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"Bargaining Models of War and the Stability of Peace in Post-Conflict Societies" published on by Oxford University Press.

Sustainable transboundary water governance is often challenged by conflicts between agents, which necessitates the design of cooperative and self-enforcing alternatives to facilitate equitable water distribution. The Nash bargaining approach, which originated from game theory, could offer a good mathematical framework to simulate strategic interactions among involved agents by considering individual rational benefits. Given that river-sharing problems often involve multiple self-interested agents, the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution (ANBS) could be used to describe agents&rsquo ; powers, as determined by disparate social, economic, and political as well as military status, and ensure win&ndash ; win strategies based on individual rationality. This paper proposed an asymmetric bargaining model by combining multi-criteria decision making, bankruptcy theory, and the ANBS for water distribution in the transboundary river context. The Euphrates River Basin (ERB) with three littoral states was used as a case study. Turkey has the highest bargaining power in ERB negotiation since it dominates in terms of economic strength, political influence, and military capacity, whereas in the two downstream countries these aspects are limited due to their internal political fragmentation and weaker military status. The water satisfaction percentages of Turkey, Syria, and Iraq under the best alternative are 96.30%, 84.23%, and 40.88%, respectively. The findings highlight the necessity for synthetically considering the agent&rsquo ; s disagreement utility and asymmetrical power when negotiating over water allocation.

Sustainable transboundary water governance is often challenged by conflicts between agents, which necessitates the design of cooperative and self-enforcing alternatives to facilitate equitable water distribution. The Nash bargaining approach, which originated from game theory, could offer a good mathematical framework to simulate strategic interactions among involved agents by considering individual rational benefits. Given that river-sharing problems often involve multiple self-interested agents, the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution (ANBS) could be used to describe agents' powers, as determined by disparate social, economic, and political as well as military status, and ensure win–win strategies based on individual rationality. This paper proposed an asymmetric bargaining model by combining multi-criteria decision making, bankruptcy theory, and the ANBS for water distribution in the transboundary river context. The Euphrates River Basin (ERB) with three littoral states was used as a case study. Turkey has the highest bargaining power in ERB negotiation since it dominates in terms of economic strength, political influence, and military capacity, whereas in the two downstream countries these aspects are limited due to their internal political fragmentation and weaker military status. The water satisfaction percentages of Turkey, Syria, and Iraq under the best alternative are 96.30%, 84.23%, and 40.88%, respectively. The findings highlight the necessity for synthetically considering the agent's disagreement utility and asymmetrical power when negotiating over water allocation.

Recent healthcare reforms have sought to increase efficiency by introducing managed care (MC) while respecting consumer preferences by admitting choice between MC and conventional care. This article proposes an institutional change designed to let German consumers choose between the two settings through directing payments from the Federal Health Fund to social health insurers (SHIs) or to specialized MC organizations (MCOs). To gauge the chance of success of this reform, a game involving a SHI, a MCO, and a representative insured (RI) is analyzed. In a 'three-player/three-cake' game the coalitions {SHI, MCO}, {MCO, RI}, and {SHI, RI} can form. Players' possibility to switch between coalitions creates new outside options, causing the conventional bilateral Nash bargaining solution to be replaced by the so-called von Neumann-Morgenstern triple. These triples are compared to the status quo (where the RI has no threat potential) and related to institutional conditions characterizing Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland.

AbstractIn this paper, I develop a dynamic version of the efficient bargaining model grounded on optimal control in which a firm and a union bargain over the wage in a continuous-time environment under the supervision of an infinitely lived mediator. Overturning the findings achieved by means of a companion right-to-manage framework, I demonstrate that when employment is assumed to adjust itself with some attrition in the direction of the contract curve implied by the preferences of the two bargainers, increases in the bargaining power of the firm (union) accelerate (delay) the speed of convergence towards the stationary solution. In addition, confirming the reversal of the results obtained when employment moves over time towards the firm's labour demand, I show that the dynamic negotiation of wages tends to penalize unionized workers and favour the firm with respect to the bargaining outcomes retrieved with a similar static wage-setting model.