A review essay on a book by Joel S. Wit, Daniel B. Poneman, & Robert L. Gallucci, Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis, (Washington: Brookings Instit Press, 2004). Going Critical offers an insiders' view of the deal struck with North Korea in 1994 & a core lesson for the Bush administration: there's no substitute for negotiation. Adapted from the source document.
Almost exactly a half-century following the outbreak of the Korean War, South Korea president Kim Dae-jung made a historic visit to Pyongyang for the first-ever summit meeting between the leaders of the two Koreas in June of 2000. A decade following the collapse of communism in the rest of the world, Kim's journey would inevitably be judged in history as a potential starting point for the end of inter-Korean confrontation. Three days following direct, broad-ranging discussions with his counterpart, Kim Jong Il, Kim Dae-jung confidently returned to Seoul with an inter-Korean summit declaration promising enhanced efforts at reconciliation and inter-Korean exchange. Upon his return to Seoul, Kim Dae-jung declared that there would be "no more war" on the Korean Peninsula. The next task was to institutionalize an array of exchanges and inter-Korean interactions designed eventually to lead to national reconciliation.