Suchergebnisse

Die EU-Staaten haben sich lange Zeit in die Rolle der "Vasallen" und des "Brückenkopfs" (Brzezinski 1999) gefügt, solange sie sich davon mehr Vor- als Nachteile versprechen konnten. Mit der Ausformung der Europäischen Union zu einem immer kompakteren wirtschaftlichen und finanzpolitischen Machtzentrum wächst auch das Bedürfnis nach einer kohärenteren und durchsetzungsfähigeren regionalen und globalen Interessenwahrnehmung in den internationalen Institutionen, gegenüber anderen Großmächten und regionalen Zusammenschlüssen sowie in gewaltsamen Konflikten, die die Interessen der EU-Staaten tangieren. Dieser Trend wird durch den unilateralen Kurs der Vereinigten Staaten zusätzlich verstärkt, der sich bereits unter der Präsidentschaft Clintons ausformte und unter der Bush-Administration eine bislang nicht gekannte Zuspitzung erfahren hat. Mit der Ablehnung des Kyoto-Protokolls und des Internationalen Strafgerichtshofs, mit der Aufkündigung des ABM-Vertrages, dem Infragestellen des Teststoppabkommens und der Rehabilitierung des Krieges als Mittel der Politik haben die Vereinigten Staaten grundlegende Interessen, Ziele und Standards der EU-Staaten negiert und mithin ihre Gegenwehr herausgefordert. ; The author argues that the "Grand Strategy" of the Bush Administration is not only challenging the international position and interests of the EU and its member states but also the European political and societal identity. In order to cope with this challenge, he suggests to elaborate a coherent and mobilising model for the Common Foreign and Security Policy. He proposes cooperative encouragement of democracy in the world through the democratisation of international relations and support of democratic regimes. The EU has to democratise its own institutions in order to preserve its international credibility. The author criticises that the European Convent has not done enough to define such a model. The "European Security Strategy" can only be the beginning of a process of defining the strategic identity and interests of the European Union.

Variation in the need for military and political support from military allies affects the degree to which foreign economic policies will discriminate in favor of military allies and against adversaries and other countries. Powers in need of such support will pursue discriminatory foreign economic policies in order to change the configuration of domestic interests to favor not only closer economic relations but also closer political relations. By strengthening domestic support for an alliance, policymakers make it more difficult for their allies to renege on alliance commitments. Stronger political relations in turn reinforce the deterrent effect of the alliance. Because the net strategic benefits from closer relations in their case are lower, powers that can go it alone without support from allies will refrain from discriminatory policies. Shifts in strategic need make it possible to explain variation in the links between security considerations and foreign economic policies within alliances over time and also across alliances. British grand strategy in the 1930s illustrates how shifts in strategic need influence the degree to which foreign economic policies discriminate in favor of potential military allies.

Since Ma Ying-jeou assumed the presidency, Taiwan's relations with Mainland China have been profoundly transformed. This article uses the perspective of a grand strategy to interpret and explain Taiwan's new approach to cross-Strait relations. It suggests that Ma's government has adopted a grand strategy of accommodation that uses assurances, confidence building, and economic integration to enhance Taiwan's security. This new grand strategy has both ideational and materialist roots. The article also assesses the preliminary results of Taiwan's new security approach and its future sustainability. (J Contemp China/GIGA)

After ten years of independence, the Republic of Uzbekistan has become a strategic partner of the United States, an unprecedented geopolitical event: for the first time in its history, Central Asia, which for centuries remained on the sidelines of world politics, has found itself in the limelight of the global and regional powers. After twenty years of independent development, the Central Asian countries are still coping with the fundamental task of formulating adequate foreign policy strategies. This article analyzes the strategic interests of Uzbekistan and the constantly changing regional context; there is the opinion that the Republic of Uzbekistan holds prime responsibility for the regional situation. This issue calls for a detailed analysis—here I shall take a look at some of the elements of what is known as the state's Grand Strategy.

Academic grand strategists are very much aware of the importance of, the need for, and situational determinants of grand strategy after a change in the strategic environment, typified by a hot or cold war. The difficulty of predicting the time, importance, or response to the next "significant" period requires a substantial change in American grand strategy. The Obama administration will surely attempt to remedy the "grand strategic deficit" that has plagued U.S. foreign policy for the past 20 years. The participants generally agreed that a solid grand strategy needs to articulate U.S. national interests and threats to those interests, prioritize among threats and opportunities, and address much more seriously the connection between "ends" and "means." A sophisticated discussion of capabilities and available resources has been lacking in recent debates on American grand strategy. The present economic environment and the challenges facing the federal budget over the next couple of decades make it all the more important to better integrate economic considerations into grand strategic planning. Even if the war in Iraq continues on a favorable trajectory and the U.S. military proves able to disengage in a successful manner, the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan will force the Obama administration to forge a new grand strategy in a wartime environment. It is important to remember that the most crucial grand strategic priority in wartime is to win the war currently being fought. Hence, the adoption of a new grand strategy needs to account for this fact and ensure the necessary resources are allocated to defeat the threat most immediate to American national interest. One of the most important challenges for the Obama administration will be to achieve this delicate balance between the short-term requirements of present conflicts and the medium- and long-term demands of any new grand strategy they may adopt.

Wie soll sich Europa zwischen den USA, China und Russland positionieren - angesichts der rasanten geopolitischen Umbrüche stellt sich diese Frage immer drängender. Die größte Unbekannte ist dabei China. Dieser Band analysiert daher, welcher Vision das Reich der Mitte folgt, ob ein Gesamtbild mit klaren politischen Zielsetzungen vorhanden ist und ob diese zu einem stringenten Handlungsstrang führen - kurzum, wie Chinas Grand Strategy der letzten Jahrzehnte aussieht. Ein besonderes Augenmerk liegt dabei auf sicherheits- und verteidungspolitischen Aspekten.

This thesis develops a diagnostic process for policymakers to use when thinking about grand strategy. Drawing upon Alexander George's work about how International Relations (IR) theories could best assist policymakers, the thesis proposes a two-part process that incorporates IR theories into a structured, logical and useful policy analysis framework. There are some daunting practical difficulties in implementing George's proposed approach. This thesis suggests overcoming these by stepping up to a higher level of abstraction to generate three broad types of grand strategy: denial, engagement and reform. This approach makes George's desired policy-relevant knowledge both more feasible to build and more useable by busy policymakers.The thesis has a four-part structure: a thematic review, a cognitive frame development section, a case study section, and a final evaluation section. A critical review determines that the principal function of grand strategy from a policymaking perspective is to create purposeful change and to build the power needed for implementation. An evaluation concerning 'how policymakers think' suggests that the poliheuristic choice decision-making architecture is the preferred policymaking approach. Using this foundation, a grand strategy typology is developed and offensive realism, new liberalism and agentic constructivism operationalized into three schemas suitable to guide policymaking. The schemas are then assessed through an empirical examination of nine case studies.George's general appeal to 'bridge the gap' between theory and practice in policymaking is realised through the populating of a poliheuristic choice model with optimized grand strategy schemas. In this way, George's seminal work in the field has been extended through the development of a diagnostic process that can help policymakers' structure their initial thinking about grand strategy alternatives. The case study analysis demonstrates that the process is applicable to real-world examples; reveals the scope of the three grand strategy types, their dynamics and outcomes; has utility for greater and lesser powers, and non-state actors; and meets George's specifications for a diagnostic process. In this, the thesis cautions against formulating grand strategies using historical analogies or some combination of theoretical perspectives devised using analytical eclecticism.