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Abstract
During the last decades of the previous century, the rebirth and the modernization of classical Confucianism gained increasing relevance. These tendencies have manifested themselves in a clearest and most influential way in the current of Modern New Confucianism. The representatives of this stream of thought aimed to elaborate upon a new ethical model of specifically Chinese modernity based upon traditional values that could in a renewed form meet the requirements of the new era. They aimed to preserve Chinese cultural identity while at the same time making their own original contributions to the development of a philosophical and theoretical dialogue between Euro-American and Chinese cultures. In this context, it is important to ask the question whether a model of modernization that is rooted in traditional Confucianism is truly capable of generating a non-individualistic version of modernity. Following this supposition, and focusing upon the works of the so-called "Second Generation" of Modern New Confucianism, this article aims to demonstrate that the alleged relation between modernity and individualism, which was almost exclusively seen as self-evident and undeniable by the Western modernization theories, is actually a result of Western historical paradigms.

Fang Dongmei (1899–1977) is among the most influential Chinese philosophers who lived and worked in Taiwan during the second half of the 20th century. The present article aims to clarify his view on the basic nature of the human Self. This assessment is more multifaceted than it seems at a first glimpse, for Fang's philosophy is also more complex than it seems. As a member of the so-called neo-conservative streams of thought, he criticized the Western-type modernization and aimed to revive the holistic onto-epistemology of classical Confucianism. On the other hand, he highlighted the importance of its basic paradigm which underlay the Confucian discourses from their very beginning, i.e. since the Book of Changes, namely the principle of creative creativity (shengshengbuxi 生生不息). The alleged contradiction between his advocating of holism and creativity, has been reflected in the apparent dichotomy between the social and relational essence of the Confucian Moral Self on the one side, and individual uniqueness on the other. The paper aims to show that both seeming contradictions are actually parts of the same theoretical principle defining the complementary interactions of binary oppositions.

The topic of this special issue deals with the development of a certain stream of the Chinese philosophical tradition. Yet this philosophy did not originate in mainland China, and thus in some supposedly logical "centre" of Chinese culture, but on its alleged "periphery", namely on the beautiful island of Taiwan. One of the incentives for our decision to compile an issue of Asian Studies which is devoted entirely to the philosophical developments in Taiwan was an international conference, entitled Taiwanese Philosophy and the Preservation of the Confucian Tradition. This interesting academic meeting was organized in October 2019 in Ljubljana by the Center for Chinese Studies at the National Central Library in Taiwan in cooperation with the East Asian Research Library (EARL) and the Department of Asian Studies at University of Ljubljana.

Večina modernih teoretičark in teoretikov je menila, da je konfucijanstvo zastarela ideologija, ki ni samo neprimerna za razvoj modernih znanosti in demokratičnih družb, temveč je tudi merodajno odgovorna za globoko družbeno in politično krizo, ki je zaznamovala Kitajsko v zadnjih dvesto letih. Tajvanski moderni konfucijanci pa v tem idejnem sistemu niso videli krivca za ta položaj. Večinoma so menili, da je konfucijanstvo popolnoma združljivo tako z znanostjo kot tudi z demokracijo. Večina jih je pri tem celo zagovarjala stališče, da vzhodnoazijske kulture v okviru svojih družbenih specifik ne bodo mogle razviti demokratičnih ustrojev družbe, če se pri tem ne bodo oprle na ustrezne elemente lastne, torej konfucijanske tradicije. Ta članek kritično analizira Tang Junyijev in Mou Zongsanov teoretski model možnega preporoda konfucijanskih protodemokracij.

Hashi Hisaki, the author of this interesting book, is founder of the Association for Comparative Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Education (http://kophil-interdis.at/wb/pages/home.php). Since 1995 she has taught at the Department of Philosophy at the University of Vienna, Austria. The present book is written in German, as it is based upon Hashi Hisaki's philosophy lectures at this university. It elaborates upon intercultural dimensions of a wide scope of problems, linked to the concept of paradox, starting from the famous classical "liar paradox" and then analysing various paradoxes exemplified in the works of Plato, Kant, Hegel, Klein, Reininger, Nagarjuna, Hanfezi, Dogen, and Nishida. The main goal of the work is to illuminate the creative function of paradoxes, and to show that it can raise in readers a vivid interest in independent and critical thinking. At the same time, it represents an inexhaustible source of integrative thinking and acting in our daily life.

Li Zehou believes that human psychology, just like humanness or "human nature", is not fixed or given, but is rather something characterized by changing developmental forms of human pragmatic reason, which is formed over millions of years, and is still continuously accumulating and changing. However, reason alone is by no means something that would absolutely separate humans from their sensuality and thus from other animals. The difference between human beings and animals primarily occurs somewhere else, namely in the very realm of the specifically human social existence, which is defined by "subjectality" (zhutixing 主體性) and includes specific human values. In this context, Li shows that Confucian pragmatic reason is formed and functions within the "emotio-rational formation" (qingli jiegou 情理結構), which is deeply rooted in the human world. It is based on actual human conditions and arises from human social emotionality, transforming these culturally integrated general communal emotions through rites in the process of "condensation of reason" (lixing ningju 理性凝聚) into rational concepts of right and wrong, good and evil. The rationality of these concepts governs the subjective personal feelings of each member of a community; the pragmatic nature of this rationality, however, is tightly linked to and intertwined with human emotions. In the concrete social life, these rational concepts can nevertheless dissolve—through the process of the "melting of reason" (lixing ronghua 理性融化)––in the heart-minds of people and thus become an integral part of individual emotions. This paper aims to posit the Confucian pragmatic reason into the framework of Li Zehou's ethics and political axiology.

Li Zehou believes that human psychology, just like humanness or "human nature", is not fixed or given, but is rather something characterized by changing developmental forms of human pragmatic reason, which is formed over millions of years, and is still continuously accumulating and changing. However, reason alone is by no means something that would absolutely separate humans from their sensuality and thus from other animals. The difference between human beings and animals primarily occurs somewhere else, namely in the very realm of the specifically human social existence, which is defined by "subjectality" (zhutixing 主體性) and includes specific human values. In this context, Li shows that Confucian pragmatic reason is formed and functions within the "emotio-rational formation" (qingli jiegou 情理結構), which is deeply rooted in the human world. It is based on actual human conditions and arises from human social emotionality, transforming these culturally integrated general communal emotions through rites in the process of "condensation of reason" (lixing ningju 理性凝聚) into rational concepts of right and wrong, good and evil. The rationality of these concepts governs the subjective personal feelings of each member of a community; the pragmatic nature of this rationality, however, is tightly linked to and intertwined with human emotions. In the concrete social life, these rational concepts can nevertheless dissolve—through the process of the "melting of reason" (lixing ronghua 理性融化)––in the heart-minds of people and thus become an integral part of individual emotions. This paper aims to posit the Confucian pragmatic reason into the framework of Li Zehou's ethics and political axiology. ; Po Li Zehouju človeška zavest tako kot »človeškost« ali »človeška narava« ni nespremenljiva ali dana, temveč so zanjo bolj značilne spreminjajoče in razvijajoče se oblike človekovega pragmatičnega uma, ki se je oblikoval več milijonov let in se še zmeraj nenehno nalaga in spreminja. Toda sam um nikakor ni nekaj, kar bi povsem ločevalo ljudi od njihove čutnosti in s tem od drugih živali. Razlika med ljudmi in živalmi se pojavi bistveno drugje, namreč v sami sferi specifično človekovega družbenega bivanja, ki ga definira »subjektnost« (zhutixing 主體性) in vsebuje specifične človeške vrednote. Li v tem kontekstu pokaže, da se konfucijanski pragmatični um formira in deluje znotraj »emocionalno-racionalne formacije« (qingli jiegou 情理結構), ki je globoko ukoreninjena v človeškem življenju. Temelji na dejanskih razmerah in nastane iz človeške družbene emocionalnosti, ki v procesu »kondenzacije razuma« (lixing ningju 理性凝聚) z obredi spreminja te kulturno sprejete, splošne skupne emocije v racionalne koncepte pravilnega in napačnega, dobrega in zla. Racionalnost teh konceptov vodi subjektivne osebne emocije vsakega pripadnika_ce skupnosti; pragmatična narava te racionalnosti je tesno povezana in prepletena s človeškimi emocijami. V konkretnem družbenem življenju se lahko ti racionalni koncepti razpršijo – v procesu »raztapljanja razuma« (lixing ronghua 理性融化) –, prenašajo v srčno zavest ljudi in tako postanejo integralni del posameznikovih emocij. Ta članek postavlja konfucijanski pragmatični um v okvir Li Zehoujeve etike in politične aksiologije.

Even though the book was published more than three years ago, it is still quite topical and unsurpassed. The Outstanding Book Award, which was presented to it last year by the Society of Professors of Education, was therefore well deserved and not surprising. In this work, Geir Sigurđsson reconstructs the meaning, the role and the manifold significance of the Confucian rituality by considering the spatial and temporal context of the present situation. This does not only mean that he wants to elaborate upon the question of what can Confucian rituality "still" offer to the present humankind, and to select those elements of this rich classical tradition that could prove themselves to be most "useful" and "worthwhile" for such endeavors. It rather means that the author aims to offer the readers his own, often quite topical philosophical insights created upon the inspirational foundations of classical Confucian texts. In this context, he proposes a reconsideration of the notion Li, which belongs to the most controversial concepts in the Confucian thought.

Taiwanese philosophers are playing a rather prominent role in the context of preserving the Chinese ideational tradition, even though their significance in this context is still widely unknown. The present article is thus focused upon the critical introduction of their work, and its positioning into the context of the political, economic and intellectual conditions of the second half of the 20th century. The role of the Taiwanese philosophy was especially important precisely in the period which begun in 1949 and lasted until the end of the century. In these five decades, the philosophical production on the mainland was mostly dominated by censorship, and the prevailing regulations of the Communist Party's policies mainly demanded that researchers working in philosophy stayed in the field of the sinization of Marxism, whereby investigating the Chinese intellectual tradition was not so much in favour. The article clearly exposes the reasons for and significance of the preservation of continued research into Chinese ideational history in Taiwan, and points out that without this extraordinarily constructive role of the Taiwanese philosophers, these studies would have suffered immense damage. The author also shows that the work carried out by the Taiwanese philosophers was not merely important in respect of preserving the continuation of Chinese philosophical research, but also because they have at the same time created numerous innovative methodological and theoretical concepts that have fundamentally enriched the recent history of investigating and developing Chinese philosophy. In this regard, the author exposes and critically analyses some of the central philosophical concepts of Mou Zongsan, who is among the most important representatives of modern Taiwanese philosophy.
Keywords: Taiwanese philosophy, research in the Chinese intellectual tradition, Chinese philosophy, Confucianism, new concepts, new methodologies

The present paper deals with Li Zehou's contributions to the discussions of Marxism in the second half of the 20th century. In Li's philosophy, Marx's theories were reshaped, modified, and upgraded in a theoretical framework that differed from the original. He agreed with Marx's presumption that the making and using of tools was the basic material practice, which made human evolution possible. Nevertheless, he saw Marx's further development of this theory as problematic, because he saw it as being one-sided: progress from the means of production to the relations of production, and then on to the superstructure, only concerned the external developments of the relation between the manufacture and use of tools. At this point, Li was more interested in their internal influences, i.e., in the ways in which the making and use of tools has reshaped the human mind. He was highly sceptical of Marxist economic theories and criticized the crucial concepts elaborated by Marx in his Capital through the lens of Kantian "transcendental illusions". Proceeding from his combination of Marx and Kant, the present paper will critically analyse some crucial differences between the Marxian idea of the class struggle as a driving force of social progress, and Li's own version of historical materialism.

Li Zehou sodi med najvplivnejše sodobne kitajske filozofe. V pričujočem članku si bomo podrobneje ogledali globinsko strukturo njegove teorije ter se posvetili analizi in interpretaciji njegovega koncepta sedimentacije (jidian 积淀), ki predstavlja osrednji pojem in paradigmatsko osnovo njegove miselnosti. V tem sistemu sedimentacija pomeni specifično vrsto kolektivnega spomina in proces, v katerem se informacije in izkustva v kodirani obliki nalagajo v našo zavest. V tem kontekstu avtorica analizira Li Zehoujeve poskuse izdelave dialektične rešitve protislovja med vsebino in obliko človeškega spomina. Skozi optiko tega pojma, ki ga Li razumeva kot akumulacijo družbeno racionaliziranih, arhetipskih form zaznave in izkušenj, ki so uskladiščene v človeškem spominu, bomo njegovo filozofijo tudi kritično primerjali z nekaterimi podobnimi, četudi ne identičnimi izhodišči moderne zahodne teorije.

Članek izhaja iz predpostavke, da sta razsvetljenska koncepta avtonomnega subjekta in humanizma v sedanji obliki zastarela in neprimerna za idejno osnovo sodobnega časa. Svobodna volja posameznika nima več opore v etičnih maksimah, saj te znotraj visoko diferenciranih socialnih in tehnoloških kontekstov sodobnih družb ne morejo več služiti kot zanesljivi kriteriji realizacije moralnih imperativov. To pa pomeni, da je ogrožena tako moralna kot tudi politična avtonomija posameznika. Avtorica izhaja iz predpostavke, da sodijo tovrstne ideje po drugi strani k najpomembnejšim kulturnim in filozofskim dediščinam Evrope in da je zato treba ta koncepta postaviti v plodno kontrastivno, poliloško in dialektično razmerje s sorodnimi dediščinami neevropskih kultur. Sinteza različnih tradicij humanizma namreč ni samo mogoča, temveč tudi nujna. Članek se pri tem osredotoča na pregled subjektu sorodnih konceptov znotraj kitajske filozofije, pri čemer poudari tradicionalne osnove ter specifično kitajsko razumevanje pojma sebstva.