Suchergebnisse

In 1931, Li Mingrui, a leading member of the Chinese Communist Party, commander-in-chief of the Seventh and Eighth Armies and a close comrade of the present Chinese leader, Deng Xiaoping, was shot as a potential traitor to the revolution. The study discusses the changing attitudes of the Party (before, during and after the Cultural Revolution) towards Li Mingrui. (DÜI-Sen)

published_or_final_version ; Social Work and Social Administration ; Doctoral ; Doctor of Philosophy

This dissertation focuses on the aftermath of the extraordinary political movement in twentieth-century China known as the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. I address the question of how Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership dealt with the legacy of injustices and atrocities committed under Maoist rule in order to reclaim Party legitimacy. To gain a deeper understanding of this tumultuous and immensely complex history, the dissertation takes Guangxi, a province-level region in southern China where widespread organized killings occurred, as a case study. Redress of Mao-era injustices was not straightforward and by no means novel. On the contrary, it formed a salient feature of the Maoist regime's crisis management policies. As early as the Party's Ninth National Congress in 1969, the Party had begun to address injustices stemming from the Cultural Revolution under the guise of "policy fixing." Many measures adopted in the post-1978 era were reminiscent of this earlier period. However, only after Mao's death and the new Party leadership's decision to partially break with the Maoist past, did large-scale rehabilitation campaign begin and the redress for Cultural Revolution injustices reach an unprecedented scope. The redress of past injustices in the post-Mao era was comprehensive and broad. The measures involved included: first, punishing culprits; second, rehabilitating and compensating victims; and third, crafting narratives to interpret the past violence. The retribution against the perpetrators of Mao-era injustices was extensive but modest. Many perpetrators implicated in the atrocities were investigated, but were allowed to assume their responsibility. However, in order to strike a balance between holding on to power and redressing past injustices perpetrated by itself, the CCP leadership deliberately downplayed the role of legal channels of redress while heavily relying on more flexible and lighter administrative means, or even granted amnesty to those willing to engage in some form of truth-telling or confessions. Apart from modest retribution against perpetrators, the Party leadership introduced two types of reparation measures – political rehabilitation and financial reparation – to compensate for the suffering of victims. By way of widely issuing official certificates, the Party and governmental departments granted full rehabilitation to nearly every individual victim. The state also used public commemorative acts, such as holding ceremonial services and erecting tombstones, to further clear the names of victims and restore their public reputation. Only in a few selected cases, however, were victims entitled to these rituals. With regard to financial reparation, instead of setting up a compensation program to remedy the losses of the victims and their families, the Party primarily relied on and developed traditional shanhou (loosely translated into English as "follow-up" or "amelioration") methods, which had limited impact on state finances, to address the political catastrophe. Moreover, along with persistently stressing rehabilitation, the government also attempted to transform the dispensation of financial reparation into an opportunity to compel families of victims to make peace with the past and move on. Official truth inquiries and other responses constitute the third dimension of the redress of Cultural Revolution injustices. However, in Guangxi the process was protracted because inquiries into past violence threatened to hold the veteran leadership, who were still in power, culpable. Only after shifts in the power landscape in the early 1980s, from veteran to new Party leadership, did leaders promote truth inquiries into the past. Thanks to the investigation materials they produced, past atrocities were written into official history and preserved in archives. Howevers, the highly limited publicity of these historical truths and the ambiguity in attributing responsibility continue to pose a threat to social reconciliation.

Currently, there are high emissions and high pollution in the tourism industry around the world, particularly due to carbon emissions from transportation. At the same time, attention is being paid to improving tourism carbon emission efficiency as tourist accommodations and activities consume significant amounts of energy. This article used the slack-based model (SBM) to calculate the tourism carbon emission efficiency in different years and explored its spatiotemporal evolution in the Guangxi region. The factors that affected tourism carbon emission efficiency in Guangxi were selected and examined through Tobit model regression. The results showed that the correlation coefficient of the tourism scale was the largest, reaching 0.6572, making it the variable factor with the greatest impact. The second factor was the tourism industry structure coefficient, which had a correlation coefficient of 0.5688. The impact of tourism industry size and transportation facilities on tourism carbon emission efficiency in Guangxi Province was relatively small, with coefficients of 0.0451 and 0.0357, respectively, i.e., both significance levels were below 0.1, indicating that spatiotemporal evolution can be applied to analyze Guangxi's tourism carbon emission efficiency.

Guangxi Beibu Gulf Port is a crucial window connecting the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, an international passage to ASEAN. This study attempts to take the Guangxi Beibu Gulf Port as the object of study, explore its port competitiveness from the perspectives of resource theory and institutional environment. This study used two sets of data which are official data of thirteen ports in 2010-2016 years and the first hand data collected from the port operators by the self-reported questionnaire.First of all, based on governmental data of thirteen ports including Beibu Gulf Port, Shanghai Port, Yantian Port and etc.from year 2010 to year 2016, the port competitiveness of Guangxi Beibu Gulf Port is comprehensively analyzed by making empirical test about the influence of port resources and institutional environment on port competitiveness, combining with the questionnaire and other first-hand materials. Second, to further valide and explain the findings from official data, this study used self-reported questionnaires to collect first-hand data from the port operators. Analyses of the two sets of data reveal the following findings. 1) the overall competitiveness of Beibu Gulf port is weak; 2) Beibu Gulf port competitiveness and port throughput are positively correlated; 3) the port resources of Beibu Gulf have not all significantly positively affecting the port competitiveness; 4) the institutional environment of Beibu Gulf port has not been able to regulate the relationship between port resources and port competitiveness; 5) the institutional environment of Beibu Gulf port has a positive regulating effect on port competition and port throughput. This study proposes relevant policies and suggestions to improve Beibu Gulf port competitiveness. ; O Guangxi Beibu Gulf Port é um importante porto de entrada para a Rota da Seda Marítima do Século XXI e o Cinturão Económico da Rota da Seda, além de ser um portal internacional para a ASEAN. Este artigo tenta usar o Guangxi Beibu Gulf Port como objeto de pesquisa para explorar a competitividade portuária do porto de Guangxi Beibu Gulf na perspectiva da teoria dos recursos e do ambiente institucional. Este estudo usou dois conjuntos de dados. Dados em primeira mão de operadores portuários coletados por dados oficiais e questionários auto-relatados para 13 portos para 2010-2016. Primeiro, usando os dados oficiais de 13 portos em Beibu Gulf, Shanghai Port e Yantian Port de 2010 a 2016, foi construído um modelo de análise empírica do impacto dos recursos portuários e do ambiente de políticas portuárias na competitividade portuária. Com base no questionário e em outros dados de primeira mão, foi realizada uma análise abrangente da competitividade do porto de Guangxi Beibu Gulf. Em segundo lugar, a fim de aprofundar o estudo e explicar os resultados dos dados oficiais, este estudo utilizou um questionário auto-relatado para coletar dados em primeira mão dos operadores portuários. Os resultados da análise dos dois conjuntos de dados revelaram: 1) A competitividade global do Porto do Golfo de Beibu é fraca; 2) A competitividade do Beibu Gulf Port está positivamente correlacionada com o rendimento do porto; 3) As variáveis dos recursos portuários do Beibu Gulf não afetaram de forma significativa e positiva a competitividade portuária; 4) O ambiente institucional do porto de Beibu Gulf não ajustou significativamente positivamente a relação entre os recursos portuários e a competitividade portuária; 5) O ambiente institucional do Beibu Gulf Port tem um efeito de ajuste positivo na relação entre a concorrência portuária e o rendimento do porto. Com base nisso, este estudo propõe recomendações políticas relevantes para melhorar a competitividade do porto do Golfo de Beibu.

On the 18 April 1936 General Li Zongren gave a stirring, patriotic interview to theCanton Gazette. In the current situation argued Li, China must stand and resist the Japanese since, "despite sacrifices, a war of resistance may pave the way for the regeneration of our nation." He was later even more emphatic, "… a war of resistance is essential for national regeneration." These seem rather prescient remarks in the light of subsequent events; a new type of society did emerge in parts of China during the war against Japan. Perhaps it should be noted in passing that the form of regeneration expedited by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was nevertheless hardly what Li Zongren had in mind in 1936. Indeed, he felt able to endorse it only late in life.

OBJECTIVE: To improve the detection and control of infectious diseases in Guangxi, China. SETTING/PARTICIPANTS: Guangxi province in southwest China has almost 50 million people, of whom approximately 30% reside in urban and 70% in rural areas. There are 12 minority nationality groups living in the region. INTERVENTION: A village doctor reports any infectious disease outbreak to the Reporting Network, which notifies the Service Network to organize the clinical response. This is supported by the Government Network that coordinates the response among the multiple layers of local governments. OUTCOMES: Since 2002 when the Three Networks system was first started, the time from incidence to report has been shortened on average from 30.6 to 7.6 days and the number of cases has increased from slightly less than 5,000 cases/year (4,965) to almost 10,000 cases/year (9,873). Average mortality has decreased from 3.23% to 0.74%. The Three Networks system has been successful in controlling measles outbreaks; and during SARS, when 11 cases came to Guangxi from the neighbouring Guangdong province, there were only 11 additional new cases with no community spread and no spread to medical staff. CONCLUSION: The Three Networks system has played an important role in infectious disease prevention and control in Guangxi province, and may be applicable to other areas with a similar situation.