Suchergebnisse

A large literature exists regarding explanations for the emergence of cooperation in the Mediterranean basin, but there is less information regarding the effectiveness of Mediterranean cooperation & its programs. Through a case study of Israel's implementation & compliance with the Barcelona Convention & the Mediterranean Action Plan, we evaluate the effectiveness of these international institutions. We find that international institutions & their efforts to target state capacity as the mechanism to improve compliance & effectiveness are often misguided unless their efforts are also directed towards enhancing societal capacity. We then explicate the way in which societal actors such as environmental NGOs can improve domestic compliance & effectiveness. These findings are illuminated through an assessment of the activities of several environmental NGOs in Israel to target Mediterranean pollution & coastal management policies. Where NGOs have taken action, they have often proved successful in forcing the Israeli government & the business sector to honor its environmental commitments. 2 Tables, 49 References. Adapted from the source document.

This book makes two central claims: first, that mineral-rich states are cursed not by their wealth but, rather, by the ownership structure they choose to manage their mineral wealth and second, that weak institutions are not inevitable in mineral-rich states. Each represents a significant departure from the conventional resource curse literature, which has treated ownership structure as a constant across time and space and has presumed that mineral-rich countries are incapable of either building or sustaining strong institutions - particularly fiscal regimes. The experience of the five petroleum-rich Soviet successor states (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) provides a clear challenge to both of these assumptions. Their respective developmental trajectories since independence demonstrate not only that ownership structure can vary even across countries that share the same institutional legacy but also that this variation helps to explain the divergence in their subsequent fiscal regimes

AbstractIn Canada's Yukon Territory, a legislative committee was tasked with assessing the risks and benefits of hydraulic fracturing. The committee designed an extensive participatory process involving citizens and experts; however, instead of information access and public hearings fostering an open dialogue and trust, these two channels failed to de‐polarize debates over hydraulic fracturing. We argue that mistrust was reinforced because (1) weak participatory processes undermined the goals of public involvement, (2) scientific evidence and scientists themselves were not accepted as neutral or apolitical, and (3) strategic fostering of mistrust by actors on both sides of a polarized issue intensified existing doubt about the integrity and credibility of the process. The implications of a failure to restore trust in government are significant, not only for the issue of hydraulic fracturing, but for governance more broadly, as mistrust has spillover effects for subsequent public negotiations.

▪ Abstract  Most political scientists and economists unequivocally accept the proposition that abundant mineral resources are more often a curse than a blessing, particularly for developing countries. We argue that the widely accepted contention that an abundance of mineral resources and the influx of external rents generated from these resources during boom periods are to blame for the so-called "resource curse" should be revisited. Instead, we offer a new research agenda for studying the problem of resource-rich states that shifts the locus of study away from the "paradox of plenty" to a more appropriate paradox—that the concentration of wealth impoverishes the state whereas the dispersion of wealth enriches the state. This agenda focuses on three interrelated issues: the structure of ownership over mineral resources, the importance of strong institutions, and the relative influence of domestic versus international factors.

Most political scientists & economists unequivocally accept the proposition that abundant mineral resources are more often a curse than a blessing, particularly for developing countries. We argue that the widely accepted contention that an abundance of mineral resources & the influx of external rents generated from these resources during boom periods are to blame for the so-called "resource curse" should be revisited. Instead, we offer a new research agenda for studying the problem of resource-rich states that shifts the locus of study away from the "paradox of plenty" to a more appropriate paradox-that the concentration of wealth impoverishes the state whereas the dispersion of wealth enriches the state. This agenda focuses on three interrelated issues: the structure of ownership over mineral resources, the importance of strong institutions, & the relative influence of domestic versus international factors. Tables, Figures, References. Adapted from the source document.

The view of institutions as coercion rather than as contracts dominates the comparative politics literature on both institutional creation and the politics of economic reform. The emergence of a collectively optimal tax code in Russia demonstrates the limitations of this emphasis on coercion. This new tax code was not imposed by a strong central leader, mandated by international institutions, or the result of state capture by powerful economic interest groups. Rather, it is the product of a mutually beneficial exchange between the Russian government and the Russian oil companies. Russia's ability to negotiate an effective tax regime also suggests the conditions under which and the microcausal mechanism whereby exogenous shocks promote institutional change and economic reform. Owing to their mutual vulnerability and interdependence, the August 1998 financial crisis generated widely shared perceptions among these actors that the payoffs of cooperation had changed. Yet the economic reform institution that resulted required a series of incremental strategic moves that established common knowledge.

The view of institutions as coercion rather than as contracts dominates the comparative politics literature on both institutional creation & the politics of economic reform. The emergence of a collectively optimal tax code in Russia demonstrates the limitations of this emphasis on coercion. This new tax code was not imposed by a strong central leader, mandated by international institutions, or the result of state capture by powerful economic interest groups. Rather, it is the product of a mutually beneficial exchange between the Russian government & the Russian oil companies. Russia's ability to negotiate an effective tax regime also suggests the conditions under which & the microcausal mechanism whereby exogenous shocks promote institutional change & economic reform. Owing to their mutual vulnerability & interdependence, the Aug 1998 financial crisis generated widely shared perceptions among these actors that the payoffs of cooperation had changed. Yet the economic reform institution that resulted required a series of incremental strategic moves that established common knowledge. 1 Figure, 92 References. Adapted from the source document.