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Relationships between friendly nations are generally characterized by mutual `responsiveness,' ie, a mutual willingness to make concessions where the other nation has strong needs. Results from an interview study in the Dept of State are presented which suggest that responsiveness is a conscious policy, located in certain gov agencies, & deriving from the goals & ways of viewing things characteristic of these agencies. A partially mathematical theoretical section is included in which responsiveness is treated as a `strategy' in a `larger game' embracing all future interactions between 2 parties. Each player's responsiveness is assumed to be a function of the other player's responsiveness & the comparative fate control of the 2 players. This formulation implies a Richardson Process, which is described briefly. AA.

Literature on power differentials within mediation sessions has indicated that when power imbalances are too great, mediation is not the proper venue for the resolution of these disputes. However, when there is not an incapacitating imbalance, it is possible that mediators can take steps to rectify this situation. A field study was conducted at two community dispute settlement centers in New York State, with the proceedings of 73 actual cases transcribed and then coded to: (1) determine the impact of unequal power on the outcome of interpersonal mediation; (2) examine how mediators deal with unequal power; (3) assess the impact of mediator efforts to balance power discrepancies, and (4) determine the impact of disputant characteristics on differences in power and outcome. It was found that the mediators in the present study did attempt to remedy power imbalances: by encouraging the more passive disputant to participate more in the hearing by criticizing aggressive disputants, and by asking embarrassing questions of more argumentative disputants and those taking a determined principled stance. However, contrary to expectations, it was found that mediator efforts to balance power discrepancies were not successful, power discrepancies did not lead to unequal agreements, and being a female or a minority did not lead to an unfair outcome.

This research concerned preference and choice among six procedures commonly used to resolve disputes. Two experiments revealed that, compared to complainants, respondents liked inaction and disliked arbitration. However, the most striking findings concerned general preferences among the procedures: consensual procedures (negotiation, mediation, and advisory‐arbitration) were best liked, followed by arbitration, with inaction and struggle least liked. Further analysis suggested that perceptions of self‐interest and societal norms underlie these procedural preferences, with the latter perceptions apparently more important. An examination of choices among the procedures revealed that negotiation was by far the most common first choice of action. If negotiation failed to resolve the conflict, the following escalative sequence of actions was typically endorsed: mediation, then advisory arbitration, then arbitration, and finally struggle.

Purpose
– The purpose of this paper is to compare and contrast two formal models of escalation and de-escalation: the attractor landscape model and the S-shaped reaction function model. Also, the paper aims to enumerate conditions that affect the shape and location of reaction functions and, hence, the stability of less and more escalated states.


Design/methodology/approach
– Both models are presented together with geometric proofs of the main assertions of the second model. Overlap and comparative strengths of the models are reviewed. Parts of the social science literature are synthesized in a discussion of the antecedents of stability.


Findings
– Though derived from totally different traditions, these models are similar in their basic assumptions and predictions. Each model has value. The attractor landscape model is easier to grasp and contains a concept of resistance to escalation that is not found in the S-shaped reaction function model. The latter model looks at individual parties rather than the dyad as a whole and, thus, offers an explanation for most of the phenomena described by the former model. It also allows identification of many variables that affect the shape and location of reaction functions and, hence, can be viewed as antecedents of escalation and de-escalation.


Research limitations/implications
– Seven testable hypotheses are presented in the Conclusions section. Laboratory tasks for testing such hypotheses have yet to be developed and there is only one study employing real-life measures. However, it is clear that once research on these phenomena really begins, new variables will be found that moderate the strength of the effects hypothesized.


Practical implications
– The models provide concepts for thinking about how to avoid runaway escalation and promote runaway de-escalation. The variables mentioned in the hypotheses suggest ways to diminish the likelihood of runaway escalation and can also be used for constructing measures of the likelihood of that phenomenon. The theories also imply that when the likelihood of runaway escalation increases, disputants should be doubly careful to avoid initiating escalative behavior.


Originality/value
– The article is original in that the S-shaped reaction function model is refined and further developed and the proofs are new. The comparison between the models is also new, as is most of the enumeration of conditions affecting the stability of low and high escalation. The value of the article is to provide concepts and theory for thinking about escalation and de-escalation, and testable hypotheses for studying these phenomena.

A simulated price war between two competing gas stations provided the context to assess the effects on de‐escalation of the subject's financial shortage, the competitor's financial shortage, and a message from the competitor conveying a non‐exploitative intent. Subject shortages encouraged gasoline price increases (de‐escalation) and competitor shortages encouraged price decreases (escalation). Subjects who were suffering a financial shortage rated their competitor as less likely to cooperate and more likely to exploit them than those who were not. Results were discussed in terms of a simplification of Pruitt and Kimmel's (1977) goal‐expectation hypothesis. One possible explanation for our results is that subjects make a comparison of relative strength before choosing either to de‐escalate or escalate.