Suchergebnisse

part, Book 2: Liberty in the Welfare State -- chapter I Liberty and Welfare -- chapter II The Reform of Parliament -- chapter Chapte III. Civil Liberties -- chapter IV Property and Equality -- chapter V Welfare in the Liberal State -- chapter VI The Geography of Liberty -- chapter VII Education -- part, Book 3: The Economics of Liberty -- chapter VIII The Dynamics of Progress -- chapter IX Relations in Industry -- chapter X Monopoly -- chapter XI Agriculture -- part, Book 4: The International Setting -- chapter XII Britain in the World -- chapter XIII Colonies to Commonwealth -- chapter XIV The Challenge of Liberalism.

This study addresses the impact of crisis management strategies, stress, and groupthink conditions on the integrative complexity of British decision makers in 10 decision-making episodes during two Anglo-German crises in 1938 and 1939. A systematic random sample of Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain's statements during British cabinet deliberations in the intragovernmental arena and British messages to Germany in the intergovernmental arena during the acute phase of each crisis was scored for integrative complexity. An ANOVA of integrative complexity for crisis, arena, and episode demonstrated a significant independent relationship between strategy and integrative complexity plus a significant interaction effect between strategy and arena on integrative complexity. There were also significant differences in Chamberlain's integrative complexity between early and later episodes of the Polish conflict in the intragovernmental arena; no significant differences occurred between episodes in either arena during the Munich conflict. These results support the hypotheses that associate low integrative complexity with the implementation of a competitive strategy in the intergovernmental arena and with high stress in the intragovernmental arena.

Walker, S. G. and Watson, G. L. Groupthink and Integrative Complexity in British Foreign Policy-Making: the Munich Case. Cooperation and Conflict, XXIV, 1989, 199-212. We focus in this paper upon the groupthink construct as a partial explanation for the flawed decision-making by British leaders in managing the Munich crisis with Germany. In order to assess its explanatory power, we follow the precedent established in previous case studies, which explore the link between groupthink and the levels of integrative complexity exhibited by decision-makers. The hypothesis linking the two phenomena is that in cases where groupthink is present, the level of integrative complexity will be significantly lower than in cases where it is absent. The Munich case is a particularly appropriate case for replicating the test of this hypothesis because, unlike other groupthink cases, it did not lead to unsuccessful military interventions or escalations. Our results indicate that: (1) groupthink existed in the Munich case; however, it did not persist throughout the entire crisis. (2) Its presence and absence within the crisis fluctuated consistently with the expectations associated with the theory which accounts for its dynamics. (3) The integrative complexity exhibited by Prime Minister Chamberlain and Foreign Secretary Halifax varied as predicted by the hypothesis linking it with groupthink.