Globalization and the National Security State: A Framework for Analysis
In: International Studies Review, 7(2), 2005
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In: International Studies Review, 7(2), 2005
SSRN
In: Millennium: journal of international studies, Band 33, Heft 2, S. 355-380
ISSN: 1477-9021
A growing body of scholarly literature argues that globalization has weakened the national security state. In this article, we investigate the impact of globalization on four core areas in which globalization scholars contend that the national security function of states has been affected: 1) the frequency of interstate wars; 2) the level of global military spending and the size of armed forces worldwide; 3) the participation of multilateral security providing institutions and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) in international security activities; and, 4) the challenge of global terrorism. Our analysis reveals that most of the globalization theorists' expectations about the worldwide pursuit of national security remain unfulfilled. There is no major evidence of a decline in global military spending, a reduction in armed forces worldwide or an increasing reliance on international institutions or INGOs to foster security in the contemporary era. Moreover, those changes that are evident — such as an apparent reduction in interstate warfare — cannot be attributed with confidence to the phenomenon of globalization, rather than to other geopolitical factors, such as the end of the Cold War and the entrenchment of American hegemony. Thus, while globalization may transform the pursuit of security in the future, there is no evidence that it has done so profoundly to-date. ————————————————————————
In: Millennium, 33(2), 2004
SSRN
In the past two decades, many have posited a correlation between the spread of globalization and the decline of the nation-state. They have maintained that the increasing interdependence between countries means that nations are no longer the sole providers of their territorial security. This text investigates.
In: APSA 2011 Annual Meeting Paper
SSRN
Working paper
In: Globalization and the National Security State, S. 161-180
In: Globalization and the National Security State, S. 115-135
In: Globalization and the National Security State, S. 3-19
In: Globalization and the National Security State, S. 136-160
In: Globalization and the National Security State, S. 36-53
In: Globalization and the National Security State, S. 54-81
In: Globalization and the National Security State, S. 20-35
In: Globalization and the National Security State, S. 82-114
In: APSA 2009 Toronto Meeting Paper
SSRN
Working paper
In: International security, Band 33, Heft 2, S. 148-181
ISSN: 1531-4804
Scholars typically define appeasement as a policy of satisfying grievances through one-sided concessions to avoid war for the foreseeable future and, therefore, as an alternative to balancing. They traditionally interpret British appeasement of Adolf Hitler in the 1930s as a naïve attempt to maintain peace with Germany by satisfying his grievances. The standard conceptualization of appeasement and the empirical treatment of the 1930s, however, are theoretically limiting and historically incorrect. Appeasement is a strategy of sustained, asymmetrical concessions with the aim of avoiding war, at least in the short term. There are three distinct variations of appeasement: (1) resolving grievances (to avoid war for the foreseeable future); (2) diffusing secondary threats (to focus on a greater threat); and (3) buying time (to rearm and/or secure allies against the current threat). British appeasement was primarily a strategy of buying time for rearmament against Germany. British leaders understood the Nazi menace and did not expect that appeasement would avoid an eventual war with Germany. They believed that by the time of the Rhineland crisis of 1936 the balance of power had already shifted in Germany's favor, but that British rearmament would work to reverse the balance by the end of the decade. Appeasement was a strategy to delay an expected confrontation with Germany until the military balance was more favorable.