Suchergebnisse

»Biosecurity« - hinter diesem Schlagwort verbirgt sich ein komplexes sicherheitspolitisches Konzept, das seit den Terroranschlägen vom 11. September 2001 in vielen Schattierungen Eingang in unseren Alltag gefunden hat. Die Kulturwissenschaftlerin und Ärztin Petra Dickmann beleuchtet die Bedrohung durch biologische Waffen und möglichen Missbrauch biomedizinischen Wissens im Hinblick auf ihre gesellschaftlichen Auswirkungen. Ihre Analyse wirft ein Schlaglicht auf die biopolitischen Hintergründe der Debatten und beschreibt, wie entsprechende Restriktionsversuche zu einer asymmetrischen Kommunikation führen, die letztlich eine filigrane Militarisierung des öffentlichen Forschungssektors nach sich zieht.

"This book explores the origins, interpretations and meanings of the term biosecurity. It brings together contributors on issues relating to the perceptions of the threat of biological weapons and how states are responding, or not, to the challenges posed by the potential of the products of the life sciences to be used for destructive purposes"--Provided by publisher

Although the traditional biosecurity paradigm is concerned with the deliberate misuse of biological agents, in recent years national security strategies have widened in scope to address a much wider spectrum of biological threats. This expanding remit, partly spurred by the high-profile epidemics of the early 2000s, still does not include conditions that have been traditionally conceived as non-infectious. Non-communicable diseases (NCDs), including cardiovascular disease, diabetes, cancers, and chronic respiratory diseases, are together responsible for 70 per cent of deaths worldwide. Heart disease and cancer have long been the leading causes of death in high-income countries but the increasing availability of tobacco, alcohol, processed food and western lifestyles have led to a boom in deaths from NCDs in low-income settings over recent decades. The substantial socio-economic burden levied by NCDs can undermine political stability in fragile states by straining weak health systems and exacerbating social inequalities. This review article argues that the rise of NCDs is a threat to international security, and that departments of defence have a central role to play in the prevention and control of these diseases. NCDs compromise the integrity of standing armies, incur large military opportunity costs, threaten the health of domestic populations, restrict economic growth in the developing world, stoke socioeconomic inequalities and seed social unrest in fragile states. Greater defence spending on domestic and international efforts to promote health and manage NCDs should be a core function of defence departments mandated to promote global security.

This article discusses institutional changes that may facilitate an adaptive approach to biosecurity risk management where governance is viewed as a multidisciplinary, interactive experiment acknowledging uncertainty. Using the principles of adaptive governance, evolved from institutional theory, we explore how the concepts of lateral information flows, incentive alignment, and policy experimentation might shape Australia's invasive species defense mechanisms. We suggest design principles for biosecurity policies emphasizing overlapping complementary response capabilities and the sharing of invasive species risks via a polycentric system of governance.

Sound biosecurity systems contribute to achieving sustainable agricultural and environmental systems, reducing the threat of introducing unwanted pests and supporting food safety and product integrity. Within Australia, the Grains Farm Biosecurity Program (GFBP) is a national initiative to assist in the development and implementation of improved biosecurity practice within its grain industry. Initiated in 2007, the extension focused program contributes to the industry's risk mitigation activities, supports continued market access and promotes a partnership approach involving governments, industry and community. The program is funded through grower levies in partnership with state government agencies and Plant Health Australia. Using a variety of community engagement strategies, the GFBP has developed a wide range of tools to improve the management of and preparedness for, biosecurity risks in the Australian grains industry at the farm and industry level by highlighting risk pathways and activities throughout the supply chain and encouraging adoption of practices and strategies to mitigate risks. The GFPB also promotes and conducts surveillance for high priority pests especially in on-farm storage. Evaluations indicate an increased awareness of biosecurity risks, industry capacity and voluntary adoption of biosecurity best practices throughout the sector. The GFBP focus on biosecurity best practice through industry engagement has seen it contribute to safeguarding and maintaining Australia's export reputation, with the program recently winning a national biosecurity award.

The Managers of Australasian Herbarium Collections (MAHC) have been working with the Plant Import Operations Branch of the Australian government Department of Agriculture and Water Resources (DAWR) to align our procedures to significantly reduce the risk of herbarium specimens being destroyed when being imported into Australia. The two groups worked together productively to bring about change and to enable the resumption of the international movement of herbarium specimens after two recent international disasters. These changes include amendments to the Biosecurity Import Conditions System (BICON) which contains the Australian government's import conditions and onshore outcomes for herbarium specimens, changes to procedures at the border (airmail gateway facilities) where biosecurity documentation is assessed and parcels released, and updates to existing herbarium parcel labels, guidelines and supplier declaration templates. We will discuss lessons learned, as well as implications for researchers, collections managers or institutions who may be sending herbarium specimen material to Australia. This is a presentation on beahlf of the Managers of Australasian Herbarium Collections (MAHC), a network of herbarium Collection Managers in Australia and New Zealand.

The Managers of Australasian Herbarium Collections (MAHC) have been working with the Plant Import Operations Branch of the Australian government Department of Agriculture and Water Resources (DAWR) to align our procedures to significantly reduce the risk of herbarium specimens being destroyed when being imported into Australia. The two groups worked together productively to bring about change and to enable the resumption of the international movement of herbarium specimens after two recent international disasters. These changes include amendments to the Biosecurity Import Conditions System (BICON) which contains the Australian government's import conditions and onshore outcomes for herbarium specimens, changes to procedures at the border (airmail gateway facilities) where biosecurity documentation is assessed and parcels released, and updates to existing herbarium parcel labels, guidelines and supplier declaration templates. We will discuss lessons learned, as well as implications for researchers, collections managers or institutions who may be sending herbarium specimen material to Australia. This is a presentation on beahlf of the Managers of Australasian Herbarium Collections (MAHC), a network of herbarium Collection Managers in Australia and New Zealand.