Suchergebnisse

SUMMARY
On the twentieth anniversary of its inception, the euro has yet to expand its role as an international currency. We document this fact with a wide range of indicators including its role as an anchor or reference in exchange rate arrangements – which we argue is a portmanteau measure – and as a currency for the denomination of trade and assets. On all these dimensions, the euro comprises a far smaller share than that of the US dollar. Furthermore, that share has been roughly constant since 1999. By some measures, the euro plays no larger role than the Deutschemark and French franc that it replaced. We explore the reasons for this underperformance. While the leading anchor currency may have a natural monopoly, a number of additional factors have limited the euro's reach, including lack of financial centre, limited geopolitical reach and US and Chinese dominance in technology research. Most important, in our view, is the comparatively scarce supply of (safe) euro-denominated assets, which we document. The European Central Bank's (ECB's) lack of policy clarity may have also played a role. We show that the euro era can be divided into a 'Bundesbank-plus' period and a 'Whatever it Takes' period. The first shows a smooth transition from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism and continued to stabilize German inflation. The second period is characterized by an expanding ECB arsenal of credit facilities to European banks and sovereigns.

Intro -- Editorial -- Abstracts -- 1 Work and Leisure in the United States and Europe: Why So Different? -- 2 Job Loss, Job Finding, and Unemployment in the U.S. Economy over the Past Fifty Years -- 3 The Rise in Firm-Level Volatility: Causes and Consequences -- 4 Monetary Policy Under Uncertainty in Micro-Founded Macroeconometric Models -- 5 A Bayesian Look at New Open Economy Macroeconomics -- 6 Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy in a Medium-Scale Macroeconomic Model.

Enthält Rezensionen u.a. von: Cassidy, John: How markets fail : the logic of economic calamities. - New York/N.Y. : Farrat, Straus and Giroux, 2009

This report was written by The Committee on International Economic Policy and Reform, a non-partisan and non-ideological group of independent experts, comprised of academics and former government and central bank officials. The objective of the group is to analyze global monetary and financial problems, offer systematic analysis and advance reform ideas that would ordinarily not emerge from official processes.The Committee will identify areas in which the global economic architecture should be strengthened and work to develop solutions that attempt to reconcile national interests with broader global interests. It will attempt to offer useful suggestions to national policy makers and international financial institutions and foster public understanding of the key issues in global monetary management and economic governance. In this September 2011 report, the committee lays out a framework for rethinking central banking in light of lessons learned in the lead-up to and aftermath of the global financial crisis.

his report was written by the Committee on International Economic Policy and Reform, a non-partisan, independent group of experts, comprised of academics and former government and central bank officials. Its objective is to analyze global monetary and financial problems, offer systematic analysis, and advance reform ideas. The committee attempts to identify areas in which the global economic architecture should be strengthened and recommend solutions intended to reconcile national interests with broader global interests. Through its reports, it seeks to foster public understanding of key issues in global economic management and economic governance. Each committee report will focus on a specific topic and will emphasize longer-term rather than conjunctural policy issues. In this September 2012 report, the committee lays out a framework for cross-border banking flows and for improved regulatory coordination.