Suchergebnisse

Abstract
Both Umberto Eco and Charles S. Peirce have been concerned with the notion of background knowledge. Eco refers to background knowledge as the encyclopedia; Peirce's term of reference is collateral experience. The aim of this article is to investigate the degree to which these two concepts are comparable. We focus on one major metaphysical issue, viz. the fact that Eco defines collateral experience, which is the first step in any process of cognition, as private, whereas Peirce, as a realist, would never accept the concept of private thoughts, feelings, etc. We suggest that freeing collateral experience from its nominalistic nomenclature makes possible a comparison and synthesis of Eco's and Peirce's conceptions when seen from the perspectives of their cognitive type, nuclear type, and molar content.

In 2014, Peirce will have been dead for one hundred years. The book will celebrate this extraordinary, prolific thinker and the relevance of his idea for semiotics, communication, and cognitive studies. More importantly, however, it will provide a major statement of the current status of Peirce's work within semiotics. The volume will be a contribution to both semiotics and Peirce studies. Torkild Thellefsen, Royal School of Information and Library Science, Copenhagen University, Denmark; Bent Sørensen, Aalborg, Denmark.

AbstractCharles Peirce provided a few, but interesting we believe, remarks about metaphor. Aristotle on the other hand developed a theory of metaphor that, to this day has been, and still is, influential (even though his theory, especially within recent years, also has been heavily criticized, e.g., by Lakoff, George & Mark Johnson. 1980.Metaphors we live by. Chicago: Chicago University Press). Factor, Lance R. 1996. Peirce's definition of metaphor and its consequences. In Vincent Colapietro & Thomas Olshewsky (eds.),Peirce's doctrine of signs: Theory, applications, and connections, 229–235. Berlin/New York: Mouton De Gruyter, as one of very few scholars, makes a comparison between Peirce and Aristotle. Factor claims that Peirce's definition of metaphor and its consequences undermine and overturn Aristotle's theory. We do not believe that Factor is right; and this is due to Factor's misinterpretation of key elements within Aristotle's theory. We rather believe that Peirce and Aristotle, in fact, have central ideas in common concerning metaphor; perhaps, in particular, when it comes to the function of metaphor. Hence, both see, for example, metaphor as a cognitive mechanism. The article tries to develop this argument.