Suchergebnisse

Scholars of international relations have long recognized the importance of soft power in great powers' hegemonic designs. In contrast, we know little of middle powers' employment of noncoercive strategies of attraction and, in particular, how soft power operates in the context of middle-power antagonism. We suggest that, first, soft power enhances coalition-building strategies for middle powers. Contrary to expectations that states join forces against a shared threat, the use of soft power via development aid produces an "Us" versus "Them" distinction in target states that unites them in the absence of a common enemy. Second, middle states' soft-power strategies are likely to support coalition maintenance so long as it does not challenge target states' national interests. Utilizing extensive archival and interview-based data, we examine how soft power featured in Egyptian–Israeli competition across sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) from 1957 to 1974. We demonstrate how soft power operates beyond the context of great power agenda setting, therefore providing novel evidence for the importance of soft power in the interplay between interstate antagonism and noncoercion in world politics.

Abstract
This article draws on interviews with 198 state ambassadors and applies an interpretivist lens to provide a more nuanced conceptualization of diplomacy. In doing so, we seek to project a closer fit between scholarly definitions of the term and how diplomacy is understood by practitioners. We contribute to the literature by proposing a more refined understanding of the term, presented here as five distinct (though not mutually exclusive) 'meanings' of diplomacy: (1) The actors taking part in modern diplomacy; (2) the objectives of diplomacy; (3) the mechanisms of diplomacy; (4) diplomacy as a skill; and (5) diplomacy as a profession. We find that drawing on the full range of the diplomatic experience is particularly important given the growing challenges to negotiation as the primary agency of diplomacy.

More than three decades after the concept of international regimes was introduced, the study of why and how states may choose to cooperate, particularly around security, remains contested. While the field has evolved considerably over that time, there remain significant puzzles in the literature concerning the emergence of different types of security regimes. We aim to address these issues by developing the concept of a tacit security regime (TSR) literature. We define a TSR as an interest-based, limited, and informal mechanism of cooperation between states for the purpose of deconflicting their respective interests over a specific security issue. We illustrate the usefulness of our concept in the two contemporary cases of Russian-Israeli and Russian-Turkish security cooperation over the Syrian crisis (2015-2018).

This article suggests that President Obama's consistent references to the extremist Sunni group as 'ISIL' (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) is not a trivial matter of nomenclature. Instead, the Obama administration's deliberate usage of the ISIL acronym (as opposed to other commonly-used terms such as 'Islamic State of Iraq and Syria' or 'ISIS', 'Islamic State', 'IS', 'so-called Islamic State' and 'Daesh') frames the public perception of the threat to avoid engagement with the requirements of strategy and operations. Both the labelling and the approach could be defended as a response to the unique challenge of a transnational group claiming religious and political legitimacy. However, we suggest that the labelling is an evasion of the necessary response, reflecting instead a lack of coherence in strategy and operations-in particular after the Islamic State's lightning offensive in Iraq and expansion in Syria in mid-2014. This tension between rhetoric, strategy and operations means that 'ISIL' does not provide a stable depiction of the Islamic State. While it may draw upon the post-9/11 depiction of 'terrorism', the tag leads to dissonance between official and media representations. The administration's depiction of a considered approach leading to victory has been undermined by the abstraction of 'ISIL', which in turn produced strategic ambiguity about the prospect of any political, economic or military challenge to the Islamic State. (International Affairs (Oxford) / SWP)