Transparency Pays? Evaluating the Effects of the Freedom of Information Laws on Perceived Government Corruption
In: The journal of development studies, Band 53, Heft 1, S. 116-137
ISSN: 1743-9140
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In: The journal of development studies, Band 53, Heft 1, S. 116-137
ISSN: 1743-9140
In: Journal of Comparative Economics, Band 21
SSRN
We investigate whether lending by the Islamic Development Bank mirrors Saudi Arabia's political interests based on religious affinity using panel data for its 56 member countries over the 1970 to 2007 period. Our results indicate that Sunni regime countries receive favorable treatment in terms of loan allocation, as well as Shia majority populated countries in exceptional occasions of conflict with other religious minority groups, while non-Muslim countries are the least favored. There is also evidence that lending by the World Bank to the same group of countries and over the same time frame does not respond to the political stance of Saudi Arabia founded on religion. These findings reveal the advantage that Saudi Arabia gains by assuming the leadership of a Regional Development Bank in contrast to coordinating common strategies in a global International Financial Institution with other large shareholders for whom religion might not be essential for political alliances.
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We investigate whether lending by the Islamic Development Bank mirrors Saudi Arabia's political interests based on religious affinity using panel data for its 56 member countries over the 1970 to 2007 period. Our results indicate that Sunni regime countries receive favorable treatment in terms of loan allocation, as well as Shia majority populated countries in exceptional occasions of conflict with other religious minority groups, while non-Muslim countries are the least favored. There is also evidence that lending by the World Bank to the same group of countries and over the same time frame does not respond to the political stance of Saudi Arabia founded on religion. These findings reveal the advantage that Saudi Arabia gains by assuming the leadership of a Regional Development Bank in contrast to coordinating common strategies in a global International Financial Institution with other large shareholders for whom religion might not be essential for political alliances.
BASE
SSRN
Working paper
In: World development: the multi-disciplinary international journal devoted to the study and promotion of world development, Band 44, S. 110-128
It is puzzling that India, which has a large domestic constituency of people suffering from underdevelopment, chronic poverty and mal-governance, is emerging as an important aid donor. With the intension of understanding why poor countries provide foreign aid, this article is the first to econometrically analyze India's aid allocation decisions. First, we utilize cross-sectional data on aid commitments by the Ministry of External Affairs to 125 developing countries, obtained in US dollars from AidData for the 2008-2010 period. Second, we compare India's aid allocation with that of other donors. Our findings show that India's aid allocation is partially in line with our expectations of the behavior of a "needy" donor. Commercial and political self-interests dominate India's aid allocation. We find the importance of political interests to be significantly larger for India than for all donors of the Development Assistance Committee. Moreover, we find that countries which are closer geographically are favored, and that countries at a similar developmental stage are more likely to enter India's aid program.
BASE
In: University of Heidelberg Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series No. 532
SSRN
Working paper
It is puzzling that India, which has a large domestic constituency of people suffering from underdevelopment, chronic poverty and mal-governance, is emerging as an important aid donor. With the intension of understanding why poor countries provide foreign aid, this article is the first to econometrically analyze India's aid allocation decisions. First, we utilize cross-sectional data on aid commitments by the Ministry of External Affairs to 125 developing countries, obtained in US dollars from AidData for the 2008-2010 period. Second, we compare India's aid allocation with that of other donors. Our findings show that India's aid allocation is partially in line with our expectations of the behavior of a "needy" donor. Commercial and political self-interests dominate India's aid allocation. We find the importance of political interests to be significantly larger for India than for all donors of the Development Assistance Committee. Moreover, we find that countries which are closer geographically are favored, and that countries at a similar developmental stage are more likely to enter India's aid program.
BASE
In: Journal of economic policy reform, Band 12, Heft 4, S. 299-322
ISSN: 1748-7889
In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 8293
SSRN
Working paper
In: Business and politics: B&P, Band 25, Heft 1, S. 67-88
ISSN: 1469-3569
AbstractTo what extent do national strategic interests influence countries' distribution of health assistance during a global health crisis? We examine China's global COVID-19 vaccine allocation, focusing on the relationship between its vaccine prioritization and its geopolitical expansion through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). We claim China uses its vaccine diplomacy as a comprehensive tool to promote its grand strategy and expand its global leadership and influence. Employing a newly available dataset on Chinese COVID-19 vaccine deliveries for a cross-section of 108 BRI member countries, our study shows that countries with foreign direct investment flows into BRI projects have received more vaccines from China. Our findings confirm that donor strategic concerns affect bilateral foreign assistance. Our results remain robust to several robustness checks, including endogeneity concerns.
SSRN
In: International political science review: the journal of the International Political Science Association (IPSA) = Revue internationale de science politique, Band 44, Heft 4, S. 471-491
ISSN: 1460-373X
Some blame free-market capitalism for increasing income inequality, arguing that richer classes could block access to others for maintaining their privileges. By manipulating the degree of political rights and resources available to others, the rich could reduce opportunities for others. Others argue that growth-promoting free markets raise all incomes, increasing aggregate welfare. We argue that governments more dependent on free markets are likely to focus on increasing access to human capital, thereby narrowing the gap between the rich and poor by increasing opportunities, even if income inequality rises with high growth. We assess the issue by examining the effects of an Index of Economic Freedom on income inequality measured by the standardized GINI and measures of the equity of access to quality schooling, health, and justice covering 128 developing countries during the 1990–2017 period. Our results show that, even if economic freedom is associated with higher income inequality, it also associates robustly with access to opportunity. Our results are robust to alternative models, sample size, and testing methods, including instrumental variables analyzes addressing potential endogeneity bias. Our results, taken together, do not suggest that growth-promoting economic freedoms hamper future progress by raising inequalities—on the contrary, economic freedoms promote equity of access to opportunities—findings inconsistent with the view that governments under free-market conditions are easily captured by the wealthy, who then block equitable access to public goods.