Government ideology and economic policy-making in the United States—a survey
In: Public choice, Band 174, Heft 1-2, S. 145-207
ISSN: 1573-7101
382 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
In: Public choice, Band 174, Heft 1-2, S. 145-207
ISSN: 1573-7101
This paper describes the role of government ideology on economic policy-making in the United States. I consider studies using data for the national, state and local level and elaborate on checks and balances, especially divided government, measurement of government ideology and empirical strategies to identify causal effects. Many studies conclude that parties do matter in the United States. Democratic presidents generate, for example, higher economic growth than Republican presidents, but these studies using data for the national level do not derive causal effects. Ideology-induced policies are prevalent at the state level: Democratic governors implement somewhat more expansionary and liberal policies than Republican governors. At the local level, government ideology hardly influences economic policymaking. How increasing political polarization and demographic change will influence the role of government ideology on economic policy-making will be an important issue for future research.
BASE
In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 6444
SSRN
Working paper
This paper describes the empirical evidence on partisan politics in OECD panel studies. I elaborate on the research designs, the measurement of government ideology and why the empirical studies do not and cannot derive causal effects. Discussing about 100 panel data studies, the results indicate that leftwing and rightwing governments pursued different economic policies until the 1990s: the size and scope of government was larger when leftwing governments were in power. Partisan politics have not disappeared since the 1990s, but have certainly become less pronounced. In particular, government ideology still seems to influence policies such as privatization and market deregulation. I discuss the consequences of declining electoral cohesion and what future research needs to explore.
BASE
In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 6024
SSRN
Working paper
Niklas Potrafke setzt sich in seinem Kommentar mit der Kritik am Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung auseinander.
BASE
In: The World Economy, Band 38, Heft 3, S. 509-552
SSRN
SSRN
Working paper
In: European Journal of Political Economy, Band 31, S. 180-187
In: Public choice, Band 154, Heft 3-4, S. 323-332
ISSN: 1573-7101
Nach Ansicht von Niklas Potrafke wird durch die große Koalition die Staatstätigkeit kräftig ausweitet. Dieser sich abzeichnende Politikwechsel sei aber problematisch, da sich die Mehrheit der deutschen Wähler keinen größeren Einfluss des Staates gewünscht hätten.
BASE
I investigate minority votes in the German Council of Economic Experts. The dataset contains information on the voting behavior of the council members over the period 1971–2011. The results show that the best predictor of minority voting is being nominated by the trade unions: a council member nominated by the trade unions isabout 70 percentage points more likely to vote against the majority opinion of the German Council of Economic Experts. This voting pattern indicates that the channel of political appointment influences voting behavior.
BASE
Principal-agent problems can arise when preferences of voters are not aligned with preferences of political representatives. Often the consequence of the political principal-agent problem is political catering to special interests. In this paper I provide examples of principal-agent problems regarding public spending. The examples concern construction or extension of concert halls in two German cities. Resistance to public funding for the concert halls was particularly strong in electoral districts with large constituencies on the left. The evidence indicates that political representatives were more bourgeois than their constituencies. In the cases studied asymmetric information did not prevail and voters were able to discipline their representatives through referenda that countered the results of voting by political representatives.
BASE
I investigate empirically the role of religion and political institutions in policies against human trafficking, using the new 3P Anti-trafficking Policy Index. The dataset contains 175 countries. The results show that governments in countries with Christian majorities implement stricter anti-trafficking policies than countries with Muslim majorities. The differences between countries with Christian and Muslim majorities is pronounced in dictatorships but less so in democracies. The influence of religion on the overall 3P Anti-trafficking Policy Index is driven by protection and prevention policies. As compared to prosecution policies that mainly target the perpetrators of human trafficking, protection and prevention policies mainly protect the victims of human trafficking, i.e. predominantly women. The conclusions are consistent with other empirical findings regarding the association between religion, political institutions, and human development.
BASE
Principal-agent problems can arise when preferences of voters are not aligned with preferences of political representatives. Often the consequence of the political principalagentproblem is political catering to special interests. In this paper I provide examples of principal-agent problems regarding public spending. The examples concern construction or extension of concert halls in two German cities. Resistance to public funding for the concert halls was particularly strong in electoral districts with large constituencieson the left. The evidence indicates that political representatives were more bourgeois than their constituencies. In the cases studied asymmetric information did not prevailand voters were able to discipline their representatives through referenda that countered the results of voting by political representatives.
BASE