Suchergebnisse

How do individual agents enact the institutions that govern collective behavior in a social situation? How do individuals come to share self-enforcing expectations about collective behavior, so that societal rules and constraints have an effect on individual choice? Conventional accounts, such as contract and evolutionary theories or the analysis of conventions and social conflict, cannot explain the origins of social institutions because they do not address the origins of shared and self-enforcing expectations about collective behavior in a social situation. I analyze two separate stages of institutionalization. First, agents must imagine collective intentionality, so that an 'imagined institution' entailing a symbolic representation of collective behavior becomes common knowledge. Second, they must 'enact' it through shared and self-enforcing expectations on the path of play. In my model, the agents are goal-oriented, so the process is strategic throughout.

An influential conventional wisdom holds that globalization could induce upward convergence in environmental regulations. Wealthy countries impose environmental regulations that prompt exporters in other countries to adopt sustainable production techniques, so the cost of environmental regulation in these countries decreases. However, previous research has only examined this California Effect for environmental regulations to address domestic externalities. I formally investigate the case of international externalities, such as global warming or ozone depletion. I find that a country can exercise leadership by enacting environmental regulations to strategically induce other countries to regulate in the future, but only if the incentive to free ride is not too strong. Surprisingly, under deep economic integration, environmental regulations are strategic complements with positive spillovers, so that international coordination is necessary to capitalize on the California Effect. In addition to showing that the California Effect is a powerful instrument of environmental statecraft, the results suggest new reasons why liberal trade and investment policies might improve environmental protection. They can also inform a strategy to promote efforts to mitigate global warming. (International Interactions/ FUB)

How do individual agents enact the institutions that govern collective behavior in a social situation? How do individuals come to share self-enforcing expectations about collective behavior, so that societal rules and constraints have an effect on individual choice? Conventional accounts, such as contract and evolutionary theories or the analysis of conventions and social conflict, cannot explain the origins of social institutions because they do not address the origins of shared and self-enforcing expectations about collective behavior in a social situation. I analyze two separate stages of institutionalization. First, agents must imagine collective intentionality, so that an 'imagined institution' entailing a symbolic representation of collective behavior becomes common knowledge. Second, they must 'enact' it through shared and self-enforcing expectations on the path of play. In my model, the agents are goal-oriented, so the process is strategic throughout. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

AbstractInternational technology cooperation promises to help countries exploit the potential of new innovations, but commercial rivalry between companies and governments raises obstacles to it. In this article, I present and solve a model of international technology cooperation. The formal analysis shows that a technology agreement must address two issues. First, governments must be able to induce companies to innovate. Second, governments must credibly commit to penalizing companies for failing to share new information produced through research. Based on these observations, I show that the potential for technology cooperation is maximized in symmetric settings between equally capable governments and companies. In practice, this observation warrants a policy focus on countries and industries that are already on a level playing ground. I also consider extensions to multinational companies and adverse selection problems. The formal analysis provides a solid foundation for practical policy implementation.

According to the imperative of enforcement, states must threaten defectors with sanctions or reciprocal suspension of international cooperation. I show that in international cooperation between the weak and the powerful, states should nevertheless limit the supply of collective enforcement power. Strong sanctions allow exploitative international agreements, so weak states refuse to engage in negotiations with powerful states in the first place. For powerful states, toothless international agreements are a credible commitment to limit power politics. The result holds even if sanctions can be used only to enforce international agreements and not for coercion. It implies that under power asymmetry, states must accept constraints on the use of power, as opposed to simply maximizing the supply of collective enforcement power. The theory offers a new perspective to international cooperation and a synthesis of the enforcement and managerial schools of international cooperation. It produces precise analytical boundary conditions and generates falsifiable empirical hypotheses. [Reprinted by permission; copyright Sage Publications Ltd. & ECPR-European Consortium for Political Research.]

I propose that special interests are particularly influential in international cooperation because they are able to enact pressure on the government already during the negotiations while the issue is not yet salient for the general public. In my formal model, special interests can offer political support to the government in exchange for a discriminatory implementation commitment that benefits them. The government colludes with the special interests if the value of political support exceeds the cost. However, if the government colludes with special interests in country A, the payoff to the government and special interests in country B also decreases because the probability of successful international cooperation decreases. In equilibrium, special interests create a collective-action problem that complicates international cooperation. In addition to providing a new explanation for the power of special interests in international cooperation, the article illuminates how international negotiations and domestic treaty implementation interact. The analysis also reveals a new dimension of flexibility in international cooperation. Adapted from the source document.

Gradualism is common in international cooperation, as states begin with limited cooperation and choose more ambitious targets slowly over time. However, most models of international cooperation are static and thus cannot explain gradualism. I show that when states can implement domestic reforms to reduce the cost of international cooperation, enforcement concerns prompt gradualism. First, to achieve ambitious international cooperation, states must internationally enforce costly domestic reform. Second, defection at the reform stage is particularly pernicious. When other states reform, their ability to punish the defector by suspending cooperation is reduced. States choose the extent of reform to maximize the benefits of expected international cooperation in the future. As collective enforcement power increases or the number of states decreases, the extent and pace of reform increase. Gradualism is also most probable in international public good provision because excludable benefits mitigate enforcement problems. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]