Suchergebnisse

It is a matter of privilege and pleasure for me to attend this
annual Conference of the Pakistan Society of Development Economists.
Over the past years this gathering has turned into a regular event
providing a unique opportunity to scholars, economists and social
scientists to deliberate on issues of national and international
significance. The participation of eminent scholars and experts from
within and outside the country and the large number of papers on various
topics to be presented during its four-day deliberations signify the
importance of the Conference and augurs well for its success. I feel
that in addition to offering a platform for academic and professional
interaction, the Conference can also be used for putting forward
specific recommendations that may be considered by the government in
formulating its policies. The theme of the Conference, namely
"Governance and Development", is critical and timely. It implies that
the issue of governance is not only significant in its own right but
also has a direct and close bearing on development issues. Experience in
Pakistan and elsewhere shows that neglecting the issue of governance and
management has severely impaired economic growth and contributed to
social and political malaise. It is a happy coincidence that this theme
is also occupying a high position in the agenda of the present
Government. You may recall that in his address to the nation on 17th
October, the Chief Executive, General Pervez Musharraf, has identified
good governance as the pre-requisite to achieving the seven aims and
objectives that the government has set before it. This seven point
agenda, includes the revival of the economy, restoration of investors'
confidence and ensuring swift and across the board
accountability.

Die sowjetische Politik war jahrzehntelang davon bestimmt, den amerikanischen Einfluß in den Ländern des Persischen Golfes einzudämmen oder auszuschalten. Mit dem Regierungsantritt Gorbatschows schienen sich die Ziele der sowjetischen Politik geändert zu haben. Der Artikel untersucht die Entwicklung Ende der 80er Jahre und zeigt Perspektiven sowjetischer Politik am Golf für die 90er Jahre. Breschnjews Vorschläge einer Sicherheitspolitik, die sowjetische Strategie der Militärhilfe, die strategischen Zieländerungen Gorbatschows und die Antwort des Westens auf die globalpolitischen und golfpolitischen Strategien der Sowjetunion sind die Themen. Der Autor sieht eine weitgehende Interessensübereinstimmung der Großmächte für die 90er Jahre - der rapide Zusammenbruch der Sowjetunion und die damit verbundenen weltpolitischen Änderungen waren nicht vorhersehbar. (DÜI-Gbh)

President Ziaur Rahman's assassination at the hands of miscreants in the vort of Chittagong in May 1981 stunned his compatriots. Zia was the first popularly elected president with a 77 per cent electoral mandate. His youth, igour and dedication had earned him the respect of his countrymen. He was he only President to establish genuine and regular political contact with the ural majority, bringing to them the promise of a better life. And in the eyes f the informed public he had pulled Bangladesh out of the backwaters of the sian sub-continent into the glare of international limelight. But his sudden eath threw the nation into chaos and uncertainty, and a resolute adherance the Constitution seemed to be the only modus operandi ad interim. The mediate reaction of the government, the opposition parties and the armed ervices to the news of the assassination was a spirited portrayal of national nity. With Zia's Cabinet still intact, the ailing septuagenarian Vice President, bdus Sattar, was hurriedly brought from an army hospital and sworn in as e Acting President,1 pending presidential elections within 180 days as was equired by the Constitution.2 Immediately after, the new Acting President roclaimed a state of emergency3 as a step towards national consolidation. n emergency Cabinet meeting was held, following which Sattar declared his overnment's resolution to honour Zia's international commitments and carry rward his domestic policies and objectives. Next, the Chiefs of the Armed ervices, the Intelligence Services, the Bangladesh Rifles and the Police were mmoned to the "Bangabhaban," and their total support to Sattar's interim overnment was publicly announced. The parliamentary group of the Banglaesh Nationalist Party (BNP), the party then in power, also hurriedly met in special session to reaffirm the party's solidarity with and total support Sattar. Sattar also invited the leaders of the opposition parties to "Bangahaban" and secured assurances of their full support to his transitional governtent. The chiefs of the navy and army in their television broadcasts assured he nation of their allegiance to Sattar and their united commitment to contain he rebellion in Chittagong expeditiously. Thus, within 48 hours after Zia's ssassination, the new government managed to portray a picture of national nity and solidarity, though the national crises that loomed large were yet to e resolved.

THE AUTHOR OF THIS ARTICLE CONTENDS THAT THE CONCEPT OF NONALIGNMENT HAS GROWN UNWIELDY OVER THE PAST DECADE. NONALIGNMENT GREW AS A CONCEPT AFTER WORLD WAR II, WITH THE RISE OF NATIONALIST FEELING IN ONCE COLONIZED NATIONS. IT WAS AT FIRST A LOOSE CONCEPT, BUT EVENTS, HE SAYS, HAVE COMPLICATED ITS IMPLICATIONS.