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This paper examines the uneven geography of COVID-19-related excess mortality during the first wave of the pandemic in Europe, before assessing the factors behind the geographical differences in impact. The analysis of 206 regions across 23 European countries reveals a distinct COVID-19 geography. Excess deaths were concentrated in a limited number of regions—expected deaths exceeded 20% in just 16 regions—with more than 40% of the regions considered experiencing no excess mortality during the first 6 months of 2020. Highly connected regions, in colder and dryer climates, with high air pollution levels, and relatively poorly endowed health systems witnessed the highest incidence of excess mortality. Institutional factors also played an important role. The first wave hit regions with a combination of weak and declining formal institutional quality and fragile informal institutions hardest. Low and declining national government effectiveness, together with a limited capacity to reach out across societal divides, and a frequent tendency to meet with friends and family were powerful drivers of regional excess mortality.

Local institutions have long been regarded as key drivers of economic development. However, little is known about the role of institutions in preparing places to cope with public health crises and pandemics. This paper sheds light on how the nature of a local institution, city autonomy, influenced variations in the incidence of the Black Death —possibly the worst pandemic ever recorded— across cities in Western Europe between 1347 and 1352. We examine urban autonomy not only because it represented a major political shift in medieval times, but because, more importantly, it also represents a key prototype of modern political institution. By exploiting data on the spatial variation of Black Death's mortality rates and duration using OLS and 2SLS methods, we uncover that city autonomy reduced mortality rates by, on average, almost 10 percent. Autonomous cities were in a better position to adopt swift and efficient measures against the pandemic than those governed by remote kings and emperors. This relationship has been confirmed by a series of placebo tests and robustness checks. In contrast, there is no evidence to suggest that city autonomy was a factor in reducing the duration of the pandemic in European cities.

This paper examines the uneven geography of COVID‐19‐related excess mortality during the first wave of the pandemic in Europe, before assessing the factors behind the geographical differences in impact. The analysis of 206 regions across 23 European countries reveals a distinct COVID‐19 geography. Excess deaths were concentrated in a limited number of regions—expected deaths exceeded 20% in just 16 regions—with more than 40% of the regions considered experiencing no excess mortality during the first 6 months of 2020. Highly connected regions, in colder and dryer climates, with high air pollution levels, and relatively poorly endowed health systems witnessed the highest incidence of excess mortality. Institutional factors also played an important role. The first wave hit regions with a combination of weak and declining formal institutional quality and fragile informal institutions hardest. Low and declining national government effectiveness, together with a limited capacity to reach out across societal divides, and a frequent tendency to meet with friends and family were powerful drivers of regional excess mortality.

AbstractThis paper looks at the divergent economic trajectories of Barcelona and Madrid since Spain's transition to democracy. It highlights how Barcelona, the city that was better positioned four decades ago to emerge as the main Spanish economic hub, has lost out to Madrid. We argue that the contrasting trajectories of the two cities have less to do with the pull of Madrid as the capital of Spain, with the development of new infrastructure in the country, or with agglomeration economies, and more with institutional factors. A growing societal divide in Barcelona along economic, social, and identity lines has led to a greater breakdown of trust and to the development of strong groups with limited capacity to bridge with one another than in Madrid. This has entailed the emergence of negative externalities that have limited the economic potential for growth in Barcelona and facilitated the rise of Madrid as the main economic hub within Spain.

This paper looks at the divergent economic trajectories of Barcelona and Madrid since Spain's transition to democracy. It highlights how Barcelona, the city that was better positioned four decades ago to emerge as the main Spanish economic hub, has lost out to Madrid. We argue that the contrasting trajectories of the two cities have less to do with the pull of Madrid as the capital of Spain, with the development of new infrastructure in the country, or with agglomeration economies, and more with institutional factors. A growing societal divide in Barcelona along economic, social, and identity lines has led to a greater breakdown of trust and to the development of strong groups with limited capacity to bridge with one another than in Madrid. This has entailed the emergence of negative externalities that have limited the economic potential for growth in Barcelona and facilitated the rise of Madrid as the main economic hub within Spain.

The aim of this paper is to assess the extent to which different levels of decentralisation across regions of the European Union (EU) affected citizens' perceptions about European integration over the period 1973-2002. The paper uses Eurobarometer Surveys to explore by means of multinomial logistic regressions whether decentralisation was an important factor behind the varying perceptions about Europe. Two dimensions of decentralization-political and fiscal-are considered in the analysis, alongside several compositional and contextual effects. The results of the analysis show that fiscal decentralisation was fundamental for citizens' support for European integration, while there is limited evidence that political decentralisation played a similar role. Hence, while fiscal decentralisation may have given prominence to the economic benefits of European integration, political decentralisation was more associated with its economic costs. Taking into account that history matters, this paper raises potentially interesting insights for the design of policies aimed at promoting social cohesion.

The aim of this paper is to assess the extent to which different levels of decentralisation across regions of the European Union (EU) affected citizens' perceptions about European integration over the period 1973-2002. The paper uses Eurobarometer Surveys to explore by means of multinomial logistic regressions whether decentralisation was an important factor behind the varying perceptions about Europe. Two dimensions of decentralization-political and fiscal-are considered in the analysis, alongside several compositional and contextual effects. The results of the analysis show that fiscal decentralisation was fundamental for citizens' support for European integration, while there is limited evidence that political decentralisation played a similar role. Hence, while fiscal decentralisation may have given prominence to the economic benefits of European integration, political decentralisation was more associated with its economic costs. Taking into account that history matters, this paper raises potentially interesting insights for the design of policies aimed at promoting social cohesion.

The aim of this paper is to assess the extent to which different levels of decentralisation across regions of the European Union (EU) affected citizens' perceptions about European integration over the period 1973-2002. The paper uses Eurobarometer Surveys to explore by means of multinomial logistic regressions whether decentralisation was an important factor behind the varying perceptions about Europe. Two dimensions of decentralization - political and fiscal - are considered in the analysis, alongside several compositional and contextual effects. The results of the analysis show that fiscal decentralisation was fundamental for citizens' support for European integration, while there is limited evidence that political decentralisation played a similar role. Hence, while fiscal decentralisation may have given prominence to the economic benefits of European integration, political decentralisation was more associated with its economic costs. Taking into account that history matters, this paper raises potentially interesting insights for the design of policies aimed at promoting social cohesion.