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AbstractThe arrival of artificial intelligence (AI) in our society has sparked many hopes and fears, with people having diverging views on the need to strictly regulate AI. The current study investigates how demographic and personality traits are associated with a desire to strictly regulate AI using a representative sample of adults from New Zealand (N = 47,951 participants). Data revealed that support for strict regulation of AI is positively related with agreeableness, neuroticism, and honesty–humility. However, it is negatively related to openness to experiences. A wide range of demographic factors including gender, age, ethnicity, religiosity, neighbourhood level economic deprivation, living rural, relationship status, and parental status were additionally related to support for regulation of AI. However, all these effects were fairly small suggesting that both personality and socio-demographic factors contribute to support for regulating AI, but other factors beyond these characteristics should also be considered for understanding people's support for regulating AI.

AbstractAlthough national flags arguably reflect a unified nation, support for a particular flag design may vary across ideological cleavages within the electorate. Here, we examined the impact of system‐challenging and system‐justifying ideologies, as well as political party support, on support for flag‐change in a large (N = 13,559) nationally representative sample of New Zealand adults. As hypothesized, system‐justifying ideologies (e.g., conservatism, right‐wing authoritarianism, historical negation, and symbolic exclusion) correlated negatively with flag change support, whereas system‐challenging ideologies (e.g., support for multiculturalism) correlated positively with support for change. Yet, consistent with an identity politics perspective, support for the National Party—the center‐right/conservative party in New Zealand whose leader advocated change—correlated positively (rather than negatively) with support for changing the flag. These results demonstrate the countervailing effects of system‐justifying and system‐challenging ideologies on support for change, and identify a boundary condition of conservatives' opposition to change (namely, party support).

We investigate macrocontextual antecedents of national levels of Social Dominance Orientation (SDO). The majority of previous research, in contrast, has tended to focus on individual‐level correlates of SDO. We extend research on Social Dominance Theory by modelling national‐level differences in institutional discrimination, macroeconomic development, and value ideologies as broad situational factors affecting SDO mean levels in previous studies. Our hypotheses were tested in a three‐level meta‐analysis of aggregate data from 50,971 individuals in 95 samples from 27 different societies. Strong effects for hierarchy‐attenuating legitimizing ideologies and gender empowerment were found. Aggregate discrimination against arbitrary‐set groups was less consistently linked to SDO, suggesting that these hierarchies are context‐specific. Using mixed‐effects three‐level modelling, the patterns can be generalized to new contexts and suggest a particular institutional and social climate that fosters high SDO.

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to show whether positive or negative framing of preparation messages leads to higher intentions to prepare for earthquakes, and whether the more important component of the message is the framing of the preparation action or the framing of the outcome of not preparing.Design/methodology/approachFour message conditions were created by crossing the framing of preparation actions (taking or not taking action) and the framing of outcomes (experiencing harm and avoiding harm in an earthquake). They were presented to citizens (n=240) in Wellington, New Zealand, who judged the general importance of preparation and specific preparation steps.FindingsThe study finds that intentions to undertake both general and specific preparation were higher with negatively framed outcomes than positive outcomes. With specific actions, negative outcomes led to higher intentions to prepare when the action frame was positive (i.e. being well prepared).Research limitations/implicationsThis research shows that negative framing should apply to outcome preparation and not to the action of preparingPractical implicationsThese findings clarify that negative framing of outcomes is likely to increase preventive actions in relation to natural hazards.Originality/valueThis is the first study to show the affects of message framing on preparing for disasters.

Feelings of group-based relative deprivation (GRD) motivate collective responses to defend the ingroup. As such, there may be status-based asymmetries in the associations GRD has with ideologies that perpetuate inequality—namely, right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO). Study 1 examined this hypothesis using a national sample of adults ( N = 41,007) and revealed that the correlations GRD had with RWA and SDO were positive among members of a high-status group but negative among members of low-status groups. Study 2 examined these associations longitudinally ( N = 22,083) across eight annual assessments. Although a traditional cross-lagged panel analysis identified status-based asymmetries in the longitudinal associations between our variables of interest, analyses partitioning between-person stability from within-person change found no evidence that GRD leads to differences in RWA or SDO (or vice versa). The theoretical and practical implications of these results are discussed.

A noticeable feature of the political discourse accompanying the rise of nationalism in white‐majority countries is that white people fare worse than other ethnic groups in their societies. However, it is unclear based on the extant literature why group‐based relative deprivation (GRD) would correlate with majority‐group nationalism. Here, we propose that the psychological function of nationalism for majority‐group members lies in its ability to assuage the negative feelings arising from GRD. Accordingly, in a New Zealand national probability sample (N = 15,607), we found that GRD among whites was negatively associated with well‐being. However, we also found an opposing indirect association mediated by nationalism. GRD was associated with higher nationalism, which was in turn associated with higher well‐being. These findings suggest that endorsing beliefs about national superiority is one way a nation's dominant ethnic group can cope with the negative psychological consequences of perceiving that their group is deprived.

A central challenge for identifying core components of a belief system is examining the position of components within the structure of the entire belief system. We test whether operational (i.e. positions on issues) or symbolic (i.e. affective attachments to political groups and labels) components are most central by modeling a political belief system as a network of interconnected attitudes and beliefs. Across seven waves of representative panel data from New Zealand, we find that symbolic components are more central than operational components (d's range 0.78 – 0.97). Symbolic components were also closer than operational components in the network to self-reported voting (d = -2.43), pro-environmental actions (d's = -1.71 and -1.63), and religious behaviors (d = -0.74). These findings are consistent with perspectives that emphasize the importance of symbolic politics in tying belief systems together and motivating behavior, and further the link between political belief system research and network science.

Since first being proposed 25 years ago, system justification theory has become a paradigm-shifting framework for understanding intergroup relations and political psychology. Based on the thesis that people are motivated to defend and bolster the societal status quo, system justification theory helps to explain varied phenomena, including resistance to change, outgroup favouritism, and other instances of false consciousness. This paper summarizes four tenets of the theory including the following: (1) antecedents to system justification, (2) palliative effects of system justification, (3) status-based asymmetries in conflict between justification motives, and (4) societal consequences of system justification. Throughout our review, we highlight how system justification theory helps to explain why disadvantaged groups might sometimes support the status quo, emphasizing research conducted outside the United States when possible. We conclude by calling on future research to (1) further utilize nationally representative and multi-level data, (2) investigate the relational motives behind system justification, (3) address social change from a system justification perspective, and (4) extend system justification theory's focus beyond WEIRD societies.

The status-legitimacy hypothesis, which predicts that low-status groups will legitimise inequality more than high-status groups, has received inconsistent empirical support. To resolve this inconsistency, we hypothesised that low-status groups would display enhanced legitimation only when evaluating the fairness of the specific hierarchy responsible for their disadvantage. In a New Zealand-based probability sample (N = 6162), we found that low-status ethnic groups (Asians and Pacific Islanders) perceived ethnic-group relations to be fairer than the high-status group (Europeans). However, these groups did not justify the overall political system more than the high-status group. In fact, Māori showed the least support for the political system. These findings clarify when the controversial status-legitimacy effects predicted by System Justification Theory will—and will not—emerge.

Documenting the relationship between Agreeableness and political conservatism has proven elusive. We address this anomaly by showing that two aspects of Agreeableness – politeness and compassion – have countervailing relationships with political conservatism through right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO). To test this, we analyzed data from a nationally representative sample of New Zealanders (N = 4,553). Politeness was positively, but compassion was negatively, correlated with political conservatism. Consistent with the differential mediation hypothesis derived from the dual process model of ideology and prejudice, these opposing relationships were differentially mediated by RWA and SDO. This attenuated the bivariate relationship between the higher-order trait of Agreeableness and political conservatism. These results demonstrate the complex relationship between personality and political orientation.