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Frontmatter -- CONTENTS -- Preface -- Contributors -- Introduction -- PART I. JUSTIFYING CIVIL AND UNCIVIL DISOBEDIENCE -- 1. Uncivil Disobedience -- 2. Disobedience in Black: On Race and Dissent -- 3. The Radical Possibilities of Protest -- PART II. THE STRATEGY OF POLITICAL PROTEST -- 4. Competing Theories of Nonviolent Politics -- 5. No Justice, No Peace: Uncivil Protest and the Politics of Confrontation -- 6. Protest Fatigue -- 7. "No Ways Tired": An Antidote for Protest Fatigue in the Trump Era -- PART III. THE DEMOCRATIC SIGNIFICANCE OF PROTEST AND DISSENT -- 8. Defining Nonviolence as a Matter of Law and Politics -- 9. On the Strike and Democratic Protest -- 10. Are Protests Good or Bad for Democracy? -- Index

Cover -- POLITICAL LEGITIMACY -- Title -- Copyright -- CONTENTS -- PREFACE -- CONTRIBUTORS -- INTRODUCTION -- PART I. FOUNDATIONS OF LEGITIMACY: AUTONOMY, ASSENT, AND OBLIGATION -- 1. Legitimacy and Self-Determination -- 2. In Defense of Functionalism -- 3. Is Political Legitimacy Worth Promoting? -- 4. The Sovereign and the Republic: A Republican View of Political Obligation -- PART II. THE JUSTIFICATION OF INSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY -- 5. Political Legitimacy under Epistemic Constraints: Why Public Reasons Matter -- 6. Legitimacy as a Right to Err -- 7. Official Intentions and Political Legitimacy: The Case of the Travel Ban -- 8. The Political Legitimacy of International NGOs -- PART III. BELIEFS ABOUT LEGITIMACY AND COMPLIANCE -- 9. Evaluating Consensual Models of Governance: Legitimacy-Based Law -- 10. On the Empirical Measurement of Legitimacy -- 11. The Empirical Study of Legitimate Authority: Normative Guidance for Positive Analysis -- 12. Trustworthy Government and Legitimating Beliefs -- Index.

Cover -- WEALTH -- Title -- Copyright -- CONTENTS -- Contributors -- Preface -- 1. Having Too Much -- 2. Wealth, Commonwealth, and the Constitution of Opportunity -- 3. The Evolution of Wealth and Mutual Concern: Democracy or Revolution? -- 4. Where's the Middle? Constitutional Aspirations, Biased Institutions, and the Disappearing Middle Class -- 5. Wealth Defense and the Complicity of Liberal Democracy -- 6. Wealth Concentration, Racial Subordination, and Political Corruption -- 7. Wealth and Democracy -- 8. Not So Fast: The Hidden Difficulties of Taxing Wealth -- Index

Contemporary political science takes bargaining to be the central mechanism of democratic decision making, though political theorists typically doubt that processes that permit the exercise of unequal power and the use of threats can yield legitimate outcomes. In this review, we trace the development of theories of institutional bargaining from the standpoint of pluralism and positive political theory before turning to the treatment of bargaining in the influential work of John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas. Their ambivalence about bargaining gave rise to a new focus on the value of negotiation and compromise but this literature constitutes an unstable midpoint between the justificatory ambitions of deliberative democracy and the desire to provide plausible models of political decision making. Instead of advocating changes in mindset or motivation, we argue that a fair bargaining process requires institutional reform, as well as a justificatory framework centered on the preservation of egalitarian decision making.

The publication of Richard Tuck's 2012 Seeley Lectures constituted an important event in intellectual history and political theory. The Sleeping Sovereign reflects the depth of Tuck's nearly forty years of historical inquiry into the concepts of rights, reason of state, and freedom, beginning with Natural Rights Theories. The leading member of the "Cambridge school" of the study of the history of political thought in the United States, and the Frank G. Thomson Professor of Government at Harvard University, Tuck combines a contextualist, and often intertextualist, approach to the interpretation of canonical works with a theorist's attention to the value these works retain for contemporary political life.

Political scientists have contributed to the world of electoral systems as scientists and as engineers. Taking stock of recent scientific research, we show that context modifies the effects of electoral rules on political outcomes in specific and systematic ways. We explore how electoral rules shape the inclusion of women and minorities, the depth and nature of political competition, and patterns of redistribution and regulation, and we consider institutional innovations that could promote political equality. Finally, we describe the diverse ways that political scientists produce an impact on the world by sharing and applying their knowledge of the consequences of electoral rules and global trends in reform.