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Federal judicial deference to state and local regulation is at the center of contentious debates regarding the implementation of competition policy. This Article invokes a political process bargaining framework to develop a principled approach for addressing the appropriate level of judicial intervention under the dormant commerce clause and state action immunity from antitrust enforcement. Using illustrations from network industries, it is argued that, at core, these two independent doctrines share a common concern with political (not only market) failure by focusing on the incentives faced by powerful stakeholders in state and local lawmaking. More important, they share the common purpose of deterring the adoption of regulations with adverse spillover effects for those who do not participate in the relevant lawmaking process. The Article illustrates how a political process bargaining approach to these doctrines differs in its recommendations from traditional formulations, with implications for the degree of deference courts afford state and local laws.

Frequently, state-wide executive agencies and localities attempt to implement federally-inspired programs. Two predominant examples are cooperative federalism programs and incorporation of federal standards in state-specific law. Federally-inspired programs can bump into state constitutional restrictions on the allocation of powers, especially in states whose constitutional systems embrace stronger prohibitions on legislative delegation than the weak restrictions at the federal level, where national goals and standards are made. This Article addresses this tension between dual federal/state normative accounts of the constitutional allocation of powers in state implementation of federally-inspired programs. To the extent the predominant ways of resolving the tension come from federal courts, state constitutionalism is challenged to produce its own account of its relevance in an era of federal programs. After surveying and critiquing the interpretative practices of state courts in dealing with these conflicting constitutional norms, the Article presents an institutional design account of state allocation of powers which might better explain why states routinely suspend constitutional restrictions on delegation in the context of state implementation of federally-inspired programs. The Article questions whether constitutional restrictions on legislative delegation have any normative basis in the context of state implementation of federally-inspired programs, but argues that it is important for state courts to answer this question as a matter of state constitutional interpretation - not by ceding turf to federal courts under the Supremacy Clause or other federally-imposed judicial interpretations.

This article addresses problems associated with settlement of appeals of legislative rules adopted by administrative agencies. Settlement is a common and important tool for avoiding litigation, but it also raises potential problems for administrative law. In particular, to the extent that an appellate litigation posture poses a principal/agent gap, an agency's incentives to settle may lead it to abandon its public interest goals, otherwise protected by statutory mandates as well as administrative procedures. The problem is most salient when an agency agrees to a substantive policy position in a settlement, committing the agency to later implement a policy course. To the extent an agency uses the same administrative procedure to implement a settlement that was used in adopting the regulation that is the subject of an appeal, the public interest may be preserved, but agencies have many ways of avoiding administrative procedure, or affording less procedure than was afforded in the initial adoption of a rule, in implementing settlement concessions. This article discusses these issues in three parts. In part I, settlement is contrasted to negotiated regulation. Settlement, it is argued, raises a more significant principal/agent gap than other consensus approach to regulation, such as negotiated regulation. Part II addresses settlement against the backdrop of presidential transitions, during in which policy shifts are common. In the context of presidential transitions, settlement can be used by an old administration to commit a new President to a policy course, or can be used by a new administration to undo the policy decisions of an old President. While policy shifts are expected during presidential transitions, such shifts have serious consequences for administrative procedure if the new policy is implemented with less procedure than the old, abandoned policy. Part III recommends some ways of narrowing the principal/agent gap in rulemaking settlement. In particular, broad participation in settlement negotiations, as ...

Linda Cohen and Matthew Spitzer's study, "The Government Litigant Advantage," sheds important light on how the Solicitor General's litigation behavior may impact the Supreme Court's decision making agenda and outcomes for regulatory and administrative law cases. By emphasizing how the Solicitor General affects cases that the Supreme Court decides, Cohen and Spitzer's findings confirm that administrative law's emphasis on lower appellate court decisions is not misplaced. Some say that D.C. Circuit cases carry equal-if not more-precedential weight than Supreme Court decisions in resolving administrative law issues. Cohen and Spitzer use positive political theory to provide a novel explanation for some of this bias towards circuit court decisions in defining the rule of law in administrative law practice and scholarship. However, this Comment argues that what Cohen and Spitzer's empirical finding of "government litigant advantage" means more generally for the rule of law in the regulatory context requires further elaboration.

In this Article, I assess one of the more notable reforms Florida made to its APA in 1996 with the intention of enhancing the accountability of agency rulemaking, and I discuss the lessons other state reformers can learn from Florida's experience. Part Il of this Article discusses rulemaking authority under the Federal AP A and the more restrictive approach many states take to ensure that agencies are accountable to the legislature in proposing rules. Some states, including Pennsylvania, have endorsed what I will term 11 statutory nondelegation 11: This is a judicially-adopted or APA-imposed clear statement requirement, suggesting that courts or administrative law judges (AIJs) review rules independently to ensure that they are based in apparent and specific statutory authority, rather than promulgated under implied powers from general grants of authority. Similar to the nondelegation doctrine, which exists in many states as a constitutional restraint on legislative delegations of rulemaking authority to agencies absent specific statutory authority and standards, statutory nondelegation is intended to ensure that agencies are accountable to the will of the legislature. States endorse statutory nondelegation with differing degrees of strength: While Pennsylvania judicially endorses a modest form of statutory nondelegation, Florida's 1996 APA reforms exemplify a radical and strong version, similar to what the United States Congress considered more than twenty years ago in the failed Bumpers Amendment to the Federal APA. In Part III of this article, I discuss some of the problems with efforts to enhance accountability by requiring statutory nondelegation in state APAs, using the recent Florida reform and its implementation as an example. Part IV discusses Florida's 1999 APA amendments, passed primarily as a reaction to legislative dissatisfaction with judicial interpretation of Florida's 1996 APA amendments. In Part V, I generalize from Florida's experience to suggest some lessons for Pennsylvania and other state ...

This essay addresses how ALJ final order authority in many state systems of administrative governance (among them Florida, Louisiana, Missouri, and South Carolina) poses a tension between independence and accountability. It is argued that political accountability is sacrificed where reviewing courts defer to ALJ final orders on issues of law and policy. Standards of review provide state courts with a way of restoring the balance between independence and accountability, but reviewing courts should heighten the deference they give to the agency's legal and policy positions -- giving little or no deference to the ALJ on these issues -- even where the ALJ's decision had final status.

This Article applies comparative institutional analysis to separation of powers under state constitutions, with a particular focus on the nondelegation doctrine and states' acceptance of Chadha-like restrictions on legislative oversight. The Article begins by contrasting state and federal doctrine and enforcement levels in each of these separation of powers contexts. Most state courts, unlike their federal counterparts, adhere to a strong nondelegation doctrine. In addition, many states accept (de facto if not de jure) even more explicit and sweeping legislative vetoes than the federal system. The Article highlights the contrast of federal and state approaches by identifying their similarity with Federalist and Antifederalist separation of powers principles, respectively. Once the contrast is drawn, the Article develops a descriptive explanation for this divergence in jurisprudential approach. After discussing the pitfalls of common American heritage, textualism, and culture-based approaches to interpreting separation of powers in state constitutionalism, the Article presents institutional analysis as a better explanation for divergences in interpretive approach. Specifically, the Article discusses institutional design in the legislative and executive branches of states, and its interrelationship with faction and capture of the agency decisionmaking process. Attention to institutional design can explain adherence to the nondelegation doctrine in many states, and can also explain the explicit and sweeping presence of legislative vetoes in some states. In addition, attention to institutional design features and their interrelationship with faction in the decisionmaking process can help to shed light on doctrinal nuances of state court approaches to upholding and striking certain delegations, such as delegations to private boards and to federal agencies. Thus, an appreciation of the role of institutional design is a necessary predicate to the development of an independent state theory of separation of powers.

This is a critical review essay, exploring the thesis advanced by Gregory Sidak and Daniel Spulber in their book Deregulatory Takings and the Regulatory Contract (Cambridge University Press 1997). Sidak and Spulber argue that deregulation of the electric utility and local telephony industries can constitute an unconstitutional taking to the extent the state does not provide compensation for the investment-backed expectations of firms in the industry. In addition, they argue that economic efficiency requires this result. This review takes Sidak and Spulber to task for their reading of the case law. In addition, the review criticizes their argument for giving short shrift to the lessons of public choice theory and the law and economics of risk. In many instances, it is argued, private industry is in a better position than ratepayers or government to bear the risk of regulatory change in the utility industry. Thus shared responsibility for change to the industry is appropriate.

This is a critical review essay, exploring the thesis advanced by Gregory Sidak and Daniel Spulber in their book Deregulatory Takings and the Regulatory Contract (Cambridge University Press 1997). Sidak and Spulber argue that deregulation of the electric utility and local telephony industries can constitute an unconstitutional taking to the extent the state does not provide compensation for the investment-backed expectations of firms in the industry. In addition, they argue that economic efficiency requires this result. This review takes Sidak and Spulber to task for their reading of the case law. In addition, the review criticizes their argument for giving short shrift to the lessons of public choice theory and the law and economics of risk. In many instances, it is argued, private industry is in a better position than ratepayers or government to bear the risk of regulatory change in the utility industry. Thus shared responsibility for change to the industry is appropriate.

This Article addresses the implications of broad-based participatory reforms for administrative process, with a particular focus on how participation reveals itself in different political-theoretic models of agency governance. The first section of the Article explores participation's value to agency governance. The second section of the Article presents three models of agency governance - expertocratic, pluralist, and civic republican - and discusses participation's importance to each model. The Article then posits a distinction between ordinary and constitutive agency decision-making, and explores how participation affects each for the three distinct models of agency governance. The implications of mass participation are explored in the context of citizen suit provisions to enforce environmental laws, the Environmental Impact Statement process under the National Environmental Policy Act, and sunshine laws which require meetings of multi-member agencies to be open to the public. The Article concludes by suggesting that mass participatory reforms to administrative law have adverse implications for the models of agency governance in various contexts, but are particularly deleterious for civic republican theories of administrative law. Thus, the Article suggests, de-emphasizing participation in administrative law theory and reforms may work to make agency governance more democratic.

In the spring of 1996, the Florida Legislature adopted a revised Administrative Procedure Act (APA),' the first massive overhaul of Florida's APA since its initial adoption over twenty years ago, in 1974. This Article examines the recent history of APA reform in Florida and surveys several provisions of the 1996 revised Florida APA that are likely to have a major effect on agency governance. Part II of this Article briefly reviews the recent history of regulatory reform in the state of Florida. Part III discusses an interesting innovation in Florida's 1996 APA revisions that governs agency waiver of rules and is designed to make agency decision-making more flexible. Part IV addresses three new provisions in Florida's APA meant to make rule making more accountable. Despite the many major changes from the status quo in the 1996 APA revisions, Part V concludes, on a skeptical note, that it will only be a short matter of time before Florida revisits the issue of APA reform.

This Article examines the political and procedural history of the EPAct in order to arrive at some general lessons and recommendations regarding congressional formation of energy policy. At least two commentators on the EPAct praise it as the "second generation" of federal energy policy, based in laws that achieve "their mandates more by consensus than coercion." The EPAct's history, however, was far from smooth. Procedural obstacles, such as filibuster, inter-committee conflict, and inter-chamber conflict, led many to declare the EPAct dead on several occasions prior to its passage.

Recent policy-effect studies denounce judicial review for its adverse effects on agency decisionmaking. In its strong version, the policy-effect thesis suggests that judicial review has paralized innovative agency decisionmaking. Professor Rossi reacts to policy-effect studies, particularly as they have been used to attack the hard look doctrine in administrative law. He revisits Professor Richard Pierce's policy-effect description of the effects of judicial review of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). Professor Rossi's survey of recent FERC decisionmaking provides some support for an attenuated version of the policy-effect thesis, but leads him to reject the strong version of the thesis. Much of the policy-effect literature hastily condemns judicial review because it is costly, unpredictable, and counter-majoritarian. However, Professor Rossi defends judicial review against the policy-effect attack as a protector of deliberative democratic values. He suggests that reforms to agency adjudicative mechanisms could alleviate the problems identified by policy-effect critics, while also allowing judicial review an opportunity to acheive its benefits.

Chapters featured in this title include: 'Dual Enforcement of Constitutional Norms', 'Cool Federalism and the Life Cycle of Moral Progress', 'Why Federalism and Constitutional Positivism Don't Mix', and 'Interjurisdictional Enforcement of Rights in a Post-erie World', amongst others