The Relative Weights of Direct and Indirect Experiences in the Formation of Environmental Risk Beliefs
In: Risk analysis: an international journal, Band 35, Heft 2
ISSN: 1539-6924
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In: Risk analysis: an international journal, Band 35, Heft 2
ISSN: 1539-6924
In: Risk analysis: an international journal, Band 35, Heft 2, S. 318-331
ISSN: 1539-6924
Direct experiences, we find, influence environmental risk beliefs more than the indirect experiences derived from outcomes to others. This disparity could have a rational basis. Or it could be based on behavioral proclivities in accord with the well‐established availability heuristic or the vested‐interest heuristic, which we introduce in this article. Using original data from a large, nationally representative sample, this article examines the perception of, and responses to, morbidity risks from tap water. Direct experiences have a stronger and more consistent effect on different measures of risk belief. Direct experiences also boost the precautionary response of drinking bottled water and drinking filtered water, while indirect experiences do not. These results are consistent with the hypothesized neglect of indirect experiences in other risk contexts, such as climate change.
In: Vanderbilt Law and Economics Research Paper No. 14-6
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In: REGULATORY BREAKDOWN: THE CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE IN US REGULATION, Cary Coglianese, ed., University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012
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In: Journal of risk and uncertainty, Band 37, Heft 2-3, S. 95-106
ISSN: 1573-0476
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In: NBER Working Paper No. w14330
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Working paper
In: NBER Working Paper No. w13445
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In: Journal of risk and uncertainty, Band 33, Heft 1-2, S. 13-36
ISSN: 1573-0476
In: NBER Working Paper No. w12582
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In: NBER Working Paper No. w11863
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In: Legislative studies quarterly, Band 28, Heft 3, S. 387-411
ISSN: 1939-9162
Numerous accounts reveal that congressional leaders often secure "hip‐pocket votes" or "if you need me" pledges from rank‐and‐file legislators. These are essentially options on votes. Leaders exercise sufficient options—pay legislators to convert to favorable votes—when those options will yield victory. Otherwise, they release the options. A model shows that this optimal strategy for leaders produces many small victories, few small losses, and losses that are, on average, larger than victories. We find precisely these patterns, hence strong evidence for vote options, in Congressional Quarterly key votes from 1975 through 2001 and in non‐key votes from the 106th Congress (1999–2000).
In: Legislative studies quarterly, Band 28, Heft 3, S. 387-412
ISSN: 0362-9805
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In: NBER Working Paper No. w5913
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Working paper