Suchergebnisse

Abstract The European Court of Auditors (ECA), established in 1977, is the external auditor of the EU budget. It was given full EU institutional status in 1993. The Treaty of Amsterdam reaffirmed its independence and extended its audit powers. Based in Luxembourg, it employs around 900 people, of whom less than half are auditors. The ECA is meant to carry out its audit tasks in close cooperation with the supreme audit institutions (SAIs) at the national level. Through its work, it shapes and adopts new audit standards that guide its practice. It is member of International Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI) (1953), a forum that brings together professional and technical experts worldwide through working groups and task forces. Drawing on Oliver Buntrock's notion of 'micro-institutionalisation', this article examines how and why the ECA formally engages in standard-setting at the international level. Drawing on primary documents and interviews, it analyses socialization processes and considers motives for participation. The article argues that membership of INTOSAI has helped bolster the ECA's professional and technical legitimacy over 20 years, and reinforced its independence vis-à-vis its main stakeholders, the European Parliament and European Commission. The paper contributes to our understanding of how a lesser-known EU body contributes to the evaluation of EU budgetary spending.

This article surveys the evolution of multi-level audit governance in the European Union. It traces sixty-five years of financial control, from the work of a single auditor at the European Coal and Steel Community (1952) to the creation of the Audit Board of the European Communities (1959-1977), and from the establishment of an independent European Court of Auditors (1977) to audit the newly established EU budget, to the setting up of a European Anti-Fraud Office (1999). The article addresses the challenges of securing effective cooperation between audit bodies at the national and supranational level. It also analyses how the Community's external auditor started to 'hold to account' EU policies and traces the tensions and inter-institutional conflict that arose between the Court and the Commission and Council. Using an analytical approach set out by Tömmel (2016) that recognises different 'modes of governance', it identifies the main phases and turning points that have shaped audit governance. It shows how the audit task has changed since the Maastricht Treaty, and considers the way the Court works to identify error and fraud in budgetary spending, acknowledging the challenges of shared implementation for policies financed by the budget. The latter part of the article addresses current institutional reform and innovation. It examines the dilemma for audit governance brought by the Eurozone financial crisis and the emergence of new tools and mechanisms paid for by taxpayer money beyond the EU budget.

AbstractAnalysis of the Commission's role in policy implementation has focused largely on the administrative rather than political level. Yet little attention has been paid to the importance of high‐level Commission actors, such as Commissioners and Director‐Generals at this stage. This article analyses the role of a working group (WG) of Commissioners in monitoring and co‐ordinating the implementation of trans‐European networks (TENs) in transport. It argues that formally institutionalized structures for intra‐College co‐operation provide important arenas for creativity, entrepreneurship and consensus‐building. Ultimately, the consistent and sustained political involvement of Commissioners improves the Commission's administrative co‐ordination and may, ultimately, help secure better policy implementation.