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Credibility is frequently represented as both an ideal goal for journalism as a profession and as an integral part of the news industry's survival strategy. Yet there is no widely accepted operationalization of the concept of credibility. In the current article, we present the results of a study of credibility in Danish news media. Credibility is defined at an institutional level by two dimensions: A) the accuracy and reliability of the news stories featured in leading Danish news media, and B) journalists' knowledge and understanding of the Danish code of press ethics. The results show that sources only find objective errors in 14.1% of the news stories, which is a lower figure than most other studies report. The results also show that Danish journalists find bad press ethics to be an increasing problem and attribute this problem to increased pressure in the newsroom.

Abstract
Political scientists Alexander Gazmararian and Dustin Tingley's incisive new book Uncertain Futures: How to Unlock the Climate Impasse contends that credibility is key to unlocking the deadlock over climate policy. They claim that fossil fuel communities have often been skeptical of any transition away from fossil fuels with good reason. In similar situations, policymakers have often failed to follow through on policies meant to mitigate economic dislocation. Drawing on a wealth of quantitative and qualitative evidence from energy-producing communities, including surveys of residents and officials alike, Gazmararian and Tingley find that different policy features that bolster credibility can build support for a transition to clean energy sources. The book provides a much-needed view of the energy transition from the ground-up. Yet the book pays less attention to a principal-agent problem at the heart of the clean energy transition: many of the elected representatives of the communities most affected by the transition don't acknowledge any need for a transition. What's more, in a highly polarized environment, the impact of policy feedbacks is likely to be muted. Drawing on the experiences of the ACA and Canada's carbon tax, we suggest that even when the policy features that the authors propose are present, support for clean-energy policies may not rise dramatically.

The credibility crisis of Community regulation is symbolized by the recurrent food scares, and even more by official reactions such as the refusal of the German and French governments to abide by the decision of the Commission to lift the ban on exports of British beef. However, the crisis is not new, nor is it limited to food safety. Problems of regulatory credibility in the EC/EU arise at different levels. Some are rooted in the deep structure of the founding treaties, while other problems result from path-dependent aspects of the integration process, from institutional inertia, or from the pursuit of short-term advantages. This article is primarily concerned with the second group of problems, but a short discussion of the more fundamental issues seems useful as a reminder of the limits of what can be achieved by piecemeal institutional engineering. The article addresses two specific threats to credibility: the mismatch between the Community's highly complex and differentiated regulatory tasks and the available administrative instruments; and the problem of credible commitment caused by the increasing level of politicization and parliamentarization of the Commission. The solution to both sets of problems, it is argued, may be found in a more far-reaching delegation of powers to independent European agencies embedded in transnational networks of national regulators and international organizations. Recent theoretical advances in the area of institutional design and procedural controls suggest that such networks could be made to satisfy all reasonable requirements of subsidiarity, accountability and efficiency. (Journal of Common Market Studies / FUB)

Several previous studies on the effect of COMM's on opinion change are referred to (Carl L Hovland, Arthur A. Lumsdaine, & Fred D. Sheffield, EXPERIMENTS IN MASS COM- MUNICATION, New York, NY: Wiley, 1949; Carl I. Hovland & W. Weiss, 'The Influence of Source Credibility on Communication Effectiveness,' Public Opinion Quarterly, 1952, 15, 635-650; & SA 106). These studies indicated that the immediate opinion change was greater when the COMM came from a high credibility source than from a low credibility source, but that, over time, the effects tended to equalize. The authors of this article conducted a study to test & refine these findings. The study was conducted in 1965 & the R's were students of introductory sociol at Indiana U. The R's filled out questionaires before & at several time points after the exposure. They were asked to rate 2 texts on the drug problem, from 2 sources. It was known that these sources had diff credibilities among the R's. It was found that in low credibility conditions, the R's immediately after exposure thought spontaneously both of the source & the content, but after some time they thought about the content & not about the source. Since the text was well written & logically reasoned, the R's in general thought more of the content than of the source. Low credibility conditions create a contrast between the source & the content, while high credibility conditions do not. A. Peskin.

AbstractEuro candidates are expected to maintain the value of their currency within the fluctuation band of the new exchange rate mechanism for at least two years. This paper highlights some unpleasant macroeconomic effects that could occur during this interval. The problem is cast as a two‐stage sequential game between private agents and the government of the applicant country. The policy‐maker decides whether to devaluate the domestic currency or not at two distinct dates; it makes a last choice just before accession to the monetary union. Under an assumption of incomplete information of private agents about the government's priorities on inflation and economic activity, the game presents a hybrid perfect Bayesian equilibrium. In the pooling configuration, an initial policy of zero devaluation does not signal the final devaluation decision. As private agents cannot completely rule out the risk of a 'last devaluation', a premium adds to interest rates and entails a systematic output loss.

There is heightened interest in reforming government regulation of financial institutions to make better use of market discipline and data. We strongly support such reforms, which are being implemented to some degree by the Federal Reserve System. However, market oriented reforms will not work unless government policies are credible in putting market participants, especially those at the largest financial institutions, at risk of loss. Establishing credible policies requires that governments address the time-consistency problem head-on. As a result, we recommend policies that establish credibility by directly reducing the incentive that policy-makers have to protect the creditors of financial institutions. Other policies, which do not address the fundamental reasons why policy-makers bail out creditors, are therefore likely to be circumvented when large banks get into trouble.

Teaching about the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region in politics or international studies courses in 'the West' is challenging due to the many stereotypes that inform students' imagination. A common pedagogical purpose is to help students recognise their biases and work through them. This often renders the classroom a controversial place and the teacher suspect of lack of objectivity. The specialised literature points at 'cognitive dissonance' as an intervening factor. On occasions, cognitive dissonance leads to harm on teachers' credibility. This article evaluates the question of credibility in two activities developed in International Relations (IR) undergraduate courses with a MENA focus, where students had to identify the impact of 'Orientalism' in the film Argo and in analyses of the 'Arab Spring'. The article argues that to fully grasp episodes of cognitive dissonance and attending problems of teacher credibility, the disciplinary context in which learners are socialised into needs to be considered – in this case, IR. The article advocates the articulation of a student-centred decolonial teaching pedagogy that renders subjectivity an object of learning and, at the same time, prepares students to understand the potentialities and weaknesses of different IR paradigms.

For deterrence to work, a potential attacker needs to perceive the deterrer's threats as capable and credible for retaliation. The issue of relative capabilities has been extensively analyzed, yet the core problem concerns credible intentions. The strategic literature is largely influenced by commitment theory prescribing various "manipulation of risk" strategies intended to enhance threat credibility. A few analysts, however, challenge this view and recognize the importance of "intrinsic interests" in the issues at stake (i.e., inherent credibility), which can limit the effectiveness of costly signals. These two alternative views are quantitatively tested in the cases of major-powers deterrence from 1895 to 1985. A new measure of the observable category of inherent credibility is also introduced, consisting of the regional interests of major powers in the area of dispute. The results indicate strong and significant effects of regional interests on both the onset and outcomes of extended-immediate deterrence, thus suggesting relevant theoretical and policy implications.

This paper quantifies the deterioration of achievable tabilization outcomes when monetary policy operates under imperfect credibility and weak anchoring of long-term expectations. Within a medium-scale DSGE model, we introduce through a simple signal extraction problem, an imperfect knowledge configuration where rice and wage setters wrongly doubt about the determination of the central bank to leave unchanged its long-term inflation objective in the face of inflationary shocks. The magnitude of private sector learning has been calibrated to match the volatility of US inflation expectations at long horizons. Given such illustrative calibrations, we find that the costs of aintaining a given inflation volatility under weak credibility could amount to 0.25 pp of output gap standard deviation.