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This paper discusses the determinants of Japan's declining fertility rate from 1973 to 2008. We examine various economic factors: GDP per capita, infant mortality rates, female labour participation, cost of education, and urbanization and find that these variables are cointegrated. We discover that GDP per capita has a negative relationship with fertility rates and a 1% increase in GDP per capita leads to a decrease in fertility by 2.1%. In addition, we discover that female labour participation shows an unexpected positive relationship to fertility suggesting that their financial contribution to the family has lowered the cost of child rearing.

AbstractUnified growth theory advances that the transition from a Malthusian regime to sustained economic growth is characterized by technological progress and, amongst other things, by an increase in demand for human capital which in turn creates incentives for lower fertility rates. Bearing that in mind, I ask the question: has southern Africa escaped the Malthusian stagnation? Specifically, I study whether primary school completion rates have played any role in total fertility rates in all countries of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) during the 1980–2009 period. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the results, based on dynamic panel time‐series methods, suggest that primary education is associated with lower fertility in the SADC, or that the community is already trading‐off quantity for quality of children. Although I do not claim causality, overall the results are significant because, in accordance with unified growth theory, they suggest that the SADC is experiencing its own transition from the Malthusian stagnation epoch into sustained growth, or that the SADC is going through its own post‐Malthusian regime.

While much of the world worries about increasing population, this book looks the other way. It highlights the dramatic fall in fertility rates in all regions of the world. Demographers suggest that by 2050 this will lead to population decline. While environmentally this may be welcomed, there may also be negative impacts on our economies: less workers, an increasing number of elderly, and more unwanted childlessness. In this book, key experts untangle the reasons for not having children; international case studies demonstrate that there are similar but also different reasons operating in different areas and psychologists and sociologists explore the possible impact on children, parents and the elderly. Given that fertility trends are not easy to reverse, the book concludes that more needs to be done to maximize the potential of all children; particularly those who have been at the margins of society.

AbstractThis study examines the role of official development assistance (ODA) in affecting adolescent fertility rates in low- and middle-income countries. Approximately 95% of adolescent births occur in middle- and low-income countries, and the average adolescent fertility rate in low-income countries is five times higher than in high-income countries. Aid donors typically pursue multiple objectives when providing development aid, many of which can go beyond changes in per capita GDP and include human capital factors such as adolescent fertility and infant mortality. Using data over the period from 1995 to 2015, our results suggest that total ODA has a beneficial impact by lowering the adolescent fertility rate either directly or through the channel of income growth. Our results also show that this beneficial effect on the adolescent fertility rate is stronger in low-income countries than in middle-income countries. Findings based on sectoral aid suggest that health aid has a stronger effect than aid in other sectors.

More worrying about the fertility rate:Politics works on the basis that society will go on and on into the future. The intense focus on climate change – for good or ill – takes for granted that there will be many future generations whose welfare is threatened by damage to the environment. But can we really be so sure that there will be future generations to benefit from our endeavours – or even to look after us in our old age?The short answer is no: the evidence suggests that the very existence of future society hangs in the balance. The current UK fertility rate – the average number of children per woman – stands at 1.6. This is significantly below the "replacement rate" of 2.1, and continues to fall.The correct answer there is well, bully for politics then. Because the liberal vision - by which we mean the real one, not the modern - is to maximise choice, freedom and liberty to the individual. Society is then the aggregation of those individual choices. Yes, of course there are limits, things like third party harm and so on. But leave people be and see what happens - that is the design for the liberal society.This past century has included glorious events - the economic liberation of women for one. The result of that freedom and liberty is fewer children. Oh well, that's just what humans want to do with their freedom and liberty. It's therefore the politics that needs to change, nothing else. For the people have spoken in their most intimate acts and decisions.It might well be true that some don't like that aggregate result, the society that results from freedom. But bully for the complaint, not the acts.

What is happening to fertility behaviour? -- No time for children? the key questions / Ann Buchanan and Anna Rotkirch -- Demographic transitions and familial change : comparative international perspectives / David S. Reher -- The growth of the one-child family and other changes in the low fertility countries of Asia / Gavin W. Jones -- Childlessness : choice and circumstances / John Haskey -- Population decline : facing an inevitable destiny? / David Coleman and Bob Rowthorn -- What are the reasons for women having fewer children? -- Why are women having fewer babies? / The views of Mumsnet users / Justine Roberts, Kate Williams and Ann Buchanan -- Young women's relationships, contraception and unintended pregnancy in the United States / Jennifer S. Barber, Yasamin Kusunoki, Heather H. Gatny,and Jennifer Yarger -- Crisis and control : Russia's dramatic fertility decline and efforts to increase it / Brienna Perelli-Harris and Olga Isupova -- The choice of having a second child and its implication for future family structure in China / Zhenzhen Zheng -- Childbearing and the impact of HIV : the South African experience / Lorna Benton and Marie-Louise Newell -- Declining fertility, television and the (mis) representation of motherhood / Stuart Basten -- What will be the impact of women having fewer babies? -- What will be the impact on the well-being of children? / Ann Buchanan -- Falling fertility, ageing, and Europe's demographic deficit / Sarah Harper -- The impact on mothers : managing the competing needs / Ann Buchanan -- Baby fever and longing for children / Anna Rotkirch -- A look into the crystal ball : possible responses -- Family policy and fertility : do policies make a difference? / Anne H. Gauthier -- Investing in early childhood / Gøsta Esping-Andersen -- Making time for children / Ann Buchanan and Anna Rotkirch

The increase in TFR is predicted to have a negative impact on the Government and the community. The ASFR factor is one of the demographic factors that is closely related to TFR, the studied is to get a picture and control solution, especially in the Goron talo province. The data used in this paper is the data of Gorontalo Province's SKAP 2018 in 2018, the population of this survey is WUS (15 to 49 years), families and adolescents aged 15 to 24 years are not married and house holds in sele cted clusters . The sampling design used stratified multistage sampling , with a total of 48 clusters selected . Each cluster was enumerated and 35 Eligible House hold were selected using the systematic random sampling technique to be interviewed. Survey results show Gorontalo Province TFR is 2.46 children per woman, increased by 2.43 percent compared to the results of the 2017 RPJMN Survey, higher than the National average TFR which reached 2.38. The highest TFR is closely related to the ASFR of 15 - 19 Years old group of 52 (52 births per 1000 women). The shift age with the highest fertility rates from 20 - 24 years to 25 - 29 years old, each shift age reached 142 and 150 births per 1000 women in each group. The high ASFR in the young age group has the potential to increase TFR. Peningkatan TFR diprediksi mampu memberi dampak buruk bagi Pemerintah dan masyarakat sendiri. Faktor ASFR merupakan salah satu faktor demografi yang berkaitan erat dengan TFR sehingga diperlukan suatu kajian untuk mendapatkan gambaran dan solusi pengendalian khususnya di wilayah provinsi Gorontalo. Data yang digunakan dalam makalah ini merupakan data SKAP 2018 Provinsi Gorontalo Tahun 2018, populasi dari survei ini adalah WUS (15 Sampai 49 Tahun), keluarga dan remaja usia 15 sampai 24 Tahun belum menikah dan rumah tangga pada klaster terpilih. Rancangan sampling yang digunakan adalah stratified multistage sampling, dengan jumlah klaster terpilih sebanyak 48 klaster. Masing-masing klaster dilakukan pencacahan dan dipilih 35 Rumah Tangga Eligible dengan menggunakan teknik sistematic random sampling untuk diwawancarai. Hasil Survei menunjukkan TFR Provinsi Gorontalo adalah 2,46 anak per wanita, meningkat 2,43 persen dibanding dengan hasil Survei RPJMN 2017 lebih tinggi dibandingkan TFR rata-rata Nasional yang mencapai 2,38. Tingginya TFR ini berkaitan erat dengan ASFR kelompok umur 15-19 Tahun sebesar 52 (52 kelahiran setiap 1000 wanita). pergeseran usia dengan tingkat fertilitas tertinggi dari usia 20-24 Tahun menjadi usia 25-29 tahun, yang masingmasing mencapai 142 dan 150 kelahiran per 1000 wanita pada masing-masing kelompok. Tingginya ASFR pada kelompok usia muda berpotensi meningkatkan TFR.

By linking 1968-1969 family planning enrollment statistics to 1970 Census county-level data, we test for program effects on the 1969-1970fertility ofsubgroups of women defined by age, race, marital status, two definitions of economic status, and, for whites, the racial composition of their area of residence. A multivariate model to control spurious program effects is developed for wives. The pattern of effects using multiple subgroup comparison provides a weight of evidence indicating significant reductions of marital fertility among low-SES wives served by the program, and no effects on groups not served.