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The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act requires the President to submit an annual report on the National Security Strategy. In theory, a formal presentation of grand strategy was intended to lend coherence to the budgeting process; a clear statement of interests, objectives, and concepts for achieving them gave Congress a clear idea of the resources required to support the President's strategy. The problem with such documents is that they often create the false impression that strategy formulation is a rational and systemic process. In fact, strategy formulation both within the executive branch and between the executive branch and Congress is an intensely political process from which national strategy emerges after protracted bargaining and compromise. Key personalities do what they can agree to do. Don Snider, as an Army colonel, participated in this process at the National Security Council, and prepared the 1988 Report on National Security Strategy. This study is his account of the strategy formulation process as viewed from the White House. ; https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1243/thumbnail.jpg

The successful application of national military strategy depends upon the existence of a balanced, flexible military establishment; a national force structured, manned, equipped, and trained to execute the broad range of potential missions that exist in the post-cold war world. With this in mind, the national leaders of the previous administration developed a concept for a military that was considerably smaller; but well-equipped, highly trained, and capable of rapid response to a number of probable scenarios in the final decade of the 20th century. The author's masterful assessment of the processes by which these plans for the future state of America's armed forces were developed is a valuable addition to the literature on strategy formulation. Working with a great deal of original source material, he is able to illuminate the critical series of events that resulted in the development of the National Military Strategy of the United States and the "base force." He comments upon the roles played throughout this process by the Secretary of Defense, by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and by the Service Chiefs. He assesses the extent to which the "build-down" has been achieved since the concept was approved, and how the process was affected by the Gulf War, domestic needs, and, to a lesser degree, by a change in administrations. ; https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1283/thumbnail.jpg

Surveys the literature of current military strategy, perceived threats to US interests, and the changing nature of conventional warfare.

This article argues that the civil-military turbulence witnessed at the outset of the Clinton Administration was a contemporary manifestation of longer-term systemic trends of professional preparation among top-level civilian and military officials. The U.S. military since Vietnam has altered its attitude towards political-military knowledge, experience, and higher education. At the same time, civilian officials have declined in national security expertise-this trend partially caused by the end of the draft and the civilian reaction to Vietnam. The confluence of an increasingly politically savvy military and less militarily experienced civilian leadership has resulted in more military influence in the national security decision-making process. When civilian and military preferences diverged in 1993, civil-military tension heightened as military arguments prevailed. However, the key to restoring the balance in U.S. civil-military relations lies not in restraining military behavior, but in enhancing and promoting civilian professional preparation.