportunities for individuals if extra years are spent in prosperity and good health, it is however often regarded as a source of problems for policy-makers. The goal of this paper is to examine the key policy challenges raised by increasing longevity. For that purpose, we first pay attention to the representation of individual preferences, and to the normative foundations of the economy, and, then, we consider the challenges raised for the design of the social security system, pension policies, preventive health policies, the provision of long term care, as well as for long-run economic growth.

One of the greatest success stories in our societies is that people are living longer, life expectancy at birth being now above 80 years. Whereas the lengthening of life opens huge opportunities for individuals if extra years are spent in prosperity and good health, it is however often regarded as a source of problems for policy-makers. The goal of this paper is to examine the key policy challenges raised by increasing longevity. For that purpose, we first pay attention to the representation of individual preferences, and to the normative foundations of the economy, and, then, we consider the challenges raised for the design of the social security system, pension policies, preventive health policies, the provision of long term care, as well as for long-run economic growth.

One of the greatest success stories in our societies is that people are living longer, life expectancy at birth being now above 80 years. Whereas the lengthening of life opens huge opportunities for individuals if extra years are spent in prosperity and good health, it is however often regarded as a source of problems for policy-makers. The goal of this paper is to examine the key policy challenges raised by increasing longevity. For that purpose, we first pay attention to the representation of individual preferences, and to the normative foundations of the economy, and, then, we consider the challenges raised for the design of the social security system, pension policies, preventive health policies, the provision of long term care, as well as for long-run economic growth.

Although the optimal policy under endogenous fertility has been widely studied, the optimal public intervention under endogenous childbearing age has remained largely unexplored. This paper examines the optimal family policy in a context where the number and the timing of births are chosen by individuals who differ as to how early fertility can weaken future earnings growth. We analyze the design of a policy of family allowances and of public pensions in such a setting, under distinct informational environments. We show how endogenous childbearing ages affect the optimalpolicy, through the redistribution across the earnings dimension and the internalization of fertility externalities. It is also shown that, contrary to common practice, children benefits differentiated according to the age of parents can, under some conditions, be part of the optimal family policy.

Although the optimal policy under endogenous fertility has been widely studied, the optimal public intervention under endogenous childbearing age has remained largely unexplored. This paper examines the optimal family policy in a context where the number and the timing of births are chosen by individuals who differ as to how early fertility can weaken future earnings growth. We analyze the design of a policy of family allowances and of public pensions in such a setting, under distinct informational environments. We show how endogenous childbearing ages affect the optimalpolicy, through the redistribution across the earnings dimension and the internalization of fertility externalities. It is also shown that, contrary to common practice, children benefits differentiated according to the age of parents can, under some conditions, be part of the optimal family policy.

Although the optimal policy under endogenous fertility has been widely studied, the optimal public intervention under endogenous childbearing age has remained largely unexplored. This paper examines the optimal family policy in a context where the number and the timing of births are chosen by individuals who differ as to how early fertility can weaken future earnings growth. We analyze the design of a policy of family allowances and of public pensions in such a setting, under distinct informational environments. We show how endogenous childbearing ages affect the optimalpolicy, through the redistribution across the earnings dimension and the internalization of fertility externalities. It is also shown that, contrary to common practice, children benefits differentiated according to the age of parents can, under some conditions, be part of the optimal family policy.