Suchergebnisse

AbstractA defining feature of public sector employment in the United States is the regular change in elected leadership. We describe how these changes alter policy and disrupt civil servants' influence over agency decisions, potentially shaping their career choices. Using data on careers from over three million federal employees in the United States from 1988 to 2011, we evaluate how administration changes influence turnover in a series of regression analyses. We find substantial stability in the civil service but also some pockets of responsiveness to political factors, particularly among career senior executives in agencies with views divergent from the president's. A combination of factors, including transitions, policy priorities, and ideological differences, could increase turnover propensity for these employees by nearly one-third in some agencies over an administration's first term. This has implications for understanding possible mechanisms linking politics and organizational capacity and for understanding how and for whom politics is influential in career decisions.

One of the central concerns about American policy making institutions is the degree to which political outcomes can be influenced by interested parties. While the literature on interest group strategies in particular institutions—legislative, administrative, and legal—is extensive, there is very little scholarship which examines how the interdependencies between institutions affects the strategies of groups. In this paper we examine in a formal theoretical model how the opportunity to litigate administrative rulemaking in the courts affects the lobbying strategies of competing interest groups at the rulemaking stage. Using a resource-based view of group activity, we develop a number of important insights about each stage that cannot be observed by examining each one in isolation. We demonstrate that lobbying effort responds to the ideology of the court, and the responsiveness of the court to resources. In particular, (1) as courts become more biased toward the status quo, interest group lobbying investments become smaller, and may be eliminated all together, (2) as interest groups become wealthier, they spend more on lobbying, and (3) as the responsiveness of courts to resources decreases, the effect it has on lobbying investments depends on the underlying ideology of the court.

'Strategy Beyond Markets' is organized around three themes: public politics, private politics and integrated political strategy. The book explores the way these strategies influence political environments, firms and corporations.