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Starting from recent formulas of EU bureaucracy for subordinating scientific and educational apparatuses to the needs of the capital and to the requests of its political representatives, the article analyses the interconnection between the historical transformation of the ideological state apparatuses (universities, higher education institutions, research institutes etc.) and the epistemological discontinuity provoked by the triumph of technosciences. The hypothesis to be tested is the following: While the crisis of West European-North American capitalism requires an ever tighter submission of ideological state apparatuses, and especially of scientific and academic apparatuses to the needs of the capital, theoretical practices in the humanities and social sciences have come to the point where they entered into an open conflict with the domination of the capital and have, as a consequence, started to subvert their own institutional supports in the ideological apparatuses of the capitalist state. For this purpose, the article reconsiders social sciences as a compromise formation and, eventually, reassesses the historical materialism as a non-Cartesian modern science.

Achieving the goals of law, the most important of which is ensuring justice, depends on the competence of law enforcement officers, their knowledge and the ability to use this knowledge in the course of professional activity. The article substantiates the assumption that one of the reasons for the low efficiency of law enforcement is the epistemological illiteracy of its subjects. It consists in the fact that they consider law enforcement as an action based on ready-made, template knowledge, into which they squeeze the object in question, which is always different from this template. The author sees the way out in giving the subject the authority to create relevant knowledge, which, while preserving the essential features of law, would be proportionate to the situation "here" and "now". This requires him to have a high level of philosophical culture and epistemological competence as its component.

The analytical relationship between Marxism and feminism has engaged critical scholarship and leftist practice since the time of the foundational contributions of Marx and Engels. Socialist feminist analysis has profoundly advanced contemporary Marxism. However, some strands in Marxist theory and left practice continue to be resistant to feminist contributions. It is this resistance that animates this paper, which is theorized as epistemological dissonance. While not in any way universal, such dissonance is pervasive and suggests an epistemological framing. This is suggested to include four dimensions, regarding: (i) temporality; (ii) idealized masculinities; (iii) specific views of totality in relation to class, race and gender; and (iv) the relationship between activism and the academy. Collectively, these elements maintain and advance not only certain tenets understood as “knowledge”, but also generate a kind of problematic left common sense that can inhibit constructive Marxist and socialist feminist investigation.

The author proposes an epistemological strategy to resolve controversial issues in the indigenous psychology (IP) movement. These include the nature of IPs, scientific standards, cultural concepts, philosophy of science, mainstream psychology, generalization of findings, and the isolation and independence of IPs. The approach includes a two-step strategy for construction of culture-inclusive theories, based on a Mandala model of self and a Face and Favor model for social interaction, and the use of these models to develop culture-inclusive theories for Confucian morphostasis. The author has successfully used this strategy, and encourages others to use it to construct their own culture-inclusive theories.

AbstractThe dominant conception of delusion in psychiatry (in textbooks, research papers, diagnostic manuals, etc.) is predominantly epistemic. Delusions are almost always characterized in terms of their epistemic defects, i.e., defects with respect to evidence, reasoning, judgment, etc. However, there is an individualistic bias in the epistemic conception; the alleged epistemic defects and abnormalities in delusions relate to individualistic epistemic processes rather than social epistemic processes. We endorse the social epistemological turn in recent philosophical epistemology, and claim that a corresponding turn is needed in the study of delusions. It is a turn from the (purely) individualistic conception, which characterizes delusions only by individualistic epistemic defects and abnormalities, to the (partially) social epistemic conception, which characterizes delusions by individualistic as well as social epistemic defects and abnormalities. This paper is intended as an initial step toward such a social epistemological turn. In particular, we will develop a new model of the development of delusions according to which testimonial abnormalities, including testimonial isolation and testimonial discount, are a causal factor in the development of delusions.