Suchergebnisse

Purpose: The purpose of this study is to investigate how a country's competitive tax policy influences its inward foreign direct investments (FDI) in the Asia–Pacific region, even when given particular constraints (e.g., population, public governance, skilled labor, and so on) exist. Design/methodology/approach: The paper uses the system GMM estimation approach to test the hypothesis. Data on FDI, corporate income tax, and various confounding factors were drawn from Ernst and Young's worldwide corporate tax guide, the World Bank, and other sources to create a panel of 28 economies over the period 2000–2016. Findings: The present research confirms the negative association between corporate income tax (CIT) and FDI inflows. The effects of other confounding factors on FDI net inflows are also supported (e.g., connectivity, GDP per capita, population, skilled labor, and trade openness). Our results support the argument that foreign investments may be more sensitive to CIT. Therefore, CIT is an effective indicator to observe international tax competition. Originality/value: The present research uses rich data on statutory CIT and other economic and public governance factors to investigate the relationship between tax competition and FDI inflows in the Asia–Pacific region. The findings add important supplements to the nuanced understanding of the political-economic dynamics in this region, especially when cut-throat tax competition, trade tensions, and stagnant economic growth have been key challenges for global economies.

The extent to which social protection programmes in general, and targeted programmes in particular, actually alleviate poverty has been a central issue in development debates for decades. The objective of this article is to contribute to the debate by empirically examining the poverty-alleviation effects of one of the largest targeted programmes in the world: the Minimum Living Standard Assistance (MLSA) or Dibao in China. Using newly available data on MLSA spending and a unique panel survey dataset covering the 1993 to 2009 period, this research investigates the impact of the MLSA on poverty alleviation. The analyses using fixed-effects and random-effects logit models and hierarchical liner models offer insights that go beyond the existing studies on the subject. Findings from the study confirm that targeted social protection programmes are an effective tool for reducing poverty.

This paper investigates the determinants of government size at the provincial level in China. We employ the panel data model as a platform for empirical analysis and control for endogeneity in the study. Our study shows that openness to trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) may curtail government expansion, and that the provincial-level public sector is characterized by economies of scale. This study also documents that Wagner's law does not hold true for China. Moreover, both expenditure decentralization and revenue decentralization contribute to the expansion of China's government. Adapted from the source document.

The temporal persistence and geographical prevalence of corruption in the world have provoked a vast amount of research into its causes. Low civil service remuneration, especially in less developed nations, is believed to be an important contributing factor to corruption. The assumption is that when salaries are low but expectations for service remains high, government officials may demand more compensation from informal or even illegal channels than what is officially sanctioned; hence, corruption arises. Accordingly, increased pay level is assumed to be effective in deterring corruption. Using China as a case, we argue that the relationship between civil service pay and corruption is not as simple as suggested. The empirical evidence gathered from China casts doubt on the assumed connection between the two to debunk the myth that increasing civil service pay contributes to the control of corruption. The article also presents the policy implications of the above analysis for human resource management and civil service governance.

This article examines a particular type of central mandate in China, the mandate for nationwide across-the-board salary increases in the public sector. The making and implementation of this mandate epitomizes the changes and challenges in intergovernmental relations of a transition economy. Our findings show that although the central pay mandates were issued under a number of conditions that favored, or should have even guaranteed, their smooth implementation, local reactions to the mandates have deviated from central expectations. The mandated pay raises have not only failed to win local compliance but also given rise to widespread pay arrears. Based on empirical data from two Chinese counties, this article analyzes the causes of local noncompliance and its implications for intergovernmental management. Adapted from the source document.