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Abstract.  By most definitions, the third wave of democratisation has given rise to dominant parties and dominant party systems in Africa. The effective number of parties, the most widely used method to count parties, does not adequately capture this fact. An analysis of 59 election results in 18 sub‐Saharan African countries shows that classifications of party systems on the basis of the effective number of parties are problematic and often flawed. Some of these problems are well known, but the African evidence brings them out with unusual clarity and force. It is found that Sartori's counting rules, party system typology and definition of a dominant party are still the most helpful analytical tools to arrive at an accurate classification of party systems and their dynamics in general, and of dominant party systems in particular.

Most political scientists view Israels Mapai (Labor Party) as an example of a "dominant party". The questions which are discussed in this study are: (1) are there any special characteristics in the behavior of a dominant party which goes into opposition; and (2) does the transition to the opposition automatically nullify its definition as a dominant party? The study deals only with the Labor Party's perception of its role in the political system, as revealed in the records of meetings of various party forums. (DÜI-Hns)

What is responsible for the decline of democratically dominant parties and the corresponding growth of competitive party systems? This article argues that, despite a ruling party's dominance, opposition forces can gain by winning important subnational offices and then creating a governance record that they can use to win new supporters. It focuses on South Africa as a paradigmatic dominant party system, tracing the increased competitiveness of elections in Cape Town and the surrounding Western Cape province between 1999 and 2010. These events show how party strategies may evolve, reflecting how party elites can learn from forming coalitions.

The view of clientelism as an abuse of state power casts doubt on the democratic credentials of highly clientelistic political systems. The question is particularly relevant for the classification of dominant party systems that heavily rely on clientelism to elicit popular support and retain a relatively open structure of participation. Knowing that clientelism is a widespread practice in modern democracies too, how do we evaluate the impact of clientelism on political competitiveness in order to sort out the position of these regimes along the lines of democracy and authoritarianism? This task requires identifying the conditions under which clientelism becomes an essentially authoritarian practice and qualifies these regimes as such. The article puts forward two propositions about the circumstances under which clientelism infringes basic democratic standards under a thin and a thick definition of democracy. Clientelism under one-party monopoly engenders authoritarianism when it thwarts and punishes the contesting voice of citizens by effectively blocking exit from its incentives and sanctions.

Authoritarian dominant parties are said to ensure elite loyalty by providing elites with regularized opportunities for career advancement. This article uses data on the distribution of leadership posts in Russia's regional legislatures (1999–2010) to conduct the first systematic test of this proposition. Loyalty to the nascent hegemonic party, United Russia, is shown to be important in determining a legislator's chances of being promoted to a leadership position. These findings generate insight into how authoritarian institutions help maintain regime stability and provide a clearer picture of how Russia's ruling party works.

Authoritarian dominant parties are said to ensure elite loyalty by providing elites with regularized opportunities for career advancement. This article uses data on the distribution of leadership posts in Russia's regional legislatures (1999-2010) to conduct the first systematic test of this proposition. Loyalty to the nascent hegemonic party, United Russia, is shown to be important in determining a legislator's chances of being promoted to a leadership position. These findings generate insight into how authoritarian institutions help maintain regime stability and provide a clearer picture of how Russia's ruling party works. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

Using country-specific case studies, top-rank analysts in the field focus on the lessons that dominant parties might learn from losing and the adaptations they consequently make in order to survive, to remain competitive or to ultimately re-gain power.