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China and the United States are the two largest emitters of greenhouse gases, making them pivotal players in global climate negotiations. Within the coming decade, however, India is set to become the most important counterpart to the United States, as it overtakes China as the country with the most at stake depending on the type of global burden-sharing agreements reached, thus becoming a member of the 'Climate G2'. We create a hypothetical global carbon market based on modelling emissions reduction commitments across countries and regions relative to their marginal abatement costs. We then analyse net financial flows across a wide range of burden-sharing agreements, from pure 'grandfathering' based on current emissions to equal-per-capita allocation. Among the four largest players – the United States, the EU-27, China, and India – it is China that would currently be the largest net seller of emissions allowances in all but the grandfathered scenario. The United States would be the largest net buyer. However, India is poised to take China's position by around 2030. That leaves the United States and India as the two major countries with most to gain and lose, depending on the type of climate deal reached.

Abstract We analyse two mechanism designs for refunding emission payments to polluting firms: output-based refunding (OBR) and expenditure-based refunding (EBR). In both instruments, emission fees are returned to the polluting industry, typically making the policy more politically acceptable than a standard tax. The crucial difference between OBR and EBR is that the fees are refunded in proportion to output in the former but in proportion to the firms' expenditure on abatement technology equipment in the latter. To achieve the same abatement target as a standard tax, the fee level in the OBR design is higher, whereas the fee level in the EBR design is lower. The use of OBR and EBR may lead to large differences in the distribution of output and costs across firms. Both designs imply a cost-ineffective provision of abatement, as firms put relatively too much effort into reducing emissions through abatement technology compared with reducing output. However, a standard tax may be politically infeasible and maintaining output may be seen as a political advantage by policymakers if they seek to avoid activity reduction in the regulated sector.

International audience ; Carbon pricing is considered by most economists as a central dimension to any climate policy. It is assumed to bring simple, transparent, and cost-effective means to change investment and consumption behaviors. The most straightforward method is carbon taxation, but its implementation is more complex. This study provides a comparative analysis of carbon taxation in three countries-Sweden, Canada, and France-aimed at drawing lessons for the future of carbon taxation. Comparing the experience of the three countries reveals that carbon taxes, once in place, do have the intended effect. In this sense, they work well. However, the analysis also reveals very different situations in terms of advances, difficulties, and results, which highlights the need to carefully consider the social and political conditions for the acceptance and effective implementation of such economic instruments. Against this background, the comparative analysis yields four main insights that deserve further research from economics and social scientists: the ability to combine pure economic instruments and other regulation or policies and measures; the management of lobbies and vested interests; the identification of a clear strategy for the recycling of the carbon revenues, whether earmarked or not; and finally, the importance of these three dimensions of carbon taxes in the new settings of zero net emission policies.

International audience ; Carbon pricing is considered by most economists as a central dimension to any climate policy. It is assumed to bring simple, transparent, and cost-effective means to change investment and consumption behaviors. The most straightforward method is carbon taxation, but its implementation is more complex. This study provides a comparative analysis of carbon taxation in three countries-Sweden, Canada, and France-aimed at drawing lessons for the future of carbon taxation. Comparing the experience of the three countries reveals that carbon taxes, once in place, do have the intended effect. In this sense, they work well. However, the analysis also reveals very different situations in terms of advances, difficulties, and results, which highlights the need to carefully consider the social and political conditions for the acceptance and effective implementation of such economic instruments. Against this background, the comparative analysis yields four main insights that deserve further research from economics and social scientists: the ability to combine pure economic instruments and other regulation or policies and measures; the management of lobbies and vested interests; the identification of a clear strategy for the recycling of the carbon revenues, whether earmarked or not; and finally, the importance of these three dimensions of carbon taxes in the new settings of zero net emission policies.

Carbon emissions have increased by 50 percent since the first Earth Summit meeting in Rio de Janeiro, but the rapid development of wind and solar energy offers hope. Published in the New York Times on June 18th, 2012.

Cover -- Half Title -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- Acknowledgements -- Series Preface -- Introduction -- Part I Overview and Comparison of Different Taxes -- 1 Thomas Sterner and Gunnar Köhlin (2003), 'Environmental Taxes in Europe', Public Finance and Management, 3, pp. 117-42 -- 2 Randall A. Bluffstone (2003), 'Environmental Taxes in Developing and Transition Economies', Public Finance and Management, 3, pp. 143-75 -- Part II Institutional Aspects and Political Economy of Implementation -- 3 Henrik Hammar, Åsa Löfgren and Thomas Sterner (2004), 'Political Economy Obstacles to Fuel Taxation', Energy Journal, 25, pp. 1-17 -- 4 Dawn Erlandson (1994), 'The Btu Tax Experience: What Happened and Why it Happened', Pace Environmental Law Review, 12, pp. 173-84 -- 5 Per G. Fredriksson and Daniel L. Millimet (2004), 'Comparative Politics and Environmental Taxation', Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 48, pp. 705-22 -- 6 Erik Gawel (2001), 'Enforcement of Environmental Charges: Some Economic Aspects and Evidence from the German Waste Water Charge', European Environment, 11, pp. 225-38 -- 7 Susmita Dasgupta, Benoit Laplante, Nlandu Mamingi and Hua Wang (2001), 'Inspections, Pollution Prices, and Environmental Performance: Evidence from China', Ecological Economics, 36, pp. 487-98 -- 8 Michael Common (1985), 'The Distributional Implications of Higher Energy Prices in the UK', Applied Economics, 17, pp. 421-36 -- 9 Alan Krupnick, Winston Harrington and Anna Alberini (2001), 'Public Support for Pollution Fee Policies for Motor Vehicles with Revenue Recycling: Survey Results', Regional Science and Urban Economics, 31, pp. 505-22 -- 10 Sarah E. West (2004), 'Distributional Effects of Alternative Vehicle Pollution Control Policies', Journal of Public Economics, 88, pp. 735-57

The two distinct approaches to environmental policy include direct regulation-sometimes called 'command and control' policies-and regulation by economic, or market-based incentives. This book is the first to compare the costs and outcomes of these approaches by examining realworld applications. In a unique format, paired case studies from the United States and Europe contrast direct regulation on one side of the Atlantic with an incentivebased policy on the other. For example, Germany's direct regulation of SO2 emissions is compared with an incentive approach in the U.S. Direct regulation of w

We analyse two mechanism designs for refunding emission payments to polluting firms: output-based refunding (OBR) and expenditure-based refunding (EBR). In both instruments, emission fees are returned to the polluting industry, typically making the policy more politically acceptable than a standard tax. The crucial difference between OBR and EBR is that the fees are refunded in proportion to output in the former but in proportion to the firms' expenditure on abatement technology equipment in the latter. To achieve the same abatement target as a standard tax, the fee level in the OBR design is higher, whereas the fee level in the EBR design is lower. The use of OBR and EBR may lead to large differences in the distribution of output and costs across firms. Both designs imply a cost-ineffective provision of abatement, as firms put relatively too much effort into reducing emissions through abatement technology compared with reducing output. However, a standard tax may be politically infeasible and maintaining output may be seen as a political advantage by policymakers if they seek to avoid activity reduction in the regulated sector.

After twenty years of global negotiations, the world is still far from a comprehensive climate agreement. The 'top-down' approach embodied by the Kyoto Protocol has all but stalled, chiefly due to disagreements over levels of ambition and objections to financial transfers. To avoid those problems, many have shifted their focus on bottom-up 'linkage' of regional, national, and sub-national cap-and-trade systems. Decentralized architecture has its appeals, but we argue that linkage among carbon markets ultimately faces the same obstacles that are at the heart of global climate negotiations. Linkage can potentially reduce overall costs of tackling climate change by leveraging the differences in the marginal costs of emissions reductions across nations. However, as incomes, ideologies and other conditions diverge - and, thus, potential economic gains from linkage increase - political obstacles to linkage grow. We identify four obstacles to successful linkage: potential for gaming of targets; objections to financial transfers; the difficulty of close regulatory coordination; and incompatibility with other domestic policy objectives. Linkage, thus, may be an important political instrument and learning process but it provides no end run around international "global warming gridlock" (Victor 2011). A functioning global climate policy architecture still requires close international coordination with a balance of 'bottom-up' and 'top-down' elements. Only with this realization - and by employing a gradual process toward full linkage - can early carbon market linkages help facilitate a path towards a successful global climate architecture.