Suchergebnisse

In November 2009 U.S. President Barack Obama travelled for the first time to Japan, attended the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Singapore, met the heads of state of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) - including the representative of the Burmese military junta -, spent three days in Shanghai and Peking, and concluded his trip in South Korea. Presenting himself as the first 'Pacific' U.S. president and presenting the United States as a central actor in the region, he communicated three messages: The United States will uphold and strengthen the traditional bilateral alliances in Asia, get more involved in the existing multilateral organisations, and is ready to co-operate with China on today's global challenges. In the American and European media, the trip received a predominantly negative response, since it had not produced any tangible results, but instead had signalled the decline of the United States and its influence in the region. Behind this verdict stands the - misguided - expectation that Obama's new approaches would instantly lead to changed positions among U.S. partners

Im vergangenen November war US-Präsident Barack Obama auf Asienreise. Er besuchte erstmals Japan, reiste zum APEC-Gipfel nach Singapur, traf die Regierungschefs der südostasiatischen Staatengemeinschaft ASEAN - einschließlich des Vertreters von Burmas Militärjunta -, hielt sich drei Tage in Shanghai und Peking auf und beendete seine Tour in Südkorea. Dabei präsentierte Obama die USA als zentralen Akteur in der Region, sich selbst bezeichnete er als Amerikas ersten »pazifischen Präsidenten«. Zugleich vermittelte er drei Botschaften: Die USA werden in Asien an ihren traditionellen bilateralen Allianzen festhalten, sie wollen sich stärker multilateral engagieren, und sie sind zur Kooperation mit China bei den großen globalen Herausforderungen bereit. In den amerikanischen und europäischen Medien wurde die Reise überwiegend negativ bewertet: Sie sei ohne konkrete Ergebnisse geblieben und habe vor allem den Machtniedergang der USA signalisiert. Hinter diesem Urteil steht indes die - verfehlte - Erwartung, dass Obamas Neuansätze umgehend zu einer veränderten Haltung der Partner führen müssten

In November 2009 U.S. President Barack Obama travelled for the first time to Japan, attended the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Singapore, met the heads of state of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) - including the representative of the Burmese military junta -, spent three days in Shanghai and Peking, and concluded his trip in South Korea. Presenting himself as the first 'Pacific' U.S. president and presenting the United States as a central actor in the region, he communicated three messages: The United States will uphold and strengthen the traditional bilateral alliances in Asia, get more involved in the existing multilateral organisations, and is ready to co-operate with China on today's global challenges. In the American and European media, the trip received a predominantly negative response, since it had not produced any tangible results, but instead had signalled the decline of the United States and its influence in the region. Behind this verdict stands the - misguided - expectation that Obama's new approaches would instantly lead to changed positions among U.S. partners