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Barack Obama's presidential victory naturally led people to believe that the United States might finally be moving into a post-racial era. Obama's Race-and its eye-opening account of the role played by race in the election-paints a dramatically different picture. The authors argue that the 2008 election was more polarized by racial attitudes than any other presidential election on record-and perhaps more significantly, that there were two sides to this racialization: resentful opposition to and racially liberal support for Obama. As Obama's campaign was given a boost in the primaries from raci

Barack Obama's presidential victory naturally led people to believe that the United States might finally be moving into a post-racial era. Obama's Race--and its eye-opening account of the role played by race in the election--paints a dramatically different picture. The authors argue that the 2008 election was more polarized by racial attitudes than any other presidential election on record--and perhaps more significantly, that there were two sides to this racialization: resentful opposition to and racially liberal support for Obama.

Despite the successes of the civil rights movement, a largely impermeable color line continues to restrict African Americans from assimilation into the broader American society. In the meantime high rates of immigration have produced an increasingly culturally diverse population. A "people of color" hypothesis suggests that the color line the new immigrants face resembles that imposed on African Americans. A "black exceptionalism" hypothesis suggests instead that the color line will be more porous for them, allowing for greater assimilation over successive generations, including a gradual weakening of politicized racial and ethnic group consciousness. Using data from Los Angeles County Social Surveys, we find that the largest new immigrant group, Latinos, like blacks, show strongly group‐interested policy preferences and strong group consciousness. However, both effects are stronger for recent Latino immigrants than for the U.S.‐born. We conclude that the new immigrant groups are increasingly likely to assimilate politically into the broader society in future generations, whereas a rather strict color line will continue to restrict blacks and maintain their distinctiveness.

Our focus is the regional political realignment that has occurred among whites over the past four decades. We hypothesize that the South's shift to the Republican party has been driven to a significant degree by racial conservatism in addition to a harmonizing of partisanship with general ideological conservatism. General Social Survey and National Election Studies data from the 1970s to the present indicate that whites residing in the old Confederacy continue to display more racial antagonism and ideological conservatism than non‐Southern whites. Racial conservatism has become linked more closely to presidential voting and party identification over time in the white South, while its impact has remained constant elsewhere. This stronger association between racial antagonism and partisanship in the South compared to other regions cannot be explained by regional differences in nonracial ideology or nonracial policy preferences, or by the effects of those variables on partisanship.

The concept of symbolic racism was originally proposed 30 years ago. Much research has been done and the society itself has changed, yet many of the original items measuring symbolic racism remain in use. The primary objective of this paper is to present and evaluate an updated scale of symbolic racism. The scale proves to be reliable and internally coherent. It has discriminant validity, being distinctively different from both older forms of racial attitudes and political conservatism, although with a base in both. It has predictive validity, explaining whites' racial policy preferences considerably better than do traditional racial attitudes or political predispositions. Evidence is presented of its usefulness for both college student and general adult population samples, as well as for minority populations. Data using this scale contradict several critiques of the symbolic racism construct (most of which are speculative rather than based on new data) concerning the consistency of its conceptualization and measurement, the coherence of the symbolic racism belief system, possible artifacts in its influence over whites' racial policy preferences (due to content overlap between the measures of independent and dependent variables), and its differentiation from nonracial conservatism and old‐fashioned racism.

We propose that (1) the preadult socialization of longstanding, stable predispositions is catalyzed by exogenous political events; (2) such events socialize attitudes selectively, only in the specific domains they make salient; and so (3) longstanding predispositions tend to be socialized episodically rather than incrementally. This theory is applied to the socialization of partisanship during a presidential campaign, examining gains in information, affective expression, and attitude crystallization. Adolescents (aged 10 to 17) and their parents were interviewed in a three-wave panel study, at the beginning of a presidential campaign, at the end, and a year later. The campaign induced substantial preadult socialization gains regarding attitude objects central to the campaign (candidates and parties), particularly in the stability of preadults' partisanship. There were few gains in attitude domains peripheral to the campaign or during the postcampaign period. These findings suggest that periodic political events catalyze preadult socialization, generating predispositions that persist into later life stages.

We propose that (1) the preadult socialization of longstanding, stable predispositions is catalyzed by exogenous political events; (2) such events socialize attitudes selectively, only in the specific domains they make salient; and so (3) longstanding predispositions tend to be socialized episodically rather than incrementally. This theory is applied to the socialization of partisanship during a presidential campaign, examining gains in information, affective expression, and attitude crystallization. Adolescents (aged 10 to 17) and their parents were interviewed in a three-wave panel study, at the beginning of a presidential campaign, at the end, and a year later. The campaign induced substantial preadult socialization gains regarding attitude objects central to the campaign (candidates and parties), particularly in the stability of preadults' partisanship. There were few gains in attitude domains peripheral to the campaign or during the postcampaign period. These findings suggest that periodic political events catalyze preadult socialization, generating predispositions that persist into later life stages. (American Political Science Review / FUB)

Bilingual education has become politicized. It is surrounded by controversy, the outcome of which may play a greater role in deciding its future as an educational program than its educational successes. To better understand this political debate and its possible outcome, the present article examines attitudes toward bilingual education among the Anglo majority, in terms of general support levels, the origins of support, and its future trajectory. We find that currently the majority feels moderately positive toward bilingual education. Opposition is greatest among those who have generally negative attitudes toward minority groups and immigrants and who oppose special favors for them and among those who oppose increased government spending and spending on foreign-language instruction. Anglos' actual personal experience with bilingual education plays only a minor role. Opposition is greater among the well informed, suggesting that opposition may increase further as the issue attains greater national visibility. Opposition is also likely to increase if bilingual education is presented as promoting linguistic and cultural maintenance among language-minority students rather than as a mechanism for teaching English.