Suchergebnisse

Aim:
Policymaking decisions are often uninformed by research and research is rarely influenced by policymakers. To bridge this 'know-do' gap, a boundary-spanning knowledge mobilisation (KM) team was created by embedding researchers-in-residence and local policymakers into each other's organisations. Through increasing the two-way flow of knowledge via social contact, KM team members fostered collaborations and the sharing of 'mindlines', aiming to generate more relevant research bids and research-informed decision-making. This paper describes the activities of the KM team, types of knowledge and how that knowledge was exchanged to influence mindlines.

Discussion:
KM team activities were classified into: relational, dissemination, transferable skills, evaluation, research and awareness raising. Knowledge available included: profession-specific (for example, research methods, healthcare landscape), insider (for example, relational, organisation and experiential) and KM theory and practice. KM team members brokered relationships through conversations interweaving different types of knowledge, particularly organisational and relational. Academics were interested in policymakers' knowledge of healthcare policy and the commissioning landscape. More than research results, policymakers valued researchers' methodological knowledge. Both groups appreciated each other as 'critical friends'.

Conclusion:
To increase research impact, 'expertise into practice' could be leveraged, specifically researchers' critical thinking and research methodology skills. As policymakers' expertise into practice also bridges the know-do gap, future impact models could focus less on evidence into practice and more on fostering this mutual flow of expertise. Embedded knowledge brokers from the two communities working in teams can influence the mindlines of both. These ambassadors can create improvements in 'inter-cultural competence' to draw academia and policymaking closer.

AbstractThis article shows that the disloyalty of political brokers causes party fragility. Lacking distinctive brands, organization, and activists to mobilize individuals, parties "hire" local notables to broker votes among a local, nonpartisan constituency. However, brokers may be unreliable agents, regularly changing political allegiances in search of better returns for their brokerage among the module of voters they control. This free agency from brokers hinders durable party–voter linkages and results in electorally vulnerable parties. Measuring how brokers influence parties is empirically complex, but taking advantage of the fact that in Brazil these agents are also local candidates, this article demonstrates the negative electoral consequences of brokers' free agency on party performance. Natural experiments and an unexpected, temporary institutional reform that discouraged disloyalty for brokers demonstrate this relationship.

Brokers or middlemen have been called a key element in preindustrial economic development, facilitating the exchange of goods within the domestic economy and opening rural production systems to foreign markets. Though Chinese society historically boasted a vigorous brokerage system, many studies of Chinese brokers have viewed them as obstacles to the development of entrepreneurship and capitalist transformation. China's brokers were limited, it is argued, by larger structural constraints—the bonds of custom and community, a preindustrial mode of production, a particular form of state organization and ideology—that inhibited entrepreneurial activities. This view is best reflected in the writings of Marxist historians who claim that brokers in China's presocialist society were an integral part of a feudal system in which landlords and the state dominated the peasant/worker economy, preventing the flowering of the "capitalist sprouts" shooting forth from China's towns and villages.

Seminal models of clientelism assert that parties value brokers for their strong downward ties to voters. Despite its dominance, scholars have not empirically scrutinized key assumptions of this theory due to the challenges of measuring brokers' network connections. We analyze unique data from three sources-Ghana's voter register, a handmade catalogue of local elites, and a large-scale survey of aspiring party brokers. We show that the observable implications of the standard model do not hold: brokers know surprisingly few voters, brokers with more downward connections are not the most active or effective, and parties do not select the brokers who know the most voters. Instead, brokers with the most upward connections to local elites appear to be the most valuable to parties. We build inductively from these results to develop an alternative theory of brokers, proposing that many parties value "problem solvers" over "monitors."

This report discusses the federal and state laws that could be applicable to information brokers and legislation that has been introduced in the 109th Congress to address consumer concerns about the practice of information gathering and identify theft resulting from security breaches.

This report discusses the federal and state laws that could be applicable to information brokers and legislation that has been introduced in the 109th Congress to address consumer concerns about the practice of information gathering and identify theft resulting from security breaches.

The purpose of this study was to examine the distribution channel interface between manufacturers of nationally branded canned food products and food brokers. In addition to the generation of descriptive information about the food broker—food manufacturer channel dyad, hypotheses were tested concerning the degree of consensus between food broker and food manufacturer perceptions of (a) the reasons food manufacturers use food brokers to distribute nationally branded canned food products and (b) their respective roles in the marketing of nationally branded canned food products.