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AbstractThe Financial Action Task Force (FATF) requires national governments to demonstrate an understanding of the distribution of money laundering risks across different sectors of the financial system. Such understanding is the foundation for effective control of money laundering under the risk‐based approach called for by the FATF. We analyzed the National Risk Assessments (NRAs) of eight systemically important countries before 2020 to test whether these demonstrated that basic understanding. The eight show very different conceptualizations, analytic approaches, and products. None showed more than minimal competence at risk assessment. For example, most relied largely on expert opinion, solicited, however, in ways that violated the well‐developed methodology for eliciting expert opinion. They consistently misinterpreted Suspicious Activity Reports, the most fine‐grained quantitative data available on money laundering, and failed to provide risk assessments relevant for policymakers. Only one described the methodology employed. Although conducting strong money laundering risk assessments is challenging, given the difficulty of estimating the extent of laundering in any sector, existing practices can be improved. We offer some potential explanations for the failure of governments to take this task seriously. The lack of involvement of risk assessment professionals is an important contributing factor to the weaknesses of the current NRAs.

The FATF requires each country to undertake a national risk assessment (NRA) to show the government's knowledge of money laundering risks. There is little guidance as to how these NRAs are to be conducted, and those that have been published show great variation in terms of data used, analytical methods, and the depth of policy analysis. After expounding some of the concepts basic to any risk analysis, we analyze two of the more detailed published NRAs, from Italy and Switzerland. The Italian NRA, focused on domestic criminal threats, relies almost exclusively on expert opinion. Its most distinctive product is an analysis of the high-threat sectors and the need for specific kinds of policy interventions. The Swiss NRA, focused primarily on threats from other countries, presents far more quantitative data, almost exclusively from suspicious activity reports, to supplement expert opinion. Though both NRAs provide useful insights about money laundering risks, neither is conceptually clear; in particular, neither reflects contemporary practice in the use of expert opinion. Our critique is aimed at helping strengthen the next round of NRAs, and identifies lessons learned for all countries. Our recommendations include the use of risk assessment standards from other fields, the addition of a measure of uncertainty, and a more critical assessment by FATF in its NRA evaluations.

Introduces a special issue, a cross-national study of drug control policy & practices among industrialized nations. The challenges of undertaking such an analysis are outlined; they arise from problems of data scarcity, poor data quality & comparability, weak causal/correlational evidence, & difficulties of generalizability. Next, an analytic framework is provided that facilitates assessment of policies & outcomes & accounts for exogenous factors. The articles are then summarized according to three geographic/economic categories: (1) the "wealthy West" (including the US, Western Europe, & Australia); (2) the Western hemisphere (US, Mexico, Colombia, & Jamaica); & (3) transition countries (Middle Eastern nations & post-Soviet Russia). 1 Figure, 26 References. K. Coddon

Examines drug control strategies in various countries in the twenty-first century; some focus on Denmark, France, Portugal, Sweden, Australia, Colombia, Jamaica, Mexico, Iran, Russia, and Canada; 12 articles. Contents: Danish drug policy, by Lau Laursen, Jorgen Jepsen; Policy paradigms, ideas, and interests: the case of the French public health policy toward drug abuse, by Henri Bergeron, Pierre Kopp; Decriminalization of drug use in Portugal: by Mirjam van het Loo et al.; Swedish drug policy in the twenty-first century: by Leif Lenke, Boerje Olsson; Harm minimization in a prohibition context--Australia, by Gabriele Bammer et al.; Science, ideology, and needle exchange programs, by Martin T. Schecter; Illegal drugs in Colombia, by Francisco E. Thoumi; Policy paradox: implications of U.S. drug control policy for Jamaica, by Marlyn J. Jones; Mexico's war on drugs, by Jorge Chabat; The price of freedom: illegal drug markets and policies in post-Soviet Russia, by Letizia Paoli; Money laundering and its regulation, by Michael Levi.

The Flow of drugs from Mexico to the United States has been a source of trouble in US-Mexican relations for at least two decades. The dominant view in Mexico is that the problem arises from the inability of the United States to control its domestic demand for heroin, cocaine, and marijuana. The dominant US view has been that the Mexican government has failed to make effective efforts to control the supply of drugs. At times — in particular after the killing of Enrique Camarena, an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), in 1985 — US government anger at Mexico's alleged failure to maintain the integrity of its anti-drug efforts has been the dominant source of friction between the two nations.