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The article deals with an interesting - from the marketing perspective - form o f electoral rivalry, realised with the participation o f politicians described as the "substitute candidates" . It was taken into consideration that while discussing the issue of "substitute candidate" it is necessary to settle two key questions: which politicians and based on what criteria could be classified as such candidates and what strategic grounds convince rivalry subjects to choose such campaign option. Assuming that the notion "substitute candidate" could be analysed from at least two different points o f view: actual substitution or apparent substitution, some issues o f creating the electoral campaign and realising the campaign with the participation o f "substitute candidate" can be pointed out: from the candidate selection stage, through the stage o f creating and developing the candidate's image, to the stage of implementing project. Moreover, some conclusions from the electoral campaign preceding the presidential elections in Katowice were presented.

We study a spatial model of electoral competition among three office-motivated candidates of unequal valence (one advantaged and two equally disadvantaged candidates) under majority rule assuming that candidates are uncertain about the voters' policy preferences and that the policy space consists of three alternatives (one at each extreme of the linear policy spectrum and one in the center) and we characterize mixed strategy Nash equilibriums of the game. Counterintuitively, we show that (a) when uncertainty about voters' preferences is high, the advantaged candidate might choose in equilibrium a more extremist strategy than the disadvantaged candidates and that (b) when uncertainty about voters' preferences is low, there exist equilibriums in which one of the disadvantaged candidates has a larger probability of election than the disadvantaged candidate of the equivalent two-candidate (one advantaged and one disadvantaged candidate) case. Adapted from the source document.

We study the effects of stochastic (probabilistic) voting on equilibrium locations, equilibrium vote shares and comparative statics in a setup with three heterogeneous candidates and a single-dimensional issue space. Comparing the equilibria with and without stochastic voting, we find that under an appropriate level of uncertainty about voter behavior, the model has a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium (PSNE) that is free from several non-plausible features of the PSNE under deterministic voting. This result is robust to extensions to asymmetric density and plurality maximization. Adapted from the source document.

Our main setting is a single-winner election contested by two major parties. A goal is to find whether candidate A or B of one party would be the stronger opponent running against candidate C of the other party. A poll (as many polls do) asks the same set of respondents to choose both between A and C and between B and C. The classical McNemar test and two novel extensions thereof can evaluate the difference between A and B regarding their strength against C. The first extension treats the case where some respondents answer one question but not both, a condition that the McNemar test itself does not handle well. The second covers the case where respondents who do not answer a question are probed further to see if they lean toward either candidate. We provide empirical examples related to the 2016 US presidential election. The A-versus-B strength difference vis-à-vis C can be statistically significant even if the difference between A's showing against C and B's showing against C is small. We argue finally that other insights helpful to party and candidate strategy can also emerge from novel augmentations to polling practices.

This study aims to explain how the existence of dai in building the political image of candidates in the 2015 Medan Mayor election. Furthermore, the researcher specifically wants to reveal the involvement of dai in the 2015 Medan Mayor election, his motivation to be involved in the Mayor election, the strategy in building candidate imagery, and dai communication ethics in building candidate image in Mayor's election. This research is a political communication research using qualitative research methods. The data collection technique is done by interview, observation, and documentation. Research informants were selected through the snowball technique. The data obtained were then processed using Miles and Huberman, namely through three steps, first reducing data, presenting data, and finally drawing or verifying conclusions. The results of this study indicate that the involvement of the dai in the 2015 election for the mayor of Medan, there were dai who supported the candidate directly, who supported indirectly, the dai group who were neutral and the dai group who refused. The motivation for dai's involvement is based on the motive of power and the motive for personal and group gain. The strategy used in building a candidate's image is carried out by caring for the candidate's character by presenting candidates at religious events, accompanying candidates at religious events, appearing on the candidate's campaign stage, and explaining the candidate's vision and mission to the congregation. Furthermore, the strategy is carried out by packaging political messages in an informative and persuasive manner with an approach that is of appeal, emotional appeal, and reward appeal. The media used by dai as a candidate imaging tool is direct media (face to face) individually or in groups. Also, printed media (newspapers, brochures, bulletin) and new media are used, namely the website, WhatsApp and Facebook. In political imaging activities, Dai still seems to ignore the ethical values of communication, namely, he is still carrying out black campaigns and is inconsistent between words and deeds.

The parties' congressional campaign committees have made it their business to strategically provide contributions to candidate campaigns in order to help their candidates win. However, the effectiveness of these contributions in terms of increasing the competitiveness of party-sponsored candidates remains untested. Using contribution data from the U.S. Federal Election Commission in a series of mixed effects models as well as a matching analysis, the receipt of direct party contributions and coordinated support is shown to significantly improve the competitive position of challengers but not open seat candidates in races for the House. Further, independent expenditures by the parties do not significantly increase candidates' competitiveness. The implications of these results for future party strategies are explored.