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Abstract
This paper develops an axiomatic context-dependent model of social image concerns. Allowing for context-dependence based on choice sets, it examines how context-dependence impacts social image concerns, in particular how a decision maker exhibits various social emotions stemming from their intrinsic reference point, which may not be captured by conforming to social norms. To elicit the intrinsic reference point, this paper provides weaker versions of Strategic Rationality and Independence, in addition to the basic axioms, to characterize the model of the Reference-Dependent Image-Conscious utilitarian. This paper also examines how social emotions stemming from the intrinsic reference point are related to preference reversals as violations of the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP). Finally, this paper considers the relationship between social image concerns and intrinsic reciprocity. The findings demonstrate that social image plays a large role and the model developed illustrates a condition in which cooperation is sustained in prisoner's dilemma games.

AbstractOne of the basic concepts of the theory of coalition games is the core of the game, together with its various extensions. However, the core is usually a set, a subset of Pareto set. Therefore, all problems of vector optimization and multiple criteria decision support arise when selecting points within a core. One of interactive decision support approaches is the use of reference points and the maximization of corresponding achievement functions. The paper proposes some ways of defining and using reference points that result in equitable allocations. One way of defining such reference points is to use known solutions of coalition games, such as Shapley value or Banzhaf value. Another way of defining such reference points might be an extension of Raiffa–Kalai–Smorodinski solution to coalition games, proposed in the paper. The properties of resulting equitable allocations in the core of the game are examined. The possibility of empty core and allocations in an extended core is also examined and the concept of maximal robustness point is introduced; this point might also be used as a reference point. Possible applications of this extension of the theory of coalition games concern business negotiations. An illustrative example of negotiating a cooperative merger of three or four high‐tech firms is given.The basic conclusion from the analysis and the examples presented in the paper is that axiomatic solutions of coalition games, e.g. Shapley and Banzhaf values, should be considered as reference points for vector optimization and multicriteria decision support rather than as normative solutions. Moreover, beside these axiomatic solutions there are several other possible definitions of reference points, such as the Raiffa solution or the maximal robustness point, that might be preferred by negotiators when solving practical coalition games. This has been confirmed by simulated gaming exercises performed by students under a strong motivation to treat simulated game seriously. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

This paper provides field evidence on how reference points adjust, a degree of freedom in reference-dependence models. Examining this in the context of cabdrivers' daily labor-supply behavior, we ask how the within-day timing of earnings affects decisions. Drivers work less in response to higher accumulated income, with a strong effect for recent earnings that gradually diminishes for earlier earnings. We estimate a structural model in which drivers work toward a reference point that adjusts to deviations from expected earnings with a lag. This dynamic view of reference dependence reconciles conflicting "neoclassical" and "behavioral" interpretations of evidence on daily labor-supply decisions. (JEL J22, J31, L94)

The European Commission requested EFSA to evaluate whether a series of dyes are covered by the 'Guidance on methodological principles and scientific methods to be taken into account when establishing Reference Points for Action (RPAs) for non‐allowed pharmacologically active substances present in food of animal origin' and to which group they should be attributed according to this guidance. Although these substances are not registered for use in food‐producing animals in the European Union, they may be used illegally in aquaculture for their antimicrobial properties. It was concluded that acriflavine, 3‐aminoacridine, aminoacridine, basic blue 7, brilliant green, leucobrilliant green, C.I. basic blue 26, chloranil, crystal violet, leucocrystal violet, dichlone, ethyl violet, methylene blue, new methylene blue, Nile blue, pararosaniline base, proflavine, proflavine hydrochloride, rhodamine 6G and trypan red are covered by the guidance document and belong to group I. A toxicological screening value of 0.0025 μg/kg body weight per day is applicable. Azure blue and potassium permanganate were excluded from the evaluation due to their inorganic nature.