Poor versus rich countries: a gap in public attitudes towards fiscal solidarity in the EU
In: West European politics, Band 43, Heft 4, S. 919-943
ISSN: 1743-9655
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In: West European politics, Band 43, Heft 4, S. 919-943
ISSN: 1743-9655
In: Journal of common market studies: JCMS, Band 57, Heft 3, S. 486-501
ISSN: 1468-5965
AbstractThis article examines how the British public perceived UK Prime Minister David Cameron's plan to renegotiate his country's relationship with the EU. It asks whether attitudes towards renegotiation followed a similar pattern to attitudes towards Brexit. It asks: are preferences towards renegotiation and Brexit related, and did British citizens perceive them as conflicting or complementary? We modelled the similarities and differences between these two types of preferences, which allowed us to classify the attitudes into four patterns: unconditional europhiles, rejectionist eurosceptics, risk‐averse eurosceptics and power‐seeking eurosceptics. Using a large‐N cross‐sectional survey conducted in the UK in April 2015 (n = 3000), our findings suggest that similar utilitarian concerns underpinned both types of preferences; but education and partisan cues differentiated them. Our findings have implications for understanding the result of the UK referendum. They also highlight the complex considerations that drive citizens' attitudes towards the EU and help us predict the scope of public acceptance of EU reform initiatives by other governments.
This article examines the effect of individual and contextual variables on preference formation towards European Union (EU) freedom of movement. Our multilevel analyses of Eurobarometer data show that citizens with low levels of human capital and strong feelings of national identity are more likely to oppose intra-EU migration. However, we argue that in order to fully grasp variation in public preferences, we need to consider the domestic context. Utilitarian and affective theories have more explanatory power in richer countries, but in less affluent member states support for free movement is evenly high irrespective of individual dispositions. Our findings have implications for the progress of European integration, especially at a time when the EU is in the process of deciding on a course of action about its future direction.
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This article examines how the British public perceived UK Prime Minister David Cameron's plan to renegotiate his country's relationship with the EU. It asks whether attitudes towards renegotiation followed a similar pattern to attitudes towards Brexit. It asks: are preferences towards renegotiation and Brexit related, and did British citizens perceive them as conflicting or complementary? We modelled the similarities and differences between these two types of preferences, which allowed us to classify the attitudes into four patterns: unconditional europhiles, rejectionist eurosceptics, risk‐averse eurosceptics and power‐seeking eurosceptics. Using a large‐N cross‐sectional survey conducted in the UK in April 2015 (n = 3000), our findings suggest that similar utilitarian concerns underpinned both types of preferences; but education and partisan cues differentiated them. Our findings have implications for understanding the result of the UK referendum. They also highlight the complex considerations that drive citizens' attitudes towards the EU and help us predict the scope of public acceptance of EU reform initiatives by other governments.
BASE
In: Journal of common market studies: JCMS, Band 57, Heft 3, S. 486-501
ISSN: 0021-9886
World Affairs Online
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Working paper
This article examines how the public perceived Cameron's renegotiation plan, and whether attitudes towards renegotiation followed a similar pattern to attitudes towards Brexit. It asks: are preferences towards renegotiation and Brexit related, and did British citizens perceive them as conflicting or complementary? We model similarities but also differences between these two types of preferences, which allows us to classify the attitudes into four patterns: Unconditional Europhiles, Rejectionist Eurosceptics, Risk-averse Eurosceptics and Power-seeking Eurosceptics. Using a large-N cross-sectional survey conducted in the UK in April 2015 (n=3.000), our findings suggest that similar utilitarian concerns underpinned both types of preferences; but education and partisan cues differentiated them. Our findings have implications for understanding the result of the UK referendum. They also highlight the complex considerations that drive citizens' attitudes towards the EU and help us predict the scope of public acceptance of EU reform initiatives by other governments.
BASE
In: Journal of European public policy, Band 26, Heft 6, S. 805-823
ISSN: 1466-4429
In: European political science: EPS, Band 18, Heft 1, S. 134-142
ISSN: 1682-0983
In: European Union politics: EUP, Band 18, Heft 3, S. 382-405
ISSN: 1741-2757
In: Government & opposition: an international journal of comparative politics, Band 53, Heft 1, S. 26-50
ISSN: 1477-7053
Why has the extreme right Greek Golden Dawn, a party with clear links to fascism, experienced a rise defying all theories that claim that such a party is unlikely to win in post-Second World War Europe? And, if we accept that economic crisis is an explanation for this, why has such a phenomenon not occurred in other countries that have similar conducive conditions, such as Portugal and Spain? This article addresses this puzzle by: (1) carrying out a controlled comparison of Greece, Portugal and Spain; and (2) showing that the rise of the extreme right is not a question of intensity of economic crisis. Rather it is the nature of the crisis – that is, economic versus overall crisis of democratic representation – that facilitates the rise of the extreme right. We argue that extreme right parties are more likely to experience an increase in their support when economic crisis culminates into an overall crisis of democratic representation. Economic crisis is likely to become a political crisis when severe issues of governability impact upon the ability of the state to fulfil its social contract obligations. This breach of the social contract is accompanied by declining levels of trust in state institutions, resulting in party system collapse.
In: European journal of political research: official journal of the European Consortium for Political Research, Band 54, Heft 1, S. 121-140
ISSN: 1475-6765
Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) represent their citizens in European Union policy making, having the power to approve, amend or reject the near majority of legislation. The media inform EU citizens about their representatives and are able to hold them publicly accountable. However, we know little about whether, and to what extent, MEPs are visible in the news. This study investigates the visibility of MEPs in national broadsheets in Britain, France, the Netherlands, Germany and Italy. It seeks to explain individual-level variation by employing an original dataset of news visibility of 302 MEPs over a period of 25 months (September 2009-September 2011) and tests the applicability of the news values and mirror theories in the context of supranational politics. The results show that political office, length of tenure and domestic party leadership have a positive effect. Legislative activities have a mixed effect on MEP news visibility. Attendance negatively affects news visibility, while non-attached MEPs receive more news coverage. In short, despite the core supranational nature of EP legislative politics, MEP news visibility primarily depends on journalists' domestic considerations. This informs both our understanding of MEP parliamentary behaviour and journalism studies in the context of the EU. Adapted from the source document.
In: European journal of political research: official journal of the European Consortium for Political Research, Band 54, Heft 1, S. 121-140
ISSN: 0304-4130
In: European journal of political research: official journal of the European Consortium for Political Research, Band 54, Heft 1, S. 121-140
ISSN: 1475-6765
AbstractMembers of the European Parliament (MEPs) represent their citizens in European Union policy making, having the power to approve, amend or reject the near majority of legislation. The media inform EU citizens about their representatives and are able to hold them publicly accountable. However, we know little about whether, and to what extent, MEPs are visible in the news. This study investigates the visibility of MEPs in national broadsheets in Britain, France, the Netherlands, Germany and Italy. It seeks to explain individual‐level variation by employing an original dataset of news visibility of 302 MEPs over a period of 25 months (September 2009–September 2011) and tests the applicability of the news values and mirror theories in the context of supranational politics. The results show that political office, length of tenure and domestic party leadership have a positive effect. Legislative activities have a mixed effect on MEP news visibility. Attendance negatively affects news visibility, while non‐attached MEPs receive more news coverage. In short, despite the core supranational nature of EP legislative politics, MEP news visibility primarily depends on journalists' domestic considerations. This informs both our understanding of MEP parliamentary behaviour and journalism studies in the context of the EU.
In: The political quarterly: PQ, Band 85, Heft 3, S. 285-288
ISSN: 0032-3179
World Affairs Online