Recent Critics of the Rationality-to-Morality Argument
In: From Rationality to Equality, S. 63-85
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In: From Rationality to Equality, S. 63-85
In: From Rationality to Equality, S. 23-62
In: From Rationality to Equality, S. 86-100
In: From Rationality to Equality, S. 162-189
In: From Rationality to Equality, S. 190-210
In: Journal of social philosophy, Band 42, Heft 4, S. 441-448
ISSN: 1467-9833
In: Ethics & international affairs, Band 22, Heft 2, S. 227-229
ISSN: 1747-7093
In: Ethics & international affairs, Band 22, Heft 2, S. 227-229
ISSN: 0892-6794
In: The Blackwell Guide to Social and Political Philosophy, S. 177-196
In: Ethics & international affairs, Band 22, Heft 2, S. 227-228
ISSN: 0892-6794
In: The American journal of economics and sociology, Band 66, Heft 1, S. 71-86
ISSN: 1536-7150
Abstract. I begin this chapter with an account of what is deserved in human ethics, an ethics that assumes without argument that only humans, or rational agents, count morally. I then take up the question of whether nonhuman living beings are also deserving, and I answer it in the affirmative. Having established that all individual living beings, as well as ecosystems, are deserving, I go on to establish what it is that they deserve and then compare the requirements of global justice when only humans are taken into account with the requirements of global justice when all living beings are taken into account. I argue that the more adequate global justice that takes into account all living beings imposes some additional obligations on us that are absent from a less defensible human‐centered global justice, but not as many as one might initially think.
In: Pazifismus: Ideengeschichte, Theorie und Praxis, S. 193-203
In: Journal of social philosophy, Band 36, Heft 3, S. 397-405
ISSN: 1467-9833
In: Journal of social philosophy, Band 36, Heft 2, S. 159-174
ISSN: 1467-9833
In: Journal of global ethics, Band 1, Heft 1, S. 53-68
ISSN: 1744-9634