Suchergebnisse

Depuis 1932, la Thaïlande connaît régulièrement coups d'États et nouvelles constitutions, jusqu'en mai 2014. La convergence d'intérêts entre les militaires, les hauts fonctionnaires et l'institution monarchique, qui forment un État dans l'État, explique en partie cette instabilité politique. Mais se heurtent également dans le pays deux principes de légitimité : une légitimité procédurale découlant des élections et une légitimité substantielle fondée sur l'appréciation de la moralité des élus, chacune renvoyant aux intérêts de couches sociales différentes. politique étrangère

This paper considers how coups d'état influence the duration of civil wars. While previous work on civil war duration has ignored coups, grouped them alongside civil wars or considered them as a special type of conflict, this article recognizes coups as dramatic events that can quickly change the course of a conflict. Coups that take place during a civil war can shock an otherwise intractable bargaining situation, shortening the war's duration. This shock influences both information and credibility concerns. Coups condense government preferences into a single, unified viewpoint and allow governments to efficiently translate preferences into action. They likewise combine the military with the government, effectively eliminating the military as a potential spoiler, which helps ease the commitment problem. These expectations are tested by examining the impact of successful coups on civil war duration, 1950–2009. Results suggest that coups indeed serve as peace-inducing shocks, primarily by working through the credibility mechanism.

We explore how institutional set-ups, in particular changes in political institutions through coups d'état, can affect the way military expenditures are determined. We use a counterfactual approach, the synthetic control method, and compare the evolution of the military burden for 40 countries affected by coups with the evolution of a synthetic counterfactual that replicates the initial conditions and the potential outcomes of the countries of interest before exposure to coups. Our case studies suggest that successful coups result in a large increase in the military burden. However, when no effects or a decrease in the defense burden are found, it is often the consequence of a democratization process triggered by the coup. These results are in keeping with recent theoretical developments on the bargaining power of the military in authoritarian regimes. Failed coups, by contrast, produce a smaller, and mostly positive, effect on the military burden, possibly as a result of the incumbent's strategy to avert further challenges to the stability of the regime by buying off the military.

Although just under half of all coup d'état attempts involve fatalities, there has been surprisingly little attention to the conditions under which coups turn violent. Existing research emphasizes the incentives coup plotters have to avoid bloodshed but does not explain the conditions under which violence nonetheless occurs. This article develops a theoretical framework that predicts that the extent of violence that occurs during coup attempts will vary systematically with central features of incumbent regimes and coup plotters. It then tests these predictions using new data on the fatalities associated with 377 coup attempts between 1950 and 2017. Coups against military regimes are found to be less violent than those against civilian dictatorships. This is because military rulers are better able to estimate the likelihood of the coup succeeding and more sensitive to the costs associated with using violence to suppress a coup. Since their post-coup fates tend to be better than those of other authoritarian leaders, they also have fewer incentives to hang on to power at any cost. The analysis also demonstrates that coups led by senior officers involve less bloodshed than those by junior officers and enlisted men. However, coups against rulers that counterbalance their militaries are no more violent than those against rulers that do not. The results shed new light on the dynamics of coup attempts.

In this lively and provocative book, Erica De Bruin looks at the threats that rulers face from their own armed forces. Can they make their regimes impervious to coups? How to Prevent Coups d'État shows that how leaders organize their coercive institutions has a profound effect on the survival of their regimes. When rulers use presidential guards, militarized police, and militia to counterbalance the regular military, efforts to oust them from power via coups d'état are less likely to succeed. Even as counterbalancing helps to prevent successful interventions, however, the resentment that it generates within the regular military can provoke new coup attempts. And because counterbalancing changes how soldiers and police perceive the costs and benefits of a successful overthrow, it can create incentives for protracted fighting that result in the escalation of a coup into full-blown civil war. Drawing on an original dataset of state security forces in 110 countries over a span of fifty years, as well as case studies of coup attempts in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East, De Bruin sheds light on how counterbalancing affects regime survival. Understanding the dynamics of counterbalancing, she shows, can help analysts predict when coups will occur, whether they will succeed, and how violent they are likely to be. The arguments and evidence in this book suggest that while counterbalancing may prevent successful coups, it is a risky strategy to pursue—and one that may weaken regimes in the long term.

par Gabriel Naudé. Avecque les reflexions historiques, morales, chrétiennes et politiques de L.D.M.C.S.D.S.E.D.M. . ; Volltext // Exemplar mit der Signatur: Regensburg, Staatliche Bibliothek -- 999/Jur.833

AbstractThis study investigates the impact of urban protests on coup attempts and subsequent regime change in a sample of 39 Sub-Saharan African countries for the period from 1990 to 2007. Widespread public discontent, especially when occurring in urban centers, can act as a trigger of coups d'état in autocratic regimes. Yet, it is less clear how elites respond to protests in terms of post-coup institutional change and democratization. To account for potential endogeneity of protests and coups, variation in rainfall is used as an instrument for urban protests. The results show that rainfall-related urban protests raise the likelihood that a coup is staged, but have no effect on subsequent democratization.

Interest in authoritarian politics and democratic breakdown has fueled a revival in scholarship on coups d'état. However, this research is held back by the fact that no global coup dataset captures theoretically salient information on the identity of coup-makers, their goals, and the relationship between the coup leaders and the ruling regime. We introduce the Colpus dataset, new global data on coup types and characteristics in the post–World War II era. These data introduce a typology of coups, measurement strategy, and coding procedures to differentiate between whether coups seek to preserve existing ruling coalitions (leader reshuffling coups) or significantly alter ruling coalitions (regime change coups). We show trends in coup types across time and space. Finally, we demonstrate that poverty—an established determinant of coups—only predicts regime change coups. Colpus data will be of use to scholars of political instability and conflict, regime change, leadership accountability, the political economy of democracy and dictatorship, and related topics.

Decolonisation in sub-Saharan Africa began in January 1956 when the Sudan joined long-independent Ethiopia and Liberia as a new, post-colonial state. Although the process is not yet complete because of the disputed status of Namibia and South Africa's continued rule by a white minority, over the past 30 years as many as 43 new states have achieved independence from colonial rule, the most recent being Zimbabwe in April 1980.