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We propose a new general measure of district competitiveness that can be applied to both PR and SMP systems. We define competitiveness as the degree of uncertainty in the outcome of an election, and so the measure of competitiveness is the minimal number of additional votes required for any party to win one additional seat. We show that this corresponds to margin of victory in an SMP system and we illustrate how this can be computed in a PR system. We also argue that while it makes sense to take into account the total number of votes cast in the district it is also imperative to consider the number of seats contested. We compare district competitiveness in two SMP and two PR countries. The findings challenge the conventional wisdom that elections are more competitive and that local competitiveness is less variable under PR than under SMP. We finally show that the impact of competitiveness on turnout decreases with district magnitude. [Copyright Elsevier Ltd.]

In this paper we study a coordination dilemma that appears in democracies where the Upper and Lower Houses are elected simultaneously using significantly different rules. How do party systems form when some parties are only viable in some districts of one of the chambers? Are party systems independent from one another, as Duvergerian theories expect, or dependent, as the literature on the interactive features of mixed electoral systems predict? Using the case of Spain, where all the possible incentive structures for electoral coordination are present, we test both theories. Our results point out that contamination effects matter, but they are not strong enough to make Duvergerian gravity disappear. Both effects are at play in Spanish elections. [Copyright 2006 Elsevier Ltd.]

In this article the campaigns effects in 1993 & 2000 elections in Spain are studied from a methodology based on a counterfactual simulation. Concretely, we wonder how the electoral results would have been without campaigns. Our empirical evidence suggests that campaigns play an important role in the activation as well as the conversion of voters. Tables, References. Adapted from the source document.

This article seeks to understand how the Galician nationalist movement (BNG) succeeded in overcoming its political marginality after the Spanish transition to democracy & today disputes with the Socialist party the second position in the Galician party System. Beyond the historical preconditions & the political opportunities of the creation of the autonomous communities in Spain, the authors stress the organizational & strategic capacities of nationalist actors. The ongoing federalization of Spain provides an open political opportunity structure, but other factors need to be taken into account, such as organization, charismatic leadership & the repertoire of mobilization, especially the moderation of nationalist demands. The article analysis specifically: (i) the successful strategy of ideological moderation & reframing during the 1990s & (ii) the progressive electoral coordination of most pre-existing nationalist parties around the BNG. Adapted from the source document.

Abstract
How does rural decline affect electoral politics? A well-known argument is that the growing geographical polarisation of populations between prospering major cities and declining hinterlands is emerging as a cleavage of electoral politics in developed countries. But prior work has focussed on specific outcomes of rural decline rather than examining whether the geographical distribution of political attitudes and behaviours within countries has become more uneven in the last decades. Using a measure of party nationalisation capturing spatial differences in electoral support across districts in OECD countries over the last 60 years, we find that a declining rural population increases differences in the geographical distribution of partisan support within countries. Nationalisation determines a party's orientation toward distribution of public resources and support for region-specific interests.

This article examines whether household size affects economic voting. We argue when individuals are asked about national economic conditions and their personal financial situation that moderate or mid-range responses are more likely in multi-person households than in one-person households. The aggregation of personal economic evaluations within households reduces the variation in economic opinions across household members. As a result, it is harder for an individual to say that the national economic conditions and her personal financial situation are good or bad as the number of household members increases. Using individual-level data from the American National Election Studies from 1966 to 2016, the authors find that both evaluations of the national economy and personal economic conditions are endogenous to household size. The aggregate, state-level evidence from five presidential elections in the U.S. shows that the impact of the economy on the incumbent support increases the larger the number of one-person households.