Suchergebnisse

In 2011-2012, the opposition successfully capitalized on the regime's miscalculations to undermine the status quo from within, despite Putin's return to power and its own inability so far to overthrow the regime. Adapted from the source document.

The article presents an analysis of "informal institutionalization" in post-Communist Russia in theoretical and comparative perspective. It is devoted to critical analysis of existing explanations of the dominance of subversive institutions – that is, those rules, norms, and practices that at first sight partly resemble institutions of modern democracy, good governance and rule of law, but in fact inhibit them. While "pessimists" focus on cultural and historical embeddedness of subversive institutions in Russia, "optimists" draw their attention to patterns of post-Communist state-building, and "realists" point out the major role of special interests groups in turning growing pains of informal governance in Russia into its chronic deceases.

Russlands politisches System hat in der Putin-Ära alle Merkmale eines elektoralen Autoritarismus angenommen. Wahlniederlagen des herrschenden Regimes sind an sich nicht vorgesehen. Doch strategische Fehler der Machthaber und das erfolgreiche Agieren der nicht systemkonformen Opposition führten im Dezember zu diesem seltenen Ereignis. Das Regime, aber auch die Opposition sind mit ihren Strategien an ihre Grenzen gestoßen. Der Status quo ist instabil. (Osteuropa (Berlin) / SWP)

Many experts argued that political regime in contemporary Russia represented one of the instances of the global phenomenon of electoral authoritarianism. But what are the major features of such a regime in case of Russia, what about its institutional foundations and political pillars? How its life cycle – the emergence, development, and further decay changed over time, and which ways it might evolve in the foreseeable future? My paper sought answers to these questions. ; Peer reviewed