Suchergebnisse

1.Introduction : state capitalism and the Chinese economic miracle /Kellee S. Tsai and Barry Naughton --Section I:Evolution of the state sector.2.State-owned business and party-state regulation in China's modern political economy /Margaret M. Pearson --3.The transformation of the state sector : SASAC, the market economy, and the new national champions /Barry Naughton --Section II:Outcomes and processes.4.Stability, asset management, and gradual change in China's reform economy /Dough Guthrie, Zhixing Xiao and Junmin Wang --5.The emergence and evolution of Chinese business groups : are pyramidal groups forming? /Dylan Sutherland and Lutao Ning --6.Competition and upgrading in Chinese industry /Loren Brandt and Eric Thun --Section III:The big picture : historical, social, and systemic perspectives.7.Explaining the dynamics of change : tranformation and evolution of China's public economy through war, revolution, and peace, 1928-2008 /Morris L. Bian --8.The evolution of a welfare state under China's state capitalism /Mark W. Frazier --9.Did China follow the East Asian development model? /Andrea Boltho and Maria Weber.

To develop a robust surveillance apparatus in the digital age, autocracies are compelled to rely on foreign suppliers or to allow domestic private entrepreneurs to enter a strategic industrial sector. The process through which China developed a surveillance state led by globally competitive security companies exemplifies this authoritarian capitalist dynamic. Initial liberalization enabled domestic firms to adapt foreign technology and eventually introduce innovations in digital surveillance. By the late 2000s, China had developed a vibrant and segmented security industry: homegrown surveillance giants with the most advanced technology dominated public procurement contracts and export markets, while smaller and medium-size enterprises were creating intrusive monitoring applications that go well beyond what the state had originally envisioned. Because China's surveillance state rests on strong public-private linkages, the assumed alliance between surveillance capitalists and a despotic state has generated external backlash from liberal democratic countries. Global supply chains involving sensitive technology have remained resilient, however. (China J/GIGA)

A comparative historical perspective shows how globalization and the specificities of China's rapid growth era limit its hegemonic potential in the twenty-first century global economy. Although state capitalism and openness to foreign capital facilitated China's economic transformation, interactions among three forms of capital—state, private, and foreign—have produced developmental dynamics that constrain China's capacity to assume the position of the world's economic hegemon. These include (1) the compromised competitiveness of China's corporate sector due to the domination of state-owned enterprises, (2) limits on the ability of Chinese firms to develop leading transnational corporations, and (3) early openness to and continued dependence on foreign capital. Moreover, the party-state's efforts to ameliorate these constraints arouse external suspicion rather than support a Chinese-led hegemonic order based on consent and shared interests. These historically conditioned realities should temper expectations that China is converging teleologically toward a familiar hegemonic role in the international economy.

Social media in China has not only become a popular means of communication, but also expanded the interaction between the government and online citizens. Why have some charitable crowdfunding campaigns had agenda-setting influence on public policy, while others have had limited or no impact? Based on an original database of 188 charitable crowdfunding projects currently active on Sina Weibo, we observe that over 80 per cent of long-term campaigns do not have explicit policy aspirations. Among those pursuing policy objectives, however, nearly two-thirds have had either agenda-setting influence or contributed to policy change. Such campaigns complement, rather than challenge existing government priorities. Based on field interviews (listed in Appendix A), case studies of four micro-charities – Free Lunch for Children, Love Save Pneumoconiosis, Support Relief of Rare Diseases, and Water Safety Program of China – are presented to highlight factors that contributed to their variation in public outcomes at the national level. The study suggests that charitable crowdfunding may be viewed as an "input institution" in the context of responsive authoritarianism in China, albeit within closely monitored parameters. (China Q/GIGA)

China's political system has been characterized by two institutions since the 1980s: an explicit "layer-by-layer administrative hierarchy" and the "appointment of cadres one level down." There have, however, been two departures from these administrative practices. First, some provinces have "empowered prosperous counties" by placing them in a dual-reporting relationship with both prefecture-level cities and provinces. Second, some provinces have restored personnel control going "two levels down" by appointing key officials at the county and urban district levels of government. These deviations evolved as responses to China's GDP-centric policy environment during the early reform era. Based on field interviews and nationwide analysis of city-level personnel data, this article argues that such adaptations have generated unintended conflicts between provinces and prefecture-level cities. While prior studies of evolutionary change in China highlight the relationship between state and non-state actors, this study demonstrates how interactions among state actors themselves may fundamentally transform the dynamics of administrative governance. (China Q / GIGA)

Urbanization in China involves administrative conversion of rural counties into urban districts. During the 1990s, provincial governments enhanced the authority of county governments by building more direct linkages between the two levels. Yet prefecture-level cities retained direct administrative authority over counties on certain issues. Based on fieldwork and an original database of administrative reorganization cases from 2011 to 2016, the authors observe that vertical competition between provinces and prefecture-level cities is mediating, and in some cases, thwarting the latter's urbanization efforts. Contrary to the expectation that more developed localities will incorporate wealthier counties, provincial capitals and less developed localities are incorporating counties with the highest fiscal revenue. In developing this argument, this article highlights the neglected role of the provincial government in administrative reorganization and the fiscal implications of urbanization. (J Contemp China/GIGA)

Investments by Asian Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) continue to be of concern in the global economy. A common perception is that they are managed by state-affiliated entities with geostrategic motives that could somehow prove detrimental to host countries. This paper demonstrates, however, that even the definition, let alone the establishment and investment targets, of Asian SWFs are embroiled in ambiguity within home country politics. Plainly put, ambiguity refers to the absence of clear-cut policy processes, means, and goals. How do we explain the ambiguity surrounding SWFs? Ambiguity is not a cover for deliberate, cohesive, and strategic actions, because SWFs are not under the control of any one set of actors. Rather, perhaps to the discomfort even of home country sovereigns, ambiguity is a messy domestic product of contending political forces that do not allow a marked trend toward any one single policy equilibrium on sovereign investments, whether domestic or foreign. While this reality is perhaps understandable in a democratic polity, it is also equally true of authoritarian ones in the region. In both types of cases, ambiguity is constructed inadvertently by the interactions of state, interstate, and intrastate actors, each with their own interests and expectations about the role of SWFs. Analyzing the cases in Singapore, China, Japan, and other Asian countries, from this unifying perspective suggests that while ambiguity may fuel external anxiety concerning home country intentions, it actually reflects far more domestically salient controversies about SWF activities than is typically appreciated.