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Using borders and alliances as indicators of opportunity and willingness, respectively, we test the relationship between these and the diffusion of war during the 1816–1965 period. The impact of borders and alliances, individually and in combination, on the growth of ongoing war through "infectious" diffusion is shown through the comparison of baseline cases to cases where states at peace were exposed to various "treatments" comprised of warring border nations or warring alliance partners. The findings indicate that the probability of war diffusion is substantially increased as opportunities and willingness increase, particularly when such geographic and political factors are combined. The applicability of the opportunity and willingness framework to the study of war and diffusion is expanded and confirmed.

The authors investigate the expectations generated by the "interaction opportunity" model initially developed by Most and Starr for the study of diffusion. The impact that borders and alliances have as "treatments" on the overall war behavior of states is the focus of study, looking at both individual and interactive effects. Using the war behavior of all states in the system from 1815–1965, the analyses support the expectations generated by the interaction opportunity model. The treatments of warring border nations and warring alliance partners, of various types and combinations, predispose states to be at war.

Drawing upon earlier research on the post failed coup survival of political leaders, we offer an ex ante in sample estimate of the likely political survival of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan following the fail coup of 2016. Depending on the assumption made about when he entered office, we conclude that his tenure is likely to endure until 2026, a result that was reached before his recent call for a snap election and its implications. We conclude with a brief discussion of the policy implications of President Erdogan's likely length of tenure.

What factors explain variation in the tenure of political leaders who survive a coup d'état? Our main hypothesis is that leaders who survive a coup attempt take the opportunity to purge known and potential rivals while also deterring future coup conspirators. The severity of the purge is also hypothesized to be positively associated with longer post-coup tenures, as potential rivals are eliminated or deterred from future coup attempts. After introducing the topic of the failed coup, and presenting the dataset we developed to measure the level of punishment associated with a failed coup attempt, we offer an analysis of the effect of purges on the survival time of leaders who survive a coup attempt. We find that, conditional on regime type, purging has an effect on lengthening leader tenure, with more severe purges being associated with longer authoritarian tenures. Democratic leaders gain no advantage. Changes in military expenditures do not increase subsequent tenure. We conclude with a discussion of the results as well as what a broader dataset might reveal.

The proclivity of military regimes and their leaders for more frequent involvement in international conflict than other autocracies has been shown in several studies. The question raised here is not whether they participate in more conflicts and disputes, but rather whether after the leaders of military regimes enter office they initiate these acts more quickly than the leaders of other types of autocracies. Drawing on three authoritarian regime typologies and examining the time to the initiation of any dispute and the initiation of violent disputes, our results show that in comparison to other authoritarian leaders a subset of military leaders is distinctly trigger-happy.