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AbstractThis article demonstrates the value of service‐customer matrices (SCMs) for managers performing strategic analysis of nonprofit organizations (NPOs). Some of the benefits of using SCMs are understanding the portfolio of businesses; clarifying what sponsors and clients value; identifying rivals, key attributes, and revenues on a service‐customer segment basis; and understanding and formulating positioning strategy.

ABSTRACTA complete conceptual framework for policy analysis requires a theory of government supply and government production failure to complement the well-developed theory of market failure provided by welfare economics. Charles Wolf has made an important start by attempting to draw parallels between market failures and the manifestations of government supply failures. This article provides a more useful analytical framework for government supply failure in two important ways. First, it draws on several perspectives from the economics of organization to sketch both normative and positive theories of government supply. Second, it uses the positive theory of government supply behavior to make direct comparisons with the traditional market failures. It concludes with some implications of the framework for assessing the potential gains from privatization.

Whether government should produce goods or services itself is analyzed from normative & positive perspectives. A normative perspective argues that goods & services should be produced when supply is not contestable (ie, competitive) & should be contracted, given public financing, when supply is contestable. Problems inherent in government production involve: natural monopoly; high agency costs, eg, cost of owner supervision; & inefficient production & consumption decisions because government, unable to enhance reputation or offer profitsharing, cannot reward employees. Government production is subject to negative externalities that have social marginal costs such as the condition when public organizations have legal rights to use resources without paying costs & when they are exempt by law from torts by those who suffer damage. The positive perspective holds that government production is a matter of degree, & that, with more contestability of supply & ownership, production problems are less serious. Positive theory allows government production that does not satisfy the normative theory, which implies that the efficiency of government supply can be improved. More investment in managerial & analytical functions of government contracting with private firms can substitute knowledge for trust & increase contestability of contracts. It is concluded that the misfit between positive & normative perspectives is resolvable because government production inefficiency is predictable & can be eradicated by designing more effective incentive & control systems. 1 Figure, 51 References. Modified AA