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SOCIAL CONFLICTS ARE THE MOTOR OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS AND POINT TO A DESIRE OR STRUGGLE FOR SOCIAL CHANGES. THESE CHANGES ARE SUBSEQUENTLY REALIZED IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS, AND THE RESULTS LAID DOWN IN LAW. DISPROPORTIONAL POSITIONAL CHANGES OF ACTORS WITHIN A SOCIAL SYSTEM BRING ABOUT CONFLICTS.

"The literature dealing systematically with the connections between change and conflict is hardly extensive, and that directly dealing with precise relationships between change and conflict resolution is even sparser. In a way, this is surprising - for many writers make implicit, and in some cases explicit, connections between some form of change and the formation of conflicts, while others discuss conflict 'dynamics' as well as those changes that are needed before any kind of resolution of a conflict can realistically be sought. A recent and completely unsystematic search of one university's modest library revealed over 420 entries combining the words 'change' and 'conflict' in their title, while a similar search of a data bank of dissertation abstracts produced over 3,500 such citations. Nonetheless, there seem to be few works that focus in general terms on connections between the two concepts, or on the process of conflict resolution as a phenomenon involving change from the relationship of enemies or adversaries into something else. This chapter endeavors to make some contribution to filling this gap in the literature by discussing the relationship between 'change' and 'conflict' in very general terms, rather than focusing on particular changes that have either created conflict between particular communities, societies and countries, or changes that have led towards a resolution of any specific conflict which has protracted and become violent. It can be considered, therefore, as a small contribution to the development of a general theory of change and conflict - or, more particularly, conflict resolution. An understanding of the dynamics of conflict formation and perpetuation should have implications for methods of resolving (or at least coping with) even the most intractable of conflict relationships. As such, the chapter may be a starting point for the development of a set of theories of conflict dynamics as well as a practical set of guidelines concerning modes and timing of 'resolutionary' interventions." (excerpt)

Like other types of diaspora groups, conflict-generated diasporas display a strong attachment to their countries of origin, and structure their identities and ideologies around discourses referring to their homeland. However, their inner cleavages, born out of the conflicts raging in their home countries, can run very deep. The maintenance of their ethnic, religious, linguistic or political divisions even generations after the migration process has taken place sometimes leads to conflict transportation processes, whereby the conflicts raging in their home countries are reproduced and maintained in countries of settlement. Incidents opposing rival diaspora groups are thus often interpreted as a prolongation or reproduction of core conflicts raging in their regions of origin. Against this assumption, this article argues that if transported conflicts often formally take the shape of core conflicts, and emulate them by using the same language, symbols and ethnic/religious/linguistic categories, they are also deeply transformed by the migration process itself. In this perspective, this article explores the transformation and reinvention of conflict-generated diasporas' politics, and proposes to look at the autonomisation processes they display vis-à-vis the core conflicts, in terms of content but also of objectives, ultimately generating a drift at the political and organisational levels.

The history of independent Ukraine is characterised by the relatively peaceful handling of ethnic & linguistic conflict potential, despite the fact that approximately one quarter of the population belongs to ethnic minorities & less than half of the population has the state language as its first language. This is not explained by skilful government policies but rather by the patrimonial character of the Ukrainian polity that is softening the excesses of Ukrainisation policies, the cultural affinity of Russian & Ukrainian cultures, as well as the general passivity of the population. The Ukrainisation campaign of the Ukrainian government has been very ineffective & Ukrainian culture is in 2001 more endangered than in 1991. Given the growing economic dependence upon Russia & declining support for Ukrainian statehood, support for Ukrainisation policies is narrowing down. The Crimea is a case apart because this peninsula is not part of historical Ukraine & few Ukrainians live there. Moreover, the Crimea is disputed by powerful forces in Russia. Conflict between Crimea & Kyiv could be contained partly due to the inability of the Crimean elite to unite & to govern the region adequately, therewith eroding support for a separatist agenda. Adapted from the source document.