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The discipline of International Relations has been slow to assess the ICC and American opposition to it. This article uses the English School approach to assess the impact of the ICC on international society. The Rome Statute's definition of core crimes and its provision of an independent prosecutor help to legally constitute world society which transcends the society of states. The US opposes this development by arguing that international criminal justice should remain within the framework of international society. This is because the society of states accommodates a strong exceptionalist discourse and furthers America's particular interests in a way world society does not.

The International Criminal Court can be seen as a cosmopolitan response to the problems of global democracy. This article demonstrates how opponents of the Court use a concern for international order to disguise a policy motivated by a narrow conception of the national interest. US opposition reveals the extent to which it fears being held accountable for the way America uses the great power veto on the UN Security Council. America's opposition to the Court has also succeeded in bringing to the surface the extent to which American foreign policy is driven by communitarian conceptions of democracy and international society. Despite promising to hold power accountable for egregious human rights violations, the Court is considered a threat to American sovereignty and dismissed as undemocratic. The article argues that this communitarian understanding of democracy promotion will be increasingly problematic as the processes of globalization undermine the capacity of states to guarantee human rights.

The International Criminal Court can be seen as a cosmopolitan response to the problems of global democracy. This article demonstrates how opponents of the Court use a concern for international order to disguise a policy motivated by a narrow conception of the national interest. US opposition reveals the extent to which it fears being held accountable for the way America uses the great power veto on the UN Security Council. America's opposition to the Court has also succeeded in bringing to the surface the extent to which American foreign policy is driven by communitarian conceptions of democracy & international society. Despite promising to hold power accountable for egregious human rights violations, the Court is considered a threat to American sovereignty & dismissed as undemocratic. The article argues that this communitarian understanding of democracy promotion will be increasingly problematic as the processes of globalization undermine the capacity of states to guarantee human rights. [Copyright 2003 Sage Publications Ltd.]

A review article on books by (1) John B. Judis, The Paradox of American Democracy: Elites, Special Interests and the Betrayal of Public Trust (New York: Pantheon Books, 2000); (2) Michael Zweig, The Working Class Majority: America's Best Kept Secret (London, Ithaca, NY: Cornell U Press, 2000); & (3) Ruy Teixeira & Joel Rogers, America's Forgotten Majority: Why the White Working Class Still Matters (New York: Basic Books, 2000). As America inaugurates its 43rd president, it enters a period of reflection. The danger is that all emphasis on voting procedure will silence a longstanding & ultimately more significant criticism of US democracy & its policy of democracy promotion. The separation of economics from politics & the promotion of so-called "market democracy" does a disservice to the wider democratic project & is potentially self-defeating. This article reviews three books to argue that the declining international reputation of the US can be traced to its own democratic shortcomings. It explores the possibility of a popular working-class movement to address these failings & examines the implication this may have on the liberal international order. Adapted from the source document.

Alan Collins is to be congratulated for highlighting the role Gorbachev's strategy of Graduated Reciprocation in Tension Reduction (GRIT) played in ending the military conflict between East and West. By offering an alternative view to the conservative opinion that America's material strength forced the Soviets into submission, it suggests that statesmen caught in security dilemmas have real options and are not simply forced to compete for power. As a policy that fostered transparency which assisted the creation of security regimes, GRIT undoubtedly played a role in the way the military conflict ended. Yet the Cold War was not simply about the military balance. Collins' account of this period is restricted by his bias towards state-centric and rationalist explanations of state behaviour. He underestimates the role ideology played in ending the Cold War and as such only offers half a Cold War story. The influence of the US during this period, as a cautious agent of liberal individualism, is completely ignored, yet, as this reply demonstrates, it is crucial to understanding the way the US reciprocated Soviet policies. Moreover, if 'debate over what the Cold War was is part of the politics of deciding what the post-Cold War is', the significance of this criticism is not merely academic. The implication of Collins' unwritten assumption that state's identities are egoistic is that a security community based on a common identity is impossible. The lesson that the Cold War, as opposed to the military conflict, only ended when a common identity based on liberal individualism was instituted, suggests that a transatlantic security community including Russia was and still is a possibility.