Suchergebnisse

This paper examines interbrand competition between a domestic and a foreign manufacturer who market their products through intermediaries. The contracts manufacturers offer these intermediaries are endogenous. In equilibrium contracts may specify exclusive territories (ET), depending on the degree of substitutability between products and the level and degree of transparency of trade barriers. Trade liberalization, through lower or more transparent barriers, may lead manufacturers to use ET, thereby substituting private anti-competitive arrangements for government-imposed barriers. This substitution may decrease competition and welfare, and thus create a role for competition policy in a freer trade environment.

Abstract We use plant‐level data to study the link between the local availability of services and the decision of manufacturing firms to source materials from abroad. We develop a model to generate predictions about how the intensity of international sourcing of materials depends on the availability of services and firm characteristics. These predictions are supported by the data. Greater availability of services across regions, industries, and time increases firms' foreign sourcing of materials relative to sales. The impact of services differs by firm type. National firms' sourcing responds to changes in regional service conditions, whereas multinationals tend to be less affected.

This paper studies why multinational firms often share ownership of a foreign affiliate with a local partner even in the absence of government restrictions on ownership. We show that shared ownership may arise, if (i) the partner owns assets that are potentially important for the investment project, and (ii) the value of these assets is private information. In this context shared ownership acts as a screening device. Our model predicts that the multinational's ownership share is increasing in its productivity, with the most productive multinationals choosing not to rely on a foreign partner at all. This prediction is shown to be consistent with data on the ownership choices of Japanese multinationals.

This paper studies why multinational firms often share ownership of a foreign affiliate with a local partner even in the absence of government restrictions on ownership. We show that shared ownership may arise, if (i) the partner owns assets that are potentially important for the investment project, and (ii) the value of these assets is private information. In this context shared ownership acts as a screening device. Our model predicts that the multinational?s ownership share is increasing in its productivity, with the most productive multinationals choosing not to rely on a foreign partner at all. This prediction is shown to be consistent with data on the ownership choices of Japanese multinationals.

This paper examines the pattern of foreign direct investment (FDI) in producer services. We develop a model of FDI in these services and test its predictions using panel data on U.S.FDI in 25 host countries from 1976 to 1995. We find evidence that, in addition to governmental and cultural barriers, producer-service firms may face informational barriers to entry into foreign markets. The presence of such barriers provides a possible explanation for the observation that producer-service FDI tends to follow FDI by downstream industries.